One of the most notable aspects of the recent Iraqi elections has been the electoral success of the Sadrists. Led by the enigmatic young cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, the Sadrist list formed part of the large, loose alliance of Shi'i religious parties known as the Iraqi National Alliance. The fact that the Sadrist list won 39 out of the coalition's 70 seats has put it in a position to play kingmaker of the next government, and will likely have a marked effect on the next government's program.
Oil policy and relations with the US are two areas where the Sadrist contingent could play a significant role in the next government's program. It is not secret that the Sadr has been one of the most vociferous opponents to the US project in Iraq since 2003. His 39 seats in parliament may be enough to break a governing coalition that shows signs of being too chummy with the Obama administration. For instance, there had been rumors that some in the Iraqi leadership had wanted to slow down the American withdrawal, even postpone it indefinitely. If any future PM pulls a stunt like that, he can expect to see Sadr's 39 MPs walk out.
Oil policy is another important aspect of the next government's program that the Sadrist trend has been highly critical of. The current hydrocarbon legislation is deadlocked (really two competing Kurdish and Ministry of Oil sponsored bills that appear to be irreconciliable), and likely has no chance of passing in its current form as long as the Sadrists have a say about it. The Sadrists have expressed a strong current of resource nationalism, are suspicious of foreign oil companies operating in Iraq, and vehemently oppose the use of Production Sharing Agreements (in which oil companies acquire equity in Iraqi oil). The Kurdish draft law actively encourages them, while the centralized Ministry of Oil draft version doesn't explicitly prohibit them (none of the recent oil deals signed between the central government and international oil companies have used the controversial PSA as their contract model). In short, passing any type of neoliberal hydrocarbon law is a pipe dream as long as the Sadrists control 39 seats in parliament, and will have a great amount of leverage in terms of selecting the next prime minister. Undoubtedly, one can expect the policies of the upcoming government to be decidedly more nationalist in nature.
Monday, April 19, 2010
Friday, April 16, 2010
The Limitations of National Unity Governments
Many hoped that the recent national elections in Iraq would shake up the balance of power that has prevailed in Baghdad since 2005 by ushering in some new parties and producing a coalition government with a greater degree of ideological coherence. In this context, recent developments in the post-election negotiation phase provide reasons for disappointment.
One of the many problems with the 2006-2010 government was that it included so many parties with conflicting ideologies. It may have been a "national unity" government in name, but it was incoherent ideologically. It included the main Shi'i religious parties, Prime Minister Maliki's Da'wa, the Kurdish Alliance, and the Sunni-led Tawafuq bloc. Since there was virtually nothing binding these blocs together besides the desire to cling to power, the government has not managed to accomplish much in the last four years.
Though former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's bloc faired the best in the recent elections (winning 91 out of 325 seats), he will not be forming the next government. A supreme court ruling has decided that the leader of the largest bloc in parliament is to be designated with forming a government, and that blocs can form after the election. This means that al-Maliki's bloc (State of Law, which finished second with 89 seats) can merge with the third place finisher (the INA, collection of Shi'i religious parties). Throw in the Kurdish Alliance, and you have yourselves the necessary number of parliamentary seats to form a government. But because Maliki has made so many enemies within the INA and Kurdish blocs during his tenure as PM, it is likely that he will not be nominated as the new PM if a State of Law + INA + Kurdish Alliance coalition emerges.
What's wrong with this potential coalition? Nothing, except it is the same coalition that has dominated Iraqi politics since 2005. And it excludes the bloc that finished first in the elections (Allawi has said he will not join such a coalition).
The ironic part about all this is that the two top finishers in the recent elections - Maliki and Allawi's blocs - are quite ideologically coherent. Both favor a strong central government, talk in nationalist terms, and are perceived as less sectarian than their rivals. Yet, a fierce personal rivalry has prevented them from reaching an accord and has forced each to turn to less logical alliance partners.
Though grandiose "national unity" governments that comprise as many blocs as possible may sound normal and fair, they often come at the expense of ideological coherence. That is precisely what happened from 2006 to 2010, and it is happening again today. The real losers in all of this are the millions of Iraqis who value a state capable of delivering security, jobs and services over a state based on ethno-sectarian quotas.
One of the many problems with the 2006-2010 government was that it included so many parties with conflicting ideologies. It may have been a "national unity" government in name, but it was incoherent ideologically. It included the main Shi'i religious parties, Prime Minister Maliki's Da'wa, the Kurdish Alliance, and the Sunni-led Tawafuq bloc. Since there was virtually nothing binding these blocs together besides the desire to cling to power, the government has not managed to accomplish much in the last four years.
Though former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's bloc faired the best in the recent elections (winning 91 out of 325 seats), he will not be forming the next government. A supreme court ruling has decided that the leader of the largest bloc in parliament is to be designated with forming a government, and that blocs can form after the election. This means that al-Maliki's bloc (State of Law, which finished second with 89 seats) can merge with the third place finisher (the INA, collection of Shi'i religious parties). Throw in the Kurdish Alliance, and you have yourselves the necessary number of parliamentary seats to form a government. But because Maliki has made so many enemies within the INA and Kurdish blocs during his tenure as PM, it is likely that he will not be nominated as the new PM if a State of Law + INA + Kurdish Alliance coalition emerges.
What's wrong with this potential coalition? Nothing, except it is the same coalition that has dominated Iraqi politics since 2005. And it excludes the bloc that finished first in the elections (Allawi has said he will not join such a coalition).
The ironic part about all this is that the two top finishers in the recent elections - Maliki and Allawi's blocs - are quite ideologically coherent. Both favor a strong central government, talk in nationalist terms, and are perceived as less sectarian than their rivals. Yet, a fierce personal rivalry has prevented them from reaching an accord and has forced each to turn to less logical alliance partners.
Though grandiose "national unity" governments that comprise as many blocs as possible may sound normal and fair, they often come at the expense of ideological coherence. That is precisely what happened from 2006 to 2010, and it is happening again today. The real losers in all of this are the millions of Iraqis who value a state capable of delivering security, jobs and services over a state based on ethno-sectarian quotas.
Saturday, April 10, 2010
Baradei and the MB
Within US policy circles, the Muslim Brotherhood is often spoken of in somewhat of a hushed tone, often times in conjunction with ominous phrases like "Islamo-fascism" or "jihadi extremism."
I was therefore dismayed but not surprised to read Foreign Policy's most recent take on the political situation currently playing out in Egypt. Mohamed el-Baradei's "commitment to liberal reform" is questionable, writes Ilan Berman, because (and here's where the hushed tone comes in) he has been "flirting with the Muslim Brotherhood." This "flirtation" is in reference to Baradei's outreach to the Muslim Brotherhood (and virtually every other opposition group and party within Egypt) in his effort to cobble together a coalition for political reform -- what he has called "The National Coalition for Change." Berman goes on to explain that the Muslim Brotherhood is "the world's most influential font of radical Islamic ideas" and that, as a result, "if the Brotherhood is joining a coalition committed to political liberalism, it's clearly not for ideological reasons." There were lots of other factual inaccuracies, analytical shortcomings, and gross mis-characterizations in the essay -- but I'll spare you.
Ilan Berman, as far as I could tell, seems to have limited expertise in local Egyptian politics (indeed there seems to be quite a trend these days of alleged Egypt 'experts' writing dispassionately about the upcoming elections). It was therefore an incredible relief to find that Foreign Policy had also published an eloquent and thorough rebuttal of Berman's article, which effectively debunked every single statement made in the piece. Samer Shehata, a professor at Georgetown, is actually an Egypt expert, having spent extensive time living and researching in the country. He has an impressive understanding of domestic politics and the various political actors in the country -- and it shows in his response.
I won't elaborate the various points Shehata makes, as they are stated better by him. His broad critique, however, is that the Muslim Brotherhood is "far from the radical threat portrayed by Berman" and that in fact it is a diverse Islamist movement with a history that extends back farther even than the current regime and that it's role in Egyptian politics is incredibly complex.
The latter is a point that is far too infrequently made in Washington (or anywhere in the US, besides the odd university seminar room). The 'hushed-tone' attitude surrounding the Muslim Brotherhood is really unfortunate. The movement certainly has had violent episodes in its past and there are factions in it today that espouse a more uncompromising bent of political Islam. But the Muslim Brotherhood is also arguably one of the most moderate Islamist groups in the Middle East today and many of its members are open-minded, well-educated professionals who are happy to embrace and participate in a liberal political system. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a genuine, well-functioning democracy in Egypt that does not include, in some shape or form, an MB-based party. In order for Baradei's reform project to have any credibility or mass support he needs the Muslim Brotherhood's blessing, and he is therefore wise to reach out to its leaders and include them in his coalition. Unfortunately the policy wonks in Washington (who claim to want democracy for Egypt) tend to avoid this inconvenient reality and choose instead to paint the Muslim Brotherhood with the same broad "Islamo-fascism" brush that is reserved for any Islamically-oriented political group.
A final point: these sort of ill-informed 'analyses' are unfortunately a common occurrence in much of the writing on the Middle East by think tank experts, policymakers, and even journalists. This fact is well known and often-decried among professors and grad students in the ME Studies departments of US universities. There is a disdain for the policymaking community's myopic focus on current events and an assumption that much of this analysis is conducted without any real depth of understanding. This is a fair criticism. But what is truly maddening is that most of these individuals -- who have the understanding and nuanced insight necessary to effectively combat these flawed accounts -- don't ever respond. Samer Shehata is a well-respected academic whose work on Egyptian labour is some of the best on the subject. And yet here he is, getting his hands dirty in the policymaking realm to make sure that poor articles like Berman's do not go unanswered. It's too bad that more professors of ME studies don't take it upon themselves to do the same.
I was therefore dismayed but not surprised to read Foreign Policy's most recent take on the political situation currently playing out in Egypt. Mohamed el-Baradei's "commitment to liberal reform" is questionable, writes Ilan Berman, because (and here's where the hushed tone comes in) he has been "flirting with the Muslim Brotherhood." This "flirtation" is in reference to Baradei's outreach to the Muslim Brotherhood (and virtually every other opposition group and party within Egypt) in his effort to cobble together a coalition for political reform -- what he has called "The National Coalition for Change." Berman goes on to explain that the Muslim Brotherhood is "the world's most influential font of radical Islamic ideas" and that, as a result, "if the Brotherhood is joining a coalition committed to political liberalism, it's clearly not for ideological reasons." There were lots of other factual inaccuracies, analytical shortcomings, and gross mis-characterizations in the essay -- but I'll spare you.
Ilan Berman, as far as I could tell, seems to have limited expertise in local Egyptian politics (indeed there seems to be quite a trend these days of alleged Egypt 'experts' writing dispassionately about the upcoming elections). It was therefore an incredible relief to find that Foreign Policy had also published an eloquent and thorough rebuttal of Berman's article, which effectively debunked every single statement made in the piece. Samer Shehata, a professor at Georgetown, is actually an Egypt expert, having spent extensive time living and researching in the country. He has an impressive understanding of domestic politics and the various political actors in the country -- and it shows in his response.
I won't elaborate the various points Shehata makes, as they are stated better by him. His broad critique, however, is that the Muslim Brotherhood is "far from the radical threat portrayed by Berman" and that in fact it is a diverse Islamist movement with a history that extends back farther even than the current regime and that it's role in Egyptian politics is incredibly complex.
The latter is a point that is far too infrequently made in Washington (or anywhere in the US, besides the odd university seminar room). The 'hushed-tone' attitude surrounding the Muslim Brotherhood is really unfortunate. The movement certainly has had violent episodes in its past and there are factions in it today that espouse a more uncompromising bent of political Islam. But the Muslim Brotherhood is also arguably one of the most moderate Islamist groups in the Middle East today and many of its members are open-minded, well-educated professionals who are happy to embrace and participate in a liberal political system. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a genuine, well-functioning democracy in Egypt that does not include, in some shape or form, an MB-based party. In order for Baradei's reform project to have any credibility or mass support he needs the Muslim Brotherhood's blessing, and he is therefore wise to reach out to its leaders and include them in his coalition. Unfortunately the policy wonks in Washington (who claim to want democracy for Egypt) tend to avoid this inconvenient reality and choose instead to paint the Muslim Brotherhood with the same broad "Islamo-fascism" brush that is reserved for any Islamically-oriented political group.
A final point: these sort of ill-informed 'analyses' are unfortunately a common occurrence in much of the writing on the Middle East by think tank experts, policymakers, and even journalists. This fact is well known and often-decried among professors and grad students in the ME Studies departments of US universities. There is a disdain for the policymaking community's myopic focus on current events and an assumption that much of this analysis is conducted without any real depth of understanding. This is a fair criticism. But what is truly maddening is that most of these individuals -- who have the understanding and nuanced insight necessary to effectively combat these flawed accounts -- don't ever respond. Samer Shehata is a well-respected academic whose work on Egyptian labour is some of the best on the subject. And yet here he is, getting his hands dirty in the policymaking realm to make sure that poor articles like Berman's do not go unanswered. It's too bad that more professors of ME studies don't take it upon themselves to do the same.
Friday, March 12, 2010
Discussing the Vibrancy of a Democracy
Many of the news accounts and commentary I've seen covering the recent Iraqi elections have been emphasizing how "smoothly" the process transpired, and how the competitiveness during the campaign, coupled with the high voter turnout (about 62%) and the relatively low level of violence on election day signal the health of Iraq's democracy. Somehow we are supposed to acknowledge the fact that "only" about 40 people were killed in election day violence and that "only" a handful of candidates were assassinated on election day indicates that the country is approaching something resembling normalcy. Something tells me the bar is being set a bit low here.
The fact is that many of these commentaries and op-eds seem to be paying attention to superficial signs of progress. Ubiquitous campaign posters hung alongside the streets are not signs of a vibrant democracy. And though the absence of large-scale violence on an election day is a necessary condition for a functioning democracy, it is certainly not sufficient. So what are the key questions stemming from the recent election that may indicate some sort of progress?
Most important are questions of the rule of law and transcending the sectarian political dynamic that has governed power relations in Iraq since 2003. The lack of the former was exposed prior to the elections when it became clear that a legally-dubious de-Baathification committee could disqualify over 400 candidates for alleged ties with Baathists. The Iraqi institutional framework demonstrated its incapacity to deal with these problems in a legitimate way by not providing any sort of checks and balances to this process.
As for judging whether progress has been made in transcending the salience of identity politics in Iraq, the election results may provide some indication. The top two coalitions appear to be Nuri al-Maliki's 'State of Law' and Iyad Allawi's 'Iraqiyya'. Three questions to keep in mind are: can Maliki make inroads into some Sunni majority provinces in Iraq's center and north? And can Allawi make any inroads into some Shi'i majority provinces in Iraq's south? If the answer in both cases is a yes, then there may be a chance that Iraqi voters are eschewing identity politics and voting on substantive issues. As results filter in through the next week, the answers to these questions will become clearer.
One more thing: when talking about democracy in this context, it's important to recognize that we're talking about a particular kind of democracy - a democracy as we conceive of it in the U.S. This particular conception of democracy emphasizes individual rights like voting rights, elections, property rights, etc. It should be recognized that this conception of democracy is not universal. Other conceptions of democracy stress more substantive issues like the need for strong institutions, social services, clean water, electricity, etc. If these basic human needs aren't met, why should anyone care about the political process? Hence the need to transcend the prevalence of identity politics and start making the debate about substantive issues.
The fact is that many of these commentaries and op-eds seem to be paying attention to superficial signs of progress. Ubiquitous campaign posters hung alongside the streets are not signs of a vibrant democracy. And though the absence of large-scale violence on an election day is a necessary condition for a functioning democracy, it is certainly not sufficient. So what are the key questions stemming from the recent election that may indicate some sort of progress?
Most important are questions of the rule of law and transcending the sectarian political dynamic that has governed power relations in Iraq since 2003. The lack of the former was exposed prior to the elections when it became clear that a legally-dubious de-Baathification committee could disqualify over 400 candidates for alleged ties with Baathists. The Iraqi institutional framework demonstrated its incapacity to deal with these problems in a legitimate way by not providing any sort of checks and balances to this process.
As for judging whether progress has been made in transcending the salience of identity politics in Iraq, the election results may provide some indication. The top two coalitions appear to be Nuri al-Maliki's 'State of Law' and Iyad Allawi's 'Iraqiyya'. Three questions to keep in mind are: can Maliki make inroads into some Sunni majority provinces in Iraq's center and north? And can Allawi make any inroads into some Shi'i majority provinces in Iraq's south? If the answer in both cases is a yes, then there may be a chance that Iraqi voters are eschewing identity politics and voting on substantive issues. As results filter in through the next week, the answers to these questions will become clearer.
One more thing: when talking about democracy in this context, it's important to recognize that we're talking about a particular kind of democracy - a democracy as we conceive of it in the U.S. This particular conception of democracy emphasizes individual rights like voting rights, elections, property rights, etc. It should be recognized that this conception of democracy is not universal. Other conceptions of democracy stress more substantive issues like the need for strong institutions, social services, clean water, electricity, etc. If these basic human needs aren't met, why should anyone care about the political process? Hence the need to transcend the prevalence of identity politics and start making the debate about substantive issues.
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
A Nuclear Middle East
Nuclear is all the rage these days. Barack Obama's election in the United States and the recent climate change summit in Copenhagen have sparked a global rush into nuclear energy, with countries from El Salvador to Ghana to Mongolia declaring their intention to build nuclear power plants. Nuclear energy is a much cleaner (though also more expensive and potentially dangerous) form of energy than oil, gas, and coal and it can produce far more electricity than wind, solar, or hydro. The combination of these factors makes nuclear a popular option for governments seeking to wean themselves off dependence on fossil fuels.
The Middle East has not missed out on this fad. Beginning in the middle of the last decade, governments in the region abandoned their policies of striving for a nuclear-free Middle East (excepting Israel) as six countries announced their intention to build civil nuclear programs. As of today, the countries in the region that have voiced interest in establishing nuclear energy capabilities are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. It is a pretty comprehensive list: the only countries that have not yet expressed interest are Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq.
The question of nuclear energy in the Middle East has resurfaced again in the past weeks. The United Arab Emirates recently placed its first order for a nuclear reactor with a consortium of Korean companies, following a fierce, year-long round of bidding. Israel says it wants to build a third nuclear power plant, in conjunction with its Jordanian neighbors (though the Jordanians say the project will not move forward until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved...). Syria, too, recently reaffirmed its desire for a reactor (no one really knows whether Syria already built one with North Korea's help, only to have it destroyed by the Israelis in September 2007). Meanwhile, Egypt claims to be making progress on finding a site for its first nuclear plant.
So the region is abuzz with nuclear activity. But this article in Daedalus, part of a series on nuclear power, says that not only are most of these countries incapable of building nuclear power plants in the near future, their justifications for wanting them are also implausible.
On the feasibility point, there are two major hurdles that must be overcome before a state can buy a nuclear reactor: cost and grid capacity. The article states that in order to afford a nuclear reactor, which these days costs at least a few billion US dollars, a country must have a GDP of at least $50 billion. Then, in addition, its electricity grid must have a minimum of 10 gigawatts in order to accommodate a large reactor.
These criteria narrow the list of potential nuclear states in the region from eighteen down to five: Egypt, Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria.
But the reasons these countries have given for wanting nuclear power do not hold up under scrutiny. Energy security is the most common justification. Consider the UAE, which based its plea for nuclear power on its rapidly rising electricity demand and its inability to meet this demand with natural gas imported from Qatar. A nuclear option would allow the country to be self-sufficient, with nuclear power eventually providing 25% of all electricity. Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria have all made similar arguments.
But as the Daedalus article makes clear, all of these countries have more than adequate access to fossil fuels or other sources of power within their borders, giving them the potential to produce sufficient electricity for decades to come. In Egypt, natural gas supplies could power the country for 43 years. In Turkey, vast hydro resources, if harnessed effectively, could provide just as much electricity as nuclear reactors -- potentially forever. Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, have oil and/or natural gas reserves capable of providing electricity to their people for 43, 66, and 100 years, respectively. By the time fossil fuels come close to running out, either nuclear will be so cheap that it will be easily adoptable or (more likely) there will be myriad renewable energy alternatives, especially in countries with abundant sunlight.
So why the rush into nuclear power, an expensive and politically fraught energy source, when it isn't really necessary? The article poses two answers. First, nuclear energy confers a degree of international credibility on a country, especially in the developing world. Since the 1950s, a nuclear program has been seen as a sign of a country's entry into the developed world -- this is what motivated Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Libya to seek nuclear options. A nuclear program is a mark of honor, a way of stimulating national pride -- and the rhetoric used by Middle Eastern regimes to describe their nuclear ambitions suggest that leaders will have no qualms using nuclear energy for this end.
Moreover, a nuclear program -- even for civilian purposes -- can create a certain strategic deterrent for neighboring countries, especially if the state in question develops its own enrichment capabilities. Japan, though not an officially recognized nuclear-weapon state, could probably build such a weapon within days if it wanted to. Middle Eastern states may be watching Iran's progress in its nuclear program and calculating that they, too, should probably get into the game.
A civilian program therefore provides both international credibility and a foot in the nuclear-weapons door. The important question is whether anyone -- either inside or outside the region -- would want to have the feet of eighteen Middle Eastern states eventually wedged in that door.
The Middle East has not missed out on this fad. Beginning in the middle of the last decade, governments in the region abandoned their policies of striving for a nuclear-free Middle East (excepting Israel) as six countries announced their intention to build civil nuclear programs. As of today, the countries in the region that have voiced interest in establishing nuclear energy capabilities are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. It is a pretty comprehensive list: the only countries that have not yet expressed interest are Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq.
The question of nuclear energy in the Middle East has resurfaced again in the past weeks. The United Arab Emirates recently placed its first order for a nuclear reactor with a consortium of Korean companies, following a fierce, year-long round of bidding. Israel says it wants to build a third nuclear power plant, in conjunction with its Jordanian neighbors (though the Jordanians say the project will not move forward until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved...). Syria, too, recently reaffirmed its desire for a reactor (no one really knows whether Syria already built one with North Korea's help, only to have it destroyed by the Israelis in September 2007). Meanwhile, Egypt claims to be making progress on finding a site for its first nuclear plant.
So the region is abuzz with nuclear activity. But this article in Daedalus, part of a series on nuclear power, says that not only are most of these countries incapable of building nuclear power plants in the near future, their justifications for wanting them are also implausible.
On the feasibility point, there are two major hurdles that must be overcome before a state can buy a nuclear reactor: cost and grid capacity. The article states that in order to afford a nuclear reactor, which these days costs at least a few billion US dollars, a country must have a GDP of at least $50 billion. Then, in addition, its electricity grid must have a minimum of 10 gigawatts in order to accommodate a large reactor.
These criteria narrow the list of potential nuclear states in the region from eighteen down to five: Egypt, Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria.
But the reasons these countries have given for wanting nuclear power do not hold up under scrutiny. Energy security is the most common justification. Consider the UAE, which based its plea for nuclear power on its rapidly rising electricity demand and its inability to meet this demand with natural gas imported from Qatar. A nuclear option would allow the country to be self-sufficient, with nuclear power eventually providing 25% of all electricity. Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria have all made similar arguments.
But as the Daedalus article makes clear, all of these countries have more than adequate access to fossil fuels or other sources of power within their borders, giving them the potential to produce sufficient electricity for decades to come. In Egypt, natural gas supplies could power the country for 43 years. In Turkey, vast hydro resources, if harnessed effectively, could provide just as much electricity as nuclear reactors -- potentially forever. Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, have oil and/or natural gas reserves capable of providing electricity to their people for 43, 66, and 100 years, respectively. By the time fossil fuels come close to running out, either nuclear will be so cheap that it will be easily adoptable or (more likely) there will be myriad renewable energy alternatives, especially in countries with abundant sunlight.
So why the rush into nuclear power, an expensive and politically fraught energy source, when it isn't really necessary? The article poses two answers. First, nuclear energy confers a degree of international credibility on a country, especially in the developing world. Since the 1950s, a nuclear program has been seen as a sign of a country's entry into the developed world -- this is what motivated Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Libya to seek nuclear options. A nuclear program is a mark of honor, a way of stimulating national pride -- and the rhetoric used by Middle Eastern regimes to describe their nuclear ambitions suggest that leaders will have no qualms using nuclear energy for this end.
Moreover, a nuclear program -- even for civilian purposes -- can create a certain strategic deterrent for neighboring countries, especially if the state in question develops its own enrichment capabilities. Japan, though not an officially recognized nuclear-weapon state, could probably build such a weapon within days if it wanted to. Middle Eastern states may be watching Iran's progress in its nuclear program and calculating that they, too, should probably get into the game.
A civilian program therefore provides both international credibility and a foot in the nuclear-weapons door. The important question is whether anyone -- either inside or outside the region -- would want to have the feet of eighteen Middle Eastern states eventually wedged in that door.
Sunday, March 7, 2010
Nir Rosen on "Iraq's New Order"
With the Iraqi national elections taking place this weekend, there has been (comparatively) extensive coverage in the New York Times and Washington Post during the last few days concerning the multiplicity of meanings and implications the poll results could have on Iraq's future. Many of these reports have been warning of possible outbreaks of sectarian violence as a result of perceived Sunni disenfranchisement. In this context, I think it's helpful to consider Nir Rosen's latest piece in The National on why these fears of revived sectarianism and civil war are overblown.
Nir Rosen - a prominent freelance journalist and currently a fellow at NYU's Center on Law and Security - has written extensively on Iraq since 2003. His language skills and cultural savvy give him access to Iraqi society at the grass roots level. Instead of staying within the comparatively safe confines of Baghdad's Green Zone and reporting on political squabbles among the Iraqi elite, Rosen is able to venture into communities throughout the country and pays attention to ordinary people as well as the atmosphere in neighborhoods, villages and mosques.
According to Rosen, his latest trip to Iraq last month made it evident that the intense fear that led Iraqis to seek the protection of gangs and sectarian militias in the past has begun to dissipate. He concludes by asserting that fears of further sectarian violence are overblown, and that the threat of Iraq's civil war being revived no longer looms. The following is a brief summary of what leads him to these conclusions.
Most importantly, the power relations between sectarian militias and the Iraqi security forces has changed drastically in the last two years. No longer can militias and gangs roam the streets unchecked by state authority. Though they still exist to one extent or another, they're immasculated and outmatched by the much strengthened Iraqi security forces. Since these militias can't hold territory anymore, and can't work around the ubiquitous security checkpoints, violence is limited to mortar attacks and the occasional spectacular car or suicide bombing.
Furthermore, Rosen notes the widespread feeling of indifference among Sunni Arabs in Baghdad, Diyala and Anbar provinces. Whereas their sense of injustice and disenfranchisement from 2003 through 2008 led to forms of contestation expressed through violence, today Sunni Arabs seem "downright docile". The banning of prominent Sunni politicians like Saleh al-Mutlak from this weekend's elections caused concern that it would precipitate a Sunni boycott or a return to sectarian violence. Neither has materialized so far. Similarly, the idea that failing to integrate the Sunni Arab Awakening groups into the Iraqi security forces would lead to a revival in the insurgency proved unfounded as well. In short, Sunni Arabs seem resigned to their fate of disenfranchisement and are no longer willing to contest it through violence.
Rosen also notes how many ordinary Iraqis associate the Shi'i religious parties with sectarianism and thus prefer the more nationalist-leaning Maliki or Allawi. This makes sense given that Rosen was traveling primarily around Baghdad and the surrounding provinces of Diyala (just northeast of Baghdad), Babil, and Salahuddin. However, the election may be won or lost in the critical province of Basra, home to the third largest city in Iraq after Baghdad and Mosul. In Basra, Maliki has to compete with the Iraqi National Alliance (the list that includes many of the largest Shi'i religious parties).
Rosen's reporting is refreshing due to its detailed coverage of the mundane and subaltern. Most importantly, this piece underscores the point that the saliency of sectarianism in Iraq has varied significantly throughout its history. Since 2003, one gets the sense from the media that sectarian tensions in Iraq are something primordial and inherent. This piece does a good job in terms of belying these flawed assumptions.
Given the amount of hysteria out there concerning the de-Bathification controversy and the supposedly rising sectarian tensions, Rosen's perspective certainly offers some valuable insight into developments, attitudes, and the saliency of sectarianism outside of the Green Zone.
Nir Rosen - a prominent freelance journalist and currently a fellow at NYU's Center on Law and Security - has written extensively on Iraq since 2003. His language skills and cultural savvy give him access to Iraqi society at the grass roots level. Instead of staying within the comparatively safe confines of Baghdad's Green Zone and reporting on political squabbles among the Iraqi elite, Rosen is able to venture into communities throughout the country and pays attention to ordinary people as well as the atmosphere in neighborhoods, villages and mosques.
According to Rosen, his latest trip to Iraq last month made it evident that the intense fear that led Iraqis to seek the protection of gangs and sectarian militias in the past has begun to dissipate. He concludes by asserting that fears of further sectarian violence are overblown, and that the threat of Iraq's civil war being revived no longer looms. The following is a brief summary of what leads him to these conclusions.
Most importantly, the power relations between sectarian militias and the Iraqi security forces has changed drastically in the last two years. No longer can militias and gangs roam the streets unchecked by state authority. Though they still exist to one extent or another, they're immasculated and outmatched by the much strengthened Iraqi security forces. Since these militias can't hold territory anymore, and can't work around the ubiquitous security checkpoints, violence is limited to mortar attacks and the occasional spectacular car or suicide bombing.
Furthermore, Rosen notes the widespread feeling of indifference among Sunni Arabs in Baghdad, Diyala and Anbar provinces. Whereas their sense of injustice and disenfranchisement from 2003 through 2008 led to forms of contestation expressed through violence, today Sunni Arabs seem "downright docile". The banning of prominent Sunni politicians like Saleh al-Mutlak from this weekend's elections caused concern that it would precipitate a Sunni boycott or a return to sectarian violence. Neither has materialized so far. Similarly, the idea that failing to integrate the Sunni Arab Awakening groups into the Iraqi security forces would lead to a revival in the insurgency proved unfounded as well. In short, Sunni Arabs seem resigned to their fate of disenfranchisement and are no longer willing to contest it through violence.
Rosen also notes how many ordinary Iraqis associate the Shi'i religious parties with sectarianism and thus prefer the more nationalist-leaning Maliki or Allawi. This makes sense given that Rosen was traveling primarily around Baghdad and the surrounding provinces of Diyala (just northeast of Baghdad), Babil, and Salahuddin. However, the election may be won or lost in the critical province of Basra, home to the third largest city in Iraq after Baghdad and Mosul. In Basra, Maliki has to compete with the Iraqi National Alliance (the list that includes many of the largest Shi'i religious parties).
Rosen's reporting is refreshing due to its detailed coverage of the mundane and subaltern. Most importantly, this piece underscores the point that the saliency of sectarianism in Iraq has varied significantly throughout its history. Since 2003, one gets the sense from the media that sectarian tensions in Iraq are something primordial and inherent. This piece does a good job in terms of belying these flawed assumptions.
Given the amount of hysteria out there concerning the de-Bathification controversy and the supposedly rising sectarian tensions, Rosen's perspective certainly offers some valuable insight into developments, attitudes, and the saliency of sectarianism outside of the Green Zone.
For Those of You Who Enjoy a Good Conspiracy…
Yeah I know: typically conspiracies are the topics of fantasy and belong within the realm of literary fiction, not area studies. But in the case of Turkey, conspiracy theories, at least in recent years, have found a bit more merit than elsewhere. Thus, I present to you, the story of Ergenekon. For many of you, as it was for me until recently, the name probably means little. However, for the Turk’s that may be reading this, it represents the story/case that has been omnipresent in Turkish media for the better part of the last three years.
But first, a short history of Turkey:
The Turkish Republic was founded following World War I upon the principles of (among others) nationalism and secularism, despite possessing almost an entirely Muslim population. Obviously, some issues ensued, namely how the secularism was to be upheld by the government and to what extent religion was to present in government affairs. Consequently, the twentieth century represented a continuing struggle of balancing both Islam and secularism in the country. As with any other political struggle, there is of course a spectrum of participants in the debate. There are the ultra-secularists and the corresponding ultra-Islamists and the moderate left and right leaning groups in-between. But for all intents and purposes, Turkey still possesses a constitution that defines it as a secular nation and includes provisions to limit the influence of Islam on government affairs and within the public sphere.
Here’s where the issue arises: In November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (or by the Turkish acronym, AKP) was elected into power by a decisive vote in the Turkish general election. The AKP is also an Islamist political party. Much to the collective dismay of the secularist fringe, the AKP proved to be both an effective and pragmatic political institution. In the past, Islamist political parties had come to power, the Welfare Party of the 1990s being an example. However, the Welfare Party did not command the same level of pragmatism that the AKP would later have and pushed their Islamic agenda a little too far. Long story short, in 1997 there was a coup (described as “post-modernist” by many scholars as there was no actual take over by the military but merely the threat of one) on the part of the secular, military elite that removed Welfare from power.
The AKP of the twenty-first century took a different approach. Continuing the successful social programs of the Welfare Party while also dialing down their outward Islamic approach, the AKP commanded a high level of popularity and an effective government. Their platform has been shaped by the recent surge on the part of the Turkish Republic to gain entry into the European Union, and many citizens have backed them in this approach.
Despite the AKP’s popularity and pragmatic approach, there is still a significant contingent of the population that wishes to see such a party with Islamist roots removed from power. As shown above in the case of the coup that brought down the Welfare Party, this secularist segment of society has also traditionally held the majority in the military, namely at its most elite levels. I’m pretty sure you can see where I’m going with this.
The word “Ergenekon” is a reference to a legend about the genesis of the Turkish people and is the suspected name of a criminal organization within Turkey that has slowly but surely been linked to members of the government at the highest levels. According to the formal indictment that was brought against the members of the group, its intention was to bring about as much chaos as possible in Turkey in order to justify yet another military coup (there have already been four since 1923). The investigation and its consequent trial have been referred to as the case of the century, having exposed a shady and somewhat disturbing conspiracy to control and shape the progression of a government and society that has tried several times to prove to the world its commitment to democracy.
For example, the original indictment that was brought against the organization by the government in the summer of 2008 outlined a number of different plots that had a number of high profile targets in mind. These featured both the current Prime Minister of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the world-renowned novelist and Pulitzer Prize winner, Orhan Pamuk. In addition, murders that had already been committed and the bombing of a newspaper were included in the charges. The campaign of destabilization had raged throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century and, despite the open investigation, is believed to continue until the present day.
Just this past week, another indictment was submitted to a Turkish High Criminal Court implicating 3rd Army Commander Gen. Saldıray Berk and 12 other suspects in a plot to frame the police force in the city of Erzincan. Weaponry had been planted near a dam in the city as a means of discrediting the police department and raising suspicions of its actions. What would this accomplish, you ask? Well, the Erzincan Police Department has been aiding prosecutors in the Ergenekon investigation. Furthermore, Erzincan possesses a diverse group of peoples, featuring Sunnis, Alevis, Kurds, and the plotters believed that fragmentation of public opinion made it more susceptible to manipulation. Despite the failure of many of the efforts of Ergenekon, the plots as exposed in the indictments cited above, if they are in fact completely true, are a bit frightening in their precision and calculation. One can only hope that conspiracies like this one can be uncovered and stopped before they can succeed, not merely for the lives that are immediately at risk, but also for the threat it poses to the democracy of the Turkish people generally.
But first, a short history of Turkey:
The Turkish Republic was founded following World War I upon the principles of (among others) nationalism and secularism, despite possessing almost an entirely Muslim population. Obviously, some issues ensued, namely how the secularism was to be upheld by the government and to what extent religion was to present in government affairs. Consequently, the twentieth century represented a continuing struggle of balancing both Islam and secularism in the country. As with any other political struggle, there is of course a spectrum of participants in the debate. There are the ultra-secularists and the corresponding ultra-Islamists and the moderate left and right leaning groups in-between. But for all intents and purposes, Turkey still possesses a constitution that defines it as a secular nation and includes provisions to limit the influence of Islam on government affairs and within the public sphere.
Here’s where the issue arises: In November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (or by the Turkish acronym, AKP) was elected into power by a decisive vote in the Turkish general election. The AKP is also an Islamist political party. Much to the collective dismay of the secularist fringe, the AKP proved to be both an effective and pragmatic political institution. In the past, Islamist political parties had come to power, the Welfare Party of the 1990s being an example. However, the Welfare Party did not command the same level of pragmatism that the AKP would later have and pushed their Islamic agenda a little too far. Long story short, in 1997 there was a coup (described as “post-modernist” by many scholars as there was no actual take over by the military but merely the threat of one) on the part of the secular, military elite that removed Welfare from power.
The AKP of the twenty-first century took a different approach. Continuing the successful social programs of the Welfare Party while also dialing down their outward Islamic approach, the AKP commanded a high level of popularity and an effective government. Their platform has been shaped by the recent surge on the part of the Turkish Republic to gain entry into the European Union, and many citizens have backed them in this approach.
Despite the AKP’s popularity and pragmatic approach, there is still a significant contingent of the population that wishes to see such a party with Islamist roots removed from power. As shown above in the case of the coup that brought down the Welfare Party, this secularist segment of society has also traditionally held the majority in the military, namely at its most elite levels. I’m pretty sure you can see where I’m going with this.
The word “Ergenekon” is a reference to a legend about the genesis of the Turkish people and is the suspected name of a criminal organization within Turkey that has slowly but surely been linked to members of the government at the highest levels. According to the formal indictment that was brought against the members of the group, its intention was to bring about as much chaos as possible in Turkey in order to justify yet another military coup (there have already been four since 1923). The investigation and its consequent trial have been referred to as the case of the century, having exposed a shady and somewhat disturbing conspiracy to control and shape the progression of a government and society that has tried several times to prove to the world its commitment to democracy.
For example, the original indictment that was brought against the organization by the government in the summer of 2008 outlined a number of different plots that had a number of high profile targets in mind. These featured both the current Prime Minister of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the world-renowned novelist and Pulitzer Prize winner, Orhan Pamuk. In addition, murders that had already been committed and the bombing of a newspaper were included in the charges. The campaign of destabilization had raged throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century and, despite the open investigation, is believed to continue until the present day.
Just this past week, another indictment was submitted to a Turkish High Criminal Court implicating 3rd Army Commander Gen. Saldıray Berk and 12 other suspects in a plot to frame the police force in the city of Erzincan. Weaponry had been planted near a dam in the city as a means of discrediting the police department and raising suspicions of its actions. What would this accomplish, you ask? Well, the Erzincan Police Department has been aiding prosecutors in the Ergenekon investigation. Furthermore, Erzincan possesses a diverse group of peoples, featuring Sunnis, Alevis, Kurds, and the plotters believed that fragmentation of public opinion made it more susceptible to manipulation. Despite the failure of many of the efforts of Ergenekon, the plots as exposed in the indictments cited above, if they are in fact completely true, are a bit frightening in their precision and calculation. One can only hope that conspiracies like this one can be uncovered and stopped before they can succeed, not merely for the lives that are immediately at risk, but also for the threat it poses to the democracy of the Turkish people generally.
Saturday, March 6, 2010
The Mossad Assassination: Strategic Move or Attempt at Absolute Gangsterdom?
The assassination of top Hamas commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai several weeks ago has attracted considerable attention in international affairs circles, with many foreign ministries and independent analysts accusing Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad, of carrying out the target killing. The Economist published an article titled “Does Mossad really make Israel safer,” analyzing the strategic implications of such an aggressive operation while sympathetic commentators were quick to pat the Israelis on the back for a job well done. Some of these analyses dwelt on issues such as al-Mabhouh’s alleged connections with Iran and other relatively un-compelling reasons why Israeli officials may have ordered the hit. I think there is a very clear motivation for the operation that has been ignored by regional experts and diplomat savants alike: the Israelis simply wanted Mossad to be considered for the title of the “World’s Most Gangster Intelligence Agency, ” the unofficial designation given to the intelligence agency which is able to carry out the most callous, brazen violations of international law within a given time frame.
Though bulldozing homes, destroying large parts of southern Lebanon, and using White Phosphorus on U.N. personnel and Palestinian civilians certainly qualifies as gangster, Israel decided that an assassination carried out by its elite intelligence agents would be the logical next step in a series of “gangster-as-hell” moves. Upping the ante for Israel has been difficult given the country’s moderately gangster foreign policy, but the Israeli decision must have been based on the idea that any reduction in Mossad’s perceived gangsterness would pose a serious (existential?) threat to the small nation state. Several political scientists at John Hopkins’ School of International and Advanced Studies, a small group of academics who created the Aggregate Gangsterness Index (AGI) in order to quantify the gangsterness of governments, private individuals, and Russian businessmen, point to Israel’s troubling scores in the past few years as one possible explanation for its actions. Israel’s AGI score, they say, peaked immediately after the Gaza operation but has plummeted considerably in the two years after due to its relative inactivity. The Israeli score hovers above the world median due to its periodic military operations in the Territories and its “straight gangsta” blockade of the Gaza Strip. Besides falling AGI scores, there is yet another other reason for Mossad to fret about losing its position as the world’s most gangster intelligence agency: stiff competition from other intelligence agencies.
Mossad has always lived in the shadow of its American counterpart, the Central Intelligence Agency. In order to challenge the sheer dominance of the CIA in the area of gangsterness, Mossad needed to plan a spectacular operation that did not involve the use of aerial drones or secret prisons (lest they look like CIA copycats). Also,rather than use the Russian method of poisoning dissidents and Ukrainian opposition leaders, Mossad decided to employ the good, old-fashioned, time-tested tactic of veteran gangsters: murder. Mossad’s attempt to cement its position at the top of the gangster hierarchy has been impressive but the agency still has much to learn from the Russians and Americans. For example, Mossad’s network of Palestinian and Lebanese (native) informants cannot match the CIA’s rolodex of nefarious, murderous regional power brokers in Afghanistan. Nor have Israelis shown the gall of the Russian and Uzbek government-connected gangsters who murder their own journalists with relative impunity. Al-Mabhous’ assassination was a valiant attempt but the Israelis have yet to foment revolutions (Central America) or overthrow democratically elected leaders (Iran). However, there is something admirable in the publicness of the act as well the brazen disregard of international norms displayed in the forging of foreign passports, elements of the assassination which suggest that perhaps Mossad may be able to contend with Saudi intelligence for the title of the “Most Gangster Middle Eastern Intelligence Agency.” This is surely a significant achievement that should be celebrated by Israelis from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. To Mossad, a Mazeltov is in order.
Though bulldozing homes, destroying large parts of southern Lebanon, and using White Phosphorus on U.N. personnel and Palestinian civilians certainly qualifies as gangster, Israel decided that an assassination carried out by its elite intelligence agents would be the logical next step in a series of “gangster-as-hell” moves. Upping the ante for Israel has been difficult given the country’s moderately gangster foreign policy, but the Israeli decision must have been based on the idea that any reduction in Mossad’s perceived gangsterness would pose a serious (existential?) threat to the small nation state. Several political scientists at John Hopkins’ School of International and Advanced Studies, a small group of academics who created the Aggregate Gangsterness Index (AGI) in order to quantify the gangsterness of governments, private individuals, and Russian businessmen, point to Israel’s troubling scores in the past few years as one possible explanation for its actions. Israel’s AGI score, they say, peaked immediately after the Gaza operation but has plummeted considerably in the two years after due to its relative inactivity. The Israeli score hovers above the world median due to its periodic military operations in the Territories and its “straight gangsta” blockade of the Gaza Strip. Besides falling AGI scores, there is yet another other reason for Mossad to fret about losing its position as the world’s most gangster intelligence agency: stiff competition from other intelligence agencies.
Mossad has always lived in the shadow of its American counterpart, the Central Intelligence Agency. In order to challenge the sheer dominance of the CIA in the area of gangsterness, Mossad needed to plan a spectacular operation that did not involve the use of aerial drones or secret prisons (lest they look like CIA copycats). Also,rather than use the Russian method of poisoning dissidents and Ukrainian opposition leaders, Mossad decided to employ the good, old-fashioned, time-tested tactic of veteran gangsters: murder. Mossad’s attempt to cement its position at the top of the gangster hierarchy has been impressive but the agency still has much to learn from the Russians and Americans. For example, Mossad’s network of Palestinian and Lebanese (native) informants cannot match the CIA’s rolodex of nefarious, murderous regional power brokers in Afghanistan. Nor have Israelis shown the gall of the Russian and Uzbek government-connected gangsters who murder their own journalists with relative impunity. Al-Mabhous’ assassination was a valiant attempt but the Israelis have yet to foment revolutions (Central America) or overthrow democratically elected leaders (Iran). However, there is something admirable in the publicness of the act as well the brazen disregard of international norms displayed in the forging of foreign passports, elements of the assassination which suggest that perhaps Mossad may be able to contend with Saudi intelligence for the title of the “Most Gangster Middle Eastern Intelligence Agency.” This is surely a significant achievement that should be celebrated by Israelis from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. To Mossad, a Mazeltov is in order.
Remittances
Someone recently pointed me to this article in the Abu Dhabi newspaper The National. It is one of the most interesting pieces I have read in a long time on the political economy of the Middle East. John Lavois, one of the newspaper's senior editors, weds some beautiful anecdotal reporting with broader musings on the moral and economic implications of remittance flows from the UAE's foreign-born underclass.
Remittances are an incredibly important part of the Middle Eastern economy. In the non-oil states, remittances from nationals working abroad make up significant portions of gross domestic products. In oil states, like the UAE, workers from poorer countries (both within and outside of the Middle East) form a large majority of laborers and service workers and many of them remit as much as 90% of their wages to their families back home. Remittances therefore shape the region's economy in every possible way -- they flow into, out of, and within the borders of the Middle East.
Some of the facts are startling. According to this article, for example, a total of $34.7 billion flowed into the Middle East and North Africa in the form of remittances in 2007. That is a larger amount of money than the entire GDP of Jordan. The World Bank estimates that the top recipients of remittance payments in the region are, in order: Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, and Tunisia. In some of these countries, sizable proportions of national GDPs are composed of remittances. Lebanon, for example, relies on remittances for one quarter of its GDP; in Jordan they comprise one fifth. Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen all rely on remittances for roughly 6% of their GDPs.
On the flip side, the remittance flows coming out of countries in the Gulf are equally striking. The World Bank calculates, for example, that only the United States sends out more remittance payments than Saudi Arabia, which in turn sends out more than rich European countries like Germany and Switzerland.
The relative weight of these remittances on the economies of so many Middle Eastern countries is all the more striking when the nature of these payments is actually considered. Most of the payments are relatively tiny; they are micro-payments, proportions of wages that are already startlingly low. The National article does an especially good job of demonstrating the truly "micro" nature of these payments. Their relatively large weight on very "macro" economic forces says a good deal about how many laborers there really are living and working in countries other than their own.
The article also tells a story of real moral ambiguity. The Gulf's foreign-born labor force is often held up as a sign of all that is perverted and wrong about its political economy. Rich locals, too spoiled and pampered to take menial jobs, rely on foreign-born workers, often living in sub-par conditions, with few rights, and depressed wages, to perform the basic tasks necessary to run a society. In places like Dubai, where growth has been happening at a dizzying pace, foreign labor has been even more important, a key driver behind the emirate's frenetic modernization. The sad paradox of cities like Dubai, critics say, is that while half the city lives and plays in a grown-up's version of Disney Land, the other half of the city lives in squalid labor camps that don't even appear on maps, too scared to speak up for fear of losing a job that is supporting an entire family thousands of miles away.
But there is another story to tell, as well -- one of economic empowerment, of new opportunities, of globalization harnessed in a way that enriches the formerly impoverished. As the National article points out, there is a reason so many workers continue to migrate to the Gulf, in spite of its deplorable labor conditions. Indeed many development economist argue that lower barriers to immigration and maximizing labor mobility is one important way by which poor countries can develop. Some see the large number of foreign remittances flowing into non-oil MENA states as a sign of economic weakness and dependency. Viewed another way, they could be a powerful force pulling members of these countries out of poverty. For example, one of the reasons Yemen's economy is said to be so backward is because huge numbers of its nationals were expelled from Saudi Arabia in the early 90s when President Saleh backed Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Those workers were forced to go home, the remittances stopped flowing in, and the economy fizzled and crashed.
I don't think there's an obvious way to come down on this issue. There may be some middle ground, though. Remittances are clearly important for many individuals in the developing world and encouraging labor mobility is certainly a defensible policy. But the UAE and other Gulf countries are wrong to take advantage of their foreign workforce. Their governments should appreciate how much of their economies are dependent on these laborers, and accord them the appropriate level of social and political rights. There is, after all, no law of economics that says remittance payments have to flow from the exploited.
Remittances are an incredibly important part of the Middle Eastern economy. In the non-oil states, remittances from nationals working abroad make up significant portions of gross domestic products. In oil states, like the UAE, workers from poorer countries (both within and outside of the Middle East) form a large majority of laborers and service workers and many of them remit as much as 90% of their wages to their families back home. Remittances therefore shape the region's economy in every possible way -- they flow into, out of, and within the borders of the Middle East.
Some of the facts are startling. According to this article, for example, a total of $34.7 billion flowed into the Middle East and North Africa in the form of remittances in 2007. That is a larger amount of money than the entire GDP of Jordan. The World Bank estimates that the top recipients of remittance payments in the region are, in order: Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, and Tunisia. In some of these countries, sizable proportions of national GDPs are composed of remittances. Lebanon, for example, relies on remittances for one quarter of its GDP; in Jordan they comprise one fifth. Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen all rely on remittances for roughly 6% of their GDPs.
On the flip side, the remittance flows coming out of countries in the Gulf are equally striking. The World Bank calculates, for example, that only the United States sends out more remittance payments than Saudi Arabia, which in turn sends out more than rich European countries like Germany and Switzerland.
The relative weight of these remittances on the economies of so many Middle Eastern countries is all the more striking when the nature of these payments is actually considered. Most of the payments are relatively tiny; they are micro-payments, proportions of wages that are already startlingly low. The National article does an especially good job of demonstrating the truly "micro" nature of these payments. Their relatively large weight on very "macro" economic forces says a good deal about how many laborers there really are living and working in countries other than their own.
The article also tells a story of real moral ambiguity. The Gulf's foreign-born labor force is often held up as a sign of all that is perverted and wrong about its political economy. Rich locals, too spoiled and pampered to take menial jobs, rely on foreign-born workers, often living in sub-par conditions, with few rights, and depressed wages, to perform the basic tasks necessary to run a society. In places like Dubai, where growth has been happening at a dizzying pace, foreign labor has been even more important, a key driver behind the emirate's frenetic modernization. The sad paradox of cities like Dubai, critics say, is that while half the city lives and plays in a grown-up's version of Disney Land, the other half of the city lives in squalid labor camps that don't even appear on maps, too scared to speak up for fear of losing a job that is supporting an entire family thousands of miles away.
But there is another story to tell, as well -- one of economic empowerment, of new opportunities, of globalization harnessed in a way that enriches the formerly impoverished. As the National article points out, there is a reason so many workers continue to migrate to the Gulf, in spite of its deplorable labor conditions. Indeed many development economist argue that lower barriers to immigration and maximizing labor mobility is one important way by which poor countries can develop. Some see the large number of foreign remittances flowing into non-oil MENA states as a sign of economic weakness and dependency. Viewed another way, they could be a powerful force pulling members of these countries out of poverty. For example, one of the reasons Yemen's economy is said to be so backward is because huge numbers of its nationals were expelled from Saudi Arabia in the early 90s when President Saleh backed Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Those workers were forced to go home, the remittances stopped flowing in, and the economy fizzled and crashed.
I don't think there's an obvious way to come down on this issue. There may be some middle ground, though. Remittances are clearly important for many individuals in the developing world and encouraging labor mobility is certainly a defensible policy. But the UAE and other Gulf countries are wrong to take advantage of their foreign workforce. Their governments should appreciate how much of their economies are dependent on these laborers, and accord them the appropriate level of social and political rights. There is, after all, no law of economics that says remittance payments have to flow from the exploited.
Friday, March 5, 2010
Guns and Butter = Qat and Water
On the first day of an introductory economics class, you are usually lectured on the simplistic, fundamental tradeoff concerning how the federal government allocates resources: guns (defense spending) and butter (social services). In Yemen these days, the fundamental tradeoff seems to be between qat and water.
According to this article in the Guardian that I stumbled across last week, Yemen is literally chewing itself to death. The treasured Yemeni past-time of relaxing in the mid-afternoon by chewing on some qat is threatening the viability of the water basin in Sana'a. Though the growing and consumption of qat is fundamental to the Yemeni economy, it is contributing to massive water shortages in the capital since the growing of qat requires extensive irrigation. Four times as much water is taken out of the Sana'a water basin as falls into it each year. Furthermore, the fact that Sana'a is one of the fastest growing capitals in the world is only exacerbating the problem.
Sana'a is expected to run out of economically viable water supplies by 2017. Coincidentally, the World Bank predicts that 2017 will be the year in which Yemen will have to start devoting all of its oil resources to internal demand, leaving it nothing to export. Since oil sales currently account for 75% of state revenues, this could have drastic implications for humanitarian, economic, political stability in Yemen.
As Killian noted last week by highlighting the James Dorsey article in Foreign Affairs on governance and security in Yemen, armed groups like al-Qaeda's Yemeni affiliate have taken to providing grass roots services in parts of the country that are not exactly under the direct control of the Yemeni government. Of course, this concept of acquiring legitimacy through implementing grass roots social services is nothing new (see Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza, as well as many groups in Iraq since 2003). The point is that as Yemen's twin water and oil crises begin to accelerate, opportunities may increase for militant non-state actors to acquire legitimacy by filling the power vacuum.
I'm not suggesting that the West in general or the US in particular "do something" about this. After all, whenever the topic of Yemen makes its way into the US public discourse, prominent senators start saying crazy things like the US should invade Yemen. In that respect, maybe it's better that Yemen saw its Google News searches drop from over 24,000 in January to just 593 in February (think of all that wasted expertise!).
Nevertheless, the international community would be foolish to turn a blind eye to the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in Yemen. The recent fighting there has left over a quarter of a million people displaced, and much of the infrastructure demolished. Though an international donor's conference was held in London last January, and Saudi Arabia is hosting a Gulf donor's conference in Riyadh this weekend, the amount of aid so far committed to rebuilding Yemen has been modest at best. The GCC as well as the international community can and should do more to stave off an impending humanitarian disaster.
According to this article in the Guardian that I stumbled across last week, Yemen is literally chewing itself to death. The treasured Yemeni past-time of relaxing in the mid-afternoon by chewing on some qat is threatening the viability of the water basin in Sana'a. Though the growing and consumption of qat is fundamental to the Yemeni economy, it is contributing to massive water shortages in the capital since the growing of qat requires extensive irrigation. Four times as much water is taken out of the Sana'a water basin as falls into it each year. Furthermore, the fact that Sana'a is one of the fastest growing capitals in the world is only exacerbating the problem.
Sana'a is expected to run out of economically viable water supplies by 2017. Coincidentally, the World Bank predicts that 2017 will be the year in which Yemen will have to start devoting all of its oil resources to internal demand, leaving it nothing to export. Since oil sales currently account for 75% of state revenues, this could have drastic implications for humanitarian, economic, political stability in Yemen.
As Killian noted last week by highlighting the James Dorsey article in Foreign Affairs on governance and security in Yemen, armed groups like al-Qaeda's Yemeni affiliate have taken to providing grass roots services in parts of the country that are not exactly under the direct control of the Yemeni government. Of course, this concept of acquiring legitimacy through implementing grass roots social services is nothing new (see Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza, as well as many groups in Iraq since 2003). The point is that as Yemen's twin water and oil crises begin to accelerate, opportunities may increase for militant non-state actors to acquire legitimacy by filling the power vacuum.
I'm not suggesting that the West in general or the US in particular "do something" about this. After all, whenever the topic of Yemen makes its way into the US public discourse, prominent senators start saying crazy things like the US should invade Yemen. In that respect, maybe it's better that Yemen saw its Google News searches drop from over 24,000 in January to just 593 in February (think of all that wasted expertise!).
Nevertheless, the international community would be foolish to turn a blind eye to the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in Yemen. The recent fighting there has left over a quarter of a million people displaced, and much of the infrastructure demolished. Though an international donor's conference was held in London last January, and Saudi Arabia is hosting a Gulf donor's conference in Riyadh this weekend, the amount of aid so far committed to rebuilding Yemen has been modest at best. The GCC as well as the international community can and should do more to stave off an impending humanitarian disaster.
Sunday, February 28, 2010
The Iraqi de-Bathification Purges Continue to Intensify
With the Iraqi elections only a week away, the de-Bathification measures that already banned over 600 candidates have been intensifying of late. Though there has been some decent coverage of these purges in the press the last month or so, the latest micro-level de-Bathification developments and their negative impact on the rule of law in Iraq haven't gained much traction yet in US media outlets.
The issue of the de-Bathification purges has dominated the public discourse throughout the campaign period. The largest Shi'i coalition - the Iraqi National Alliance - has been strongly pushing the issue, and not just through the de-Bathification committee headed by Ahmad Chalabi and Ali al-Lami. Though the de-Bathification committee announced Thursday that it was purging 376 officers (20 of whom are high-ranking) from the Iraqi army and police, the purging of civil servants with alleged Bathist ties has now gained substantial traction throughout the Shia-majority provinces of Iraq's south. The provincial governments that are headed by Dawa and ISCI have been following the lead of Chalabi and Lami in Baghdad and have begun implementing micro-level purges throughout their respective provinces.
Though Maliki is legally able to overrule the decisions of the de-Bathification committee, he cannot afford to do so when the national elections are only a week away. In this respect, the Iraqi National Alliance (for whom Chalabi and Lami are candidates) has politically boxed Maliki into a corner. Maliki can't overrule their decision lest he risks looking sympathetic to these alleged Bathists. That will certainly not win him many votes among his core constituency. So in response to the de-Bathification blitz being pushed by Chalabi and the INA, Maliki and his Dawa party have actually been organizing demonstrations in favor of the purges, and Dawa-dominated provincial councils have been pushing through micro-level purges themselves. So much for the 'Rule of Law'.
It is clearly evident that not only have these purges been used to weaken the secular/nationalist current in Iraqi politics at a critical time before the election, they are being implemented at the security and micro-levels of Iraqi society to fundamentally alter the balance of power in favor of the Shia religious parties (most notably ISCI). These parties that comprise the INA and who are close allies of the Iranians don't really have anything substantive to run on in these elections. They got hammered in the provincial elections of 2009, and their continued inability to provide reliable services to their constituencies hasn't made them any more popular. Hence their emphasis on identity politics and their persistance in pushing the Bathist witch hunts.
Since there seems to be no Iraqi institutional capacity for resisting the de-Bathification board's legally dubious high-handedness, how far will these purges go? So far the international community's response has been fairly muted. The US has made a little noise over it, but clearly not enough to have any effect on Chalabi and Lami. US Ambassador Christopher Hill spoke about the controversy at a press briefing in Washington last week and sounded worryingly optimistic, claiming that he thinks "we've gotten through that issue." The fact of the matter is that the issue is not through with; it is most likely far from over. The recent intensification of the purges demonstrate that. And just because the issue may not generate much violence (most of the disenfranchised groups don't have the capacity to take on the Iraqi security forces) doesn't mean the problem isn't important. A functional Iraq depends on the rule of law and capable institutions. The last six weeks have revealed just how non-existent these two principles are in the current state of affairs in Iraq.
The issue of the de-Bathification purges has dominated the public discourse throughout the campaign period. The largest Shi'i coalition - the Iraqi National Alliance - has been strongly pushing the issue, and not just through the de-Bathification committee headed by Ahmad Chalabi and Ali al-Lami. Though the de-Bathification committee announced Thursday that it was purging 376 officers (20 of whom are high-ranking) from the Iraqi army and police, the purging of civil servants with alleged Bathist ties has now gained substantial traction throughout the Shia-majority provinces of Iraq's south. The provincial governments that are headed by Dawa and ISCI have been following the lead of Chalabi and Lami in Baghdad and have begun implementing micro-level purges throughout their respective provinces.
Though Maliki is legally able to overrule the decisions of the de-Bathification committee, he cannot afford to do so when the national elections are only a week away. In this respect, the Iraqi National Alliance (for whom Chalabi and Lami are candidates) has politically boxed Maliki into a corner. Maliki can't overrule their decision lest he risks looking sympathetic to these alleged Bathists. That will certainly not win him many votes among his core constituency. So in response to the de-Bathification blitz being pushed by Chalabi and the INA, Maliki and his Dawa party have actually been organizing demonstrations in favor of the purges, and Dawa-dominated provincial councils have been pushing through micro-level purges themselves. So much for the 'Rule of Law'.
It is clearly evident that not only have these purges been used to weaken the secular/nationalist current in Iraqi politics at a critical time before the election, they are being implemented at the security and micro-levels of Iraqi society to fundamentally alter the balance of power in favor of the Shia religious parties (most notably ISCI). These parties that comprise the INA and who are close allies of the Iranians don't really have anything substantive to run on in these elections. They got hammered in the provincial elections of 2009, and their continued inability to provide reliable services to their constituencies hasn't made them any more popular. Hence their emphasis on identity politics and their persistance in pushing the Bathist witch hunts.
Since there seems to be no Iraqi institutional capacity for resisting the de-Bathification board's legally dubious high-handedness, how far will these purges go? So far the international community's response has been fairly muted. The US has made a little noise over it, but clearly not enough to have any effect on Chalabi and Lami. US Ambassador Christopher Hill spoke about the controversy at a press briefing in Washington last week and sounded worryingly optimistic, claiming that he thinks "we've gotten through that issue." The fact of the matter is that the issue is not through with; it is most likely far from over. The recent intensification of the purges demonstrate that. And just because the issue may not generate much violence (most of the disenfranchised groups don't have the capacity to take on the Iraqi security forces) doesn't mean the problem isn't important. A functional Iraq depends on the rule of law and capable institutions. The last six weeks have revealed just how non-existent these two principles are in the current state of affairs in Iraq.
Saturday, February 27, 2010
The Jeremiads on Dubai
There have been a lot of doomsday predictions lately regarding Dubai's future. Consider this FP article on the emerging literature that has sprung up criticizing Dubai's model of development and anticipating the city's imminent downfall. Critics of the city point to a staggering number of legitimate shortcomings: Dubai is over-leveraged, its development model is unsustainable, its cultural vision is contradictory, its population is under-educated, its institutions are bureaucratic and corrupt, its labor conditions are miserable, its buildings are shiny but substance-less and now empty, its judicial system is arcane, and it is now attracting an array of unsavory criminals, smugglers, and racketeers.
All of the above criticisms of Dubai are, in my opinion, entirely valid. The city-state grew too fast during the boom years. It built in order to impress, not to develop. It tried to market itself as a meeting place between East and West, as a cosmopolitan melting pot in the Arab world. The problem is Dubai thought this utopia could be bought (or borrowed and then bought) rather than being cultivated over time.
Curious people from around the world were unsurprisingly drawn to this strange new phenomenon happening in the deserts of the Arab Gulf. They came, they took photos, some of them even settled down for a bit. Now they are all gone. With the unveiling of the new Burj Khalifa, Dubai seems not to have quite learned its lesson. The city is still trying, now increasingly desperately, to attract the world's attention with another superlative, hoping that no one will notice that they have yet to find enough find tenants to fill the monolith.
All that being said, I think the Jeremiads on Dubai are overblown. The bloom may be off the rose -- but the rose still remains. Dubai, for all its myriad flaws, has a lot going for it. For example, Dubai is the sixth busiest port in the world with thousands upon thousands of containers passing through on their way from the East to the West and back again. The only ports with more traffic than Dubai are the megaports of East Asia -- Singapore, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Busan. The next largest port within even the general vicinity of Dubai is Mumbai, at number twenty-seven. In the Middle East, Jeddah is second, with a ranking of thrirty-two and about a quarter of the traffic of Dubai.
Dubai's port is likely its greatest and most sustainable long-term asset. Think of Singapore, another city that had its fair share of skeptics and detractors in the 1970s. Its position as one of the largest ports in the world (today it is number one) has propelled it on a bull-run of multi-decade economic growth, such that it now ranks as one of the world's greatest metropolises. The Dubai port generates a huge amount of commercial activity in the city, which is the original reason that so many different companies in various industries originally decided to set up shop there. As long as the hum of port activity persists, many of these industries and companies are likely to remain.
Dubai also has a slightly less tangible asset working in its favor -- inertia. Yes, the city has seen hitches recently. But are all those companies that relocated to Dubai, convinced it was going to be the new urban center of a fast-growing emerging market, really going to pick up and relocate? Is the marginal benefit of moving down the road to Abu Dhabi, or across the sea to Doha, or further into the desert to Riyadh really that great? Dubai may have tripped, but it will take a lot more than a single sovereign debt debacle to cause a true mass exodus. As long as the Gulf remains a key emerging market (and with oil supplies still plentiful, that will likely be for a while), it will need a regional capital out of which firms can base their operations. For the foreseeable future Dubai still looks like the most likely city to have that honor.
No doubt Dubai's glory days are over. But the city-state can still learn from the poor choices of the past decade and right itself. It can get itself back on a road to growth and development, though this time it will have to be at a much more restrained and sustainable pace.
All of the above criticisms of Dubai are, in my opinion, entirely valid. The city-state grew too fast during the boom years. It built in order to impress, not to develop. It tried to market itself as a meeting place between East and West, as a cosmopolitan melting pot in the Arab world. The problem is Dubai thought this utopia could be bought (or borrowed and then bought) rather than being cultivated over time.
Curious people from around the world were unsurprisingly drawn to this strange new phenomenon happening in the deserts of the Arab Gulf. They came, they took photos, some of them even settled down for a bit. Now they are all gone. With the unveiling of the new Burj Khalifa, Dubai seems not to have quite learned its lesson. The city is still trying, now increasingly desperately, to attract the world's attention with another superlative, hoping that no one will notice that they have yet to find enough find tenants to fill the monolith.
All that being said, I think the Jeremiads on Dubai are overblown. The bloom may be off the rose -- but the rose still remains. Dubai, for all its myriad flaws, has a lot going for it. For example, Dubai is the sixth busiest port in the world with thousands upon thousands of containers passing through on their way from the East to the West and back again. The only ports with more traffic than Dubai are the megaports of East Asia -- Singapore, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Busan. The next largest port within even the general vicinity of Dubai is Mumbai, at number twenty-seven. In the Middle East, Jeddah is second, with a ranking of thrirty-two and about a quarter of the traffic of Dubai.
Dubai's port is likely its greatest and most sustainable long-term asset. Think of Singapore, another city that had its fair share of skeptics and detractors in the 1970s. Its position as one of the largest ports in the world (today it is number one) has propelled it on a bull-run of multi-decade economic growth, such that it now ranks as one of the world's greatest metropolises. The Dubai port generates a huge amount of commercial activity in the city, which is the original reason that so many different companies in various industries originally decided to set up shop there. As long as the hum of port activity persists, many of these industries and companies are likely to remain.
Dubai also has a slightly less tangible asset working in its favor -- inertia. Yes, the city has seen hitches recently. But are all those companies that relocated to Dubai, convinced it was going to be the new urban center of a fast-growing emerging market, really going to pick up and relocate? Is the marginal benefit of moving down the road to Abu Dhabi, or across the sea to Doha, or further into the desert to Riyadh really that great? Dubai may have tripped, but it will take a lot more than a single sovereign debt debacle to cause a true mass exodus. As long as the Gulf remains a key emerging market (and with oil supplies still plentiful, that will likely be for a while), it will need a regional capital out of which firms can base their operations. For the foreseeable future Dubai still looks like the most likely city to have that honor.
No doubt Dubai's glory days are over. But the city-state can still learn from the poor choices of the past decade and right itself. It can get itself back on a road to growth and development, though this time it will have to be at a much more restrained and sustainable pace.
Saturday, February 20, 2010
The Future of Iraq's Executive Trinity
Reidar Visser, a savvy Iraq analyst on the Gulf Research Unit at the University of Oslo and editor of the Iraq blog historiae.org, has just written a great piece in The National newspaper on the fate of Iraq's triumvirate executive council.
Here's the gist of his article. Back in 2006, the government headed by Prime Minister Maliki was formed under a transitional framework that mandated the following: the Iraqi president would be selected by a 2/3 supermajority in the Iraqi parliament. The two vice presidents would also be approved in the same vote. So not only was a supermajority consensus required to establish the three man executive council, but it was essentially a package deal. Furthermore, the dominant political parties agreed that the executive trinity should reflect Iraq's three main ethno-sectarian groups. Needless to say, the process of hammering out a consensus deal that could survive the supermajority vote took a long time. Only after the executive council was approved by parliament could the Iraqi president ask Maliki to form a government. Back in 2006, this process took an agonizingly long six months.
However, as mentioned above, the rules that guided the process in 2006 were only meant as a transitional mechanism. The new rules stipulate that Iraq's president not need a 2/3 parliamentary supermajority to be elected - only a majority. In addition, the president and vice presidents are to be elected on different votes (it's no longer a package deal). Beyond that, there is no stipulation that the executive triumvirate be comprised of a Shi'i, Kurd, and Sunni Arab. Given these new rules, it will be much easier to select a president and vice presidents. This means that the formulation of a new government following the March 7th elections should happen a lot faster than in 2006.
This change also has significant implications for identity politics in Iraq. Sectarianism has governed the political dynamic in Iraq since 2003. I'd like to emphasize that this in no way was inevitable; rather, the policies pursued by Bremer's CPA during the crucial years of 2003 and 2004 enshrined sectarianism into the Iraqi political system. Because of this sectarian political dynamic and the salience of identity politics in recent years, the dominant political parties were united in nothing more than the desire to cling to power. All of the parties involved in the ruling coalition had conflicting interests; there was hardly any ideological coherence among them. This explains why the past four years have seen hardly any real political accomplishments.
However, abandoning the principle of a supermajority means diminishing the number of special interests that need to be accomodated simply to form a cabinet. This creates space for alliances to form around horizontal forms of association (issue based) rather than vertical ones (identity based). In short, it will be easier for coalitions to find ideological coherence.
At stake here is how Iraq chooses to define itself. Does it see itself as a compartmentalized nation, consisting of monolithic ethno-sectarian groups? It seems that the Iraqi exiles who returned in 2003 see Iraq that way; it was they and their U.S. allies that promoted and entrenched this sectarian political dynamic. It should also be noted that Iran has a vital stake in perpetuating a sectarian political system in Iraq. As long as that system continues, their Shi'i allies (primarily ISCI and other smaller Shi'i groups) have an advantage. However, Iraqis could make an attempt to transcend this dynamic by eschewing an ethno-sectarian quota for the executive council. Abandoning this quota could signal a shift in the nature of the political dynamic. It could trigger a salience of issue-based rather than identity-based politics. Then again, the upcoming election may not even settle the issue or offer any tangible indication as to where the political dynamic is heading. We'll start to find out in two weeks when the polls close and the drama heats up.
Here's the gist of his article. Back in 2006, the government headed by Prime Minister Maliki was formed under a transitional framework that mandated the following: the Iraqi president would be selected by a 2/3 supermajority in the Iraqi parliament. The two vice presidents would also be approved in the same vote. So not only was a supermajority consensus required to establish the three man executive council, but it was essentially a package deal. Furthermore, the dominant political parties agreed that the executive trinity should reflect Iraq's three main ethno-sectarian groups. Needless to say, the process of hammering out a consensus deal that could survive the supermajority vote took a long time. Only after the executive council was approved by parliament could the Iraqi president ask Maliki to form a government. Back in 2006, this process took an agonizingly long six months.
However, as mentioned above, the rules that guided the process in 2006 were only meant as a transitional mechanism. The new rules stipulate that Iraq's president not need a 2/3 parliamentary supermajority to be elected - only a majority. In addition, the president and vice presidents are to be elected on different votes (it's no longer a package deal). Beyond that, there is no stipulation that the executive triumvirate be comprised of a Shi'i, Kurd, and Sunni Arab. Given these new rules, it will be much easier to select a president and vice presidents. This means that the formulation of a new government following the March 7th elections should happen a lot faster than in 2006.
This change also has significant implications for identity politics in Iraq. Sectarianism has governed the political dynamic in Iraq since 2003. I'd like to emphasize that this in no way was inevitable; rather, the policies pursued by Bremer's CPA during the crucial years of 2003 and 2004 enshrined sectarianism into the Iraqi political system. Because of this sectarian political dynamic and the salience of identity politics in recent years, the dominant political parties were united in nothing more than the desire to cling to power. All of the parties involved in the ruling coalition had conflicting interests; there was hardly any ideological coherence among them. This explains why the past four years have seen hardly any real political accomplishments.
However, abandoning the principle of a supermajority means diminishing the number of special interests that need to be accomodated simply to form a cabinet. This creates space for alliances to form around horizontal forms of association (issue based) rather than vertical ones (identity based). In short, it will be easier for coalitions to find ideological coherence.
At stake here is how Iraq chooses to define itself. Does it see itself as a compartmentalized nation, consisting of monolithic ethno-sectarian groups? It seems that the Iraqi exiles who returned in 2003 see Iraq that way; it was they and their U.S. allies that promoted and entrenched this sectarian political dynamic. It should also be noted that Iran has a vital stake in perpetuating a sectarian political system in Iraq. As long as that system continues, their Shi'i allies (primarily ISCI and other smaller Shi'i groups) have an advantage. However, Iraqis could make an attempt to transcend this dynamic by eschewing an ethno-sectarian quota for the executive council. Abandoning this quota could signal a shift in the nature of the political dynamic. It could trigger a salience of issue-based rather than identity-based politics. Then again, the upcoming election may not even settle the issue or offer any tangible indication as to where the political dynamic is heading. We'll start to find out in two weeks when the polls close and the drama heats up.
The Love Lives of M.E.S. Students: More Problems than Methods
Having been witness (and perhaps party to) many stilted and uncomfortable conversations that do not include references to Foucault but are, instead, attempts to enter into relations with an attractive classmate, I am convinced that Middle Eastern Studies students are particularly awkward when it comes to romance. To some extent, the awkwardness of gender relations in the field can be attributed to the region’s own rigid gender divisions and conservative social culture. For instance, one would expect Lain American Studies students to be relatively more adept in this arena because of the region’s inherent sensuality and its peoples’ unbridled hedonistic impulses. (In particular, Paraguay has gained the reputation of being a bastion for pleasure-seekers.)
I seek here not only to problematize gender relations as they manifest themselves in daily graduate student life, but to suggest a new framework for how these gender relations may evolve. For that purpose and in belated celebration of Valentine’s day, I have composed a few pick-up lines, customized for students of the region. While making reference to common subjects of interest, these pick-up lines also subvert and complicate assumptions about the nature of romance in contemporary MESAstan. Note of qualification: Though these pick-up lines display a distinct heteronormative bias, they are in no way meant to support the unstable, socially-constructed categories that characterize gender.
1. Why don’t we continue this conversation about forms of contestation in Ottoman Macedonia over drinks on Friday night?
This line is particularly effective if you have just attended a lecture on Ottoman Macedonia and are engaged in a riveting conversation about the role of the bandit in the Empire’s far flung provinces. If you have not been discussing Ottoman Macedonia, this statement may be a non-sequitur. The danger here is that when you do continue the conversation, you are unable to impress your classmate with your knowledge of Macedonian geography and Ottoman language.
2. Let me be your Caliph, I will put an end to the fitna within your soul.
3. May I establish my intellectual hegemony over you during a cup of coffee?
This sentence reveals your intellectual “confidence” in a not-so-subtle way. Also, asking someone out for coffee is always a safe bet given the reality that some of the Pious, Righteous and Virtuous members of the ummah do not indulge in the drink (laban).
4. I would like to problematize your single status on Facebook by taking you to dinner on Thursday night.
Most Middle Eastern Studies graduate students spend an embarrassing amount of time on the social networking site. While referencing somebody’s relationship status on Facebook may have been taboo two years ago, the nearly universal adoption of Facebook as an element of our Panoptic society means that you can safely use this line. However, you may feel obligated to mention how Facebook is used to surveille and discipline the population and, therefore, constitutes a form of state power. References to the not-so-unproblematic forms of self-representation and modes of “staging the self” engendered by Facebook participation would also be appreciated.
5. I’d like to be the New Historian of your current relationship.
6. Ana Ismi Maha. Ana adrus el arabiyya fi Jamaat New York. Eskun fi Brooklyn. Walidi t’amel fi el umum el mutahida. Wa Ana fahlan wahiida.
Imitating Maha from al-Kitaab’s impeccable fusa is one way you can establish your linguistic prowess and impressive your classmate. However, you must be sure to stick to the script, lapsing into colloquial Egyptian is guaranteed to elicit stares and derogatory comments from the Lebanese. (Ca va?) This method works best when you are able to use Maha’s lines semi-appropriately in context. For example, in a crowded public lecture you may turn to your attractive classmate and say:
“Why don’t we grab a coffee, ya’ni, besebub el izdiham” (on account of the crowdedness”)
I seek here not only to problematize gender relations as they manifest themselves in daily graduate student life, but to suggest a new framework for how these gender relations may evolve. For that purpose and in belated celebration of Valentine’s day, I have composed a few pick-up lines, customized for students of the region. While making reference to common subjects of interest, these pick-up lines also subvert and complicate assumptions about the nature of romance in contemporary MESAstan. Note of qualification: Though these pick-up lines display a distinct heteronormative bias, they are in no way meant to support the unstable, socially-constructed categories that characterize gender.
1. Why don’t we continue this conversation about forms of contestation in Ottoman Macedonia over drinks on Friday night?
This line is particularly effective if you have just attended a lecture on Ottoman Macedonia and are engaged in a riveting conversation about the role of the bandit in the Empire’s far flung provinces. If you have not been discussing Ottoman Macedonia, this statement may be a non-sequitur. The danger here is that when you do continue the conversation, you are unable to impress your classmate with your knowledge of Macedonian geography and Ottoman language.
2. Let me be your Caliph, I will put an end to the fitna within your soul.
3. May I establish my intellectual hegemony over you during a cup of coffee?
This sentence reveals your intellectual “confidence” in a not-so-subtle way. Also, asking someone out for coffee is always a safe bet given the reality that some of the Pious, Righteous and Virtuous members of the ummah do not indulge in the drink (laban).
4. I would like to problematize your single status on Facebook by taking you to dinner on Thursday night.
Most Middle Eastern Studies graduate students spend an embarrassing amount of time on the social networking site. While referencing somebody’s relationship status on Facebook may have been taboo two years ago, the nearly universal adoption of Facebook as an element of our Panoptic society means that you can safely use this line. However, you may feel obligated to mention how Facebook is used to surveille and discipline the population and, therefore, constitutes a form of state power. References to the not-so-unproblematic forms of self-representation and modes of “staging the self” engendered by Facebook participation would also be appreciated.
5. I’d like to be the New Historian of your current relationship.
6. Ana Ismi Maha. Ana adrus el arabiyya fi Jamaat New York. Eskun fi Brooklyn. Walidi t’amel fi el umum el mutahida. Wa Ana fahlan wahiida.
Imitating Maha from al-Kitaab’s impeccable fusa is one way you can establish your linguistic prowess and impressive your classmate. However, you must be sure to stick to the script, lapsing into colloquial Egyptian is guaranteed to elicit stares and derogatory comments from the Lebanese. (Ca va?) This method works best when you are able to use Maha’s lines semi-appropriately in context. For example, in a crowded public lecture you may turn to your attractive classmate and say:
“Why don’t we grab a coffee, ya’ni, besebub el izdiham” (on account of the crowdedness”)
Friday, February 19, 2010
Yemen, Again
James Dorsey, a freelance journalist, recently published an article on Foreign Affairs' website that may just be the best piece of analysis on Yemen I have read thus far. It does a beautiful job capturing why Yemen is such a problem-ridden state and why it will be so difficult for anyone (including the Yemeni government) to solve its interconnected problems. He addresses some of the biggest questions that have been aired since the Christmas Day bomb attempt of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. Why has Al Qaeda gained a foothold in Yemen? Why is Yemen so difficult to rule? And what can the US (or the West) do about it?
He points out that one of the principal reasons AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) has been able to settle in Yemen is because it provides social services to local villagers. The Yemeni government's presence beyond core sectors of the country is so minimal that critical services -- like education, healthcare, and security -- are entirely ignored. Locals are happy to extend their support to any group that can fill this void. This notion of legitimacy coming from social service provision is not a new one, and has been used to describe political dynamics in other parts of the Middle East, as well as Latin America, South Asia, and Africa. There is compelling evidence that any group -- state or non-state -- will gain grassroots political favor through the extension of services; in fact, the phenomenon is so common in the developing world that 'non-state social welfare provision' has become something of an academic sub-field. Within the Middle East, experts have mostly studied how providing social services can be a key part of the political strategies of certain Islamist groups -- Hamas, Hezbullah, and the Egyptian MB, being the most prominent examples. It is therefore unsurprising to hear that Al Qaeda's Yemen branch has adopted much the same tactic, with equal success.
This point dovetails nicely with Dorsey's second key insight, which is that a security-dominated approach to Yemen is likely to bear little fruit for the West. Al Qaeda has been successful in Yemen, in part, because it provides key services that the government fails to offer. Foreign aid, both in the form of funding and training, can help the Yemeni government extend its social service capabilities further afield. By usurping Al Qaeda's role as a provider and protector, the government can win back the favor of the population and erode Al Qaeda's popularity and legitimacy. Of course, there is the issue of Yemen's current government being so corrupt and bureaucratic that it struggles to accept large amounts of aid. But, as Dorsey points out, the West has few better options but to try.
A final important argument that he makes is that the West is much better off relying on other state actors, particularly Saudi Arabia and others in the GCC, to help implement reform in Yemen. The Saudi government has influence both with Yemen's government and with many of its tribes and could be a powerful agent of positive change if it signed onto a series of reform initiatives. Many of Yemen's greatest security, political, social, and economic problems could be better addressed with Saudi support. Moreover, Saudis are trusted in Yemen to a far greater extent than Western workers and do not operate with the automatic handicap of being seen as a foreign occupier or agents of neo-colonialism.
An interesting idea highlighted within this argument is the suggestion that the GCC bring Yemen into its fold. To my knowledge, this is not a possibility that has been seriously discussed, probably because the Gulf countries would never give it real consideration. Yemen is far too poor, divided, and corrupt for the other Gulf states to consider letting it into what they consider to be an elite club. Moreover, as the GCC considers the possibility of further economic integration (possibly a single currency union), letting Yemen in would complicate matters even further. But what could work is providing Yemen with a reasonable path toward GCC membership. This strategy has proven remarkably successful in Europe, where the European Union has laid out a series of stringent development hurdles that must be cleared in order for candidate countries to gain membership (in fact, this article points out how much better this strategy has been than the foreign aid approach that the US has used with its Caribbean neighbors...and is likely to use with Yemen). In Eastern European countries like Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the Union in 2007, massive political and economic reform efforts were undertaken to prepare for membership. Yemen has openly expressed its desire to join the GCC. If the Council provided a credible path toward Yemeni membership, entailing a series of stringent criteria that would first have to be met, Yemen's government might be coaxed into making some of the tough decisions necessary to avert further decay.
No effort at domestic transformation in Yemen will be successful without the full backing of the Yemeni government. A path to GCC membership may be the best idea yet aired to cajole the government into coming fully on board.
He points out that one of the principal reasons AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) has been able to settle in Yemen is because it provides social services to local villagers. The Yemeni government's presence beyond core sectors of the country is so minimal that critical services -- like education, healthcare, and security -- are entirely ignored. Locals are happy to extend their support to any group that can fill this void. This notion of legitimacy coming from social service provision is not a new one, and has been used to describe political dynamics in other parts of the Middle East, as well as Latin America, South Asia, and Africa. There is compelling evidence that any group -- state or non-state -- will gain grassroots political favor through the extension of services; in fact, the phenomenon is so common in the developing world that 'non-state social welfare provision' has become something of an academic sub-field. Within the Middle East, experts have mostly studied how providing social services can be a key part of the political strategies of certain Islamist groups -- Hamas, Hezbullah, and the Egyptian MB, being the most prominent examples. It is therefore unsurprising to hear that Al Qaeda's Yemen branch has adopted much the same tactic, with equal success.
This point dovetails nicely with Dorsey's second key insight, which is that a security-dominated approach to Yemen is likely to bear little fruit for the West. Al Qaeda has been successful in Yemen, in part, because it provides key services that the government fails to offer. Foreign aid, both in the form of funding and training, can help the Yemeni government extend its social service capabilities further afield. By usurping Al Qaeda's role as a provider and protector, the government can win back the favor of the population and erode Al Qaeda's popularity and legitimacy. Of course, there is the issue of Yemen's current government being so corrupt and bureaucratic that it struggles to accept large amounts of aid. But, as Dorsey points out, the West has few better options but to try.
A final important argument that he makes is that the West is much better off relying on other state actors, particularly Saudi Arabia and others in the GCC, to help implement reform in Yemen. The Saudi government has influence both with Yemen's government and with many of its tribes and could be a powerful agent of positive change if it signed onto a series of reform initiatives. Many of Yemen's greatest security, political, social, and economic problems could be better addressed with Saudi support. Moreover, Saudis are trusted in Yemen to a far greater extent than Western workers and do not operate with the automatic handicap of being seen as a foreign occupier or agents of neo-colonialism.
An interesting idea highlighted within this argument is the suggestion that the GCC bring Yemen into its fold. To my knowledge, this is not a possibility that has been seriously discussed, probably because the Gulf countries would never give it real consideration. Yemen is far too poor, divided, and corrupt for the other Gulf states to consider letting it into what they consider to be an elite club. Moreover, as the GCC considers the possibility of further economic integration (possibly a single currency union), letting Yemen in would complicate matters even further. But what could work is providing Yemen with a reasonable path toward GCC membership. This strategy has proven remarkably successful in Europe, where the European Union has laid out a series of stringent development hurdles that must be cleared in order for candidate countries to gain membership (in fact, this article points out how much better this strategy has been than the foreign aid approach that the US has used with its Caribbean neighbors...and is likely to use with Yemen). In Eastern European countries like Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the Union in 2007, massive political and economic reform efforts were undertaken to prepare for membership. Yemen has openly expressed its desire to join the GCC. If the Council provided a credible path toward Yemeni membership, entailing a series of stringent criteria that would first have to be met, Yemen's government might be coaxed into making some of the tough decisions necessary to avert further decay.
No effort at domestic transformation in Yemen will be successful without the full backing of the Yemeni government. A path to GCC membership may be the best idea yet aired to cajole the government into coming fully on board.
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
Moving the UN to Dubai
As a brief follow-up to my last post on Dubai, this article introduces a provocative, if somewhat amusing, argument: move the United Nations headquarters from New York City to Dubai. The authors point out that moving the UN to the Emirate would solve a host of problems for each city. For New York, it would free up office and residential space and relieve the city from having to pay for the expensive upkeep of a crumbling facility full of America-bashing diplomats. And for Dubai, it would bring renewed international attention and prestige after its image has been tarnished and would fill a bunch of empty buildings that are currently desperate for tenants. The city could even construct a Dubai United Nations City -- to go alongside its Media City, Internet City, Knowledge Village, Festival City, Sports City, and Cultural Village. Dubai, for its part, seems enthusiastic: it responded to the Op-Ed three days later, saying it "is fully prepared to host the UN's headquarters."
The idea is interesting perhaps most for its implausibility. While it makes perfect practical sense the way the authors lay it out, there is simply no way the UN would choose the razzle-dazzle Emirate as its new home. The city is too young, too unproven, and too closely associated with glamor, new money, and ostentation. The United States is also wary of Dubai and the broader UAE, as evinced by Congress's decision in 2006 to block the Dubai port operator DP World from taking over operations at a collection of US ports. It is much more likely (as the article points out) that when the UN seeks a temporary new home in 2015, it will go to a different Asian city state -- Singapore. This is perhaps a telling choice. Singapore, at one point in its life, faced many of the questions skeptics are now raising about Dubai. In the decade following its independence many in the international community doubted that Singapore could present a viable economic model that would ensure its survival. And yet, here it is: a thriving cosmopolitan center of economic prosperity, vying to host the world's preeminent international organization.
Who knows. Perhaps three decades from now Dubai will not seems such an unlikely choice to host the United Nations...
The idea is interesting perhaps most for its implausibility. While it makes perfect practical sense the way the authors lay it out, there is simply no way the UN would choose the razzle-dazzle Emirate as its new home. The city is too young, too unproven, and too closely associated with glamor, new money, and ostentation. The United States is also wary of Dubai and the broader UAE, as evinced by Congress's decision in 2006 to block the Dubai port operator DP World from taking over operations at a collection of US ports. It is much more likely (as the article points out) that when the UN seeks a temporary new home in 2015, it will go to a different Asian city state -- Singapore. This is perhaps a telling choice. Singapore, at one point in its life, faced many of the questions skeptics are now raising about Dubai. In the decade following its independence many in the international community doubted that Singapore could present a viable economic model that would ensure its survival. And yet, here it is: a thriving cosmopolitan center of economic prosperity, vying to host the world's preeminent international organization.
Who knows. Perhaps three decades from now Dubai will not seems such an unlikely choice to host the United Nations...
Monday, February 15, 2010
Migration as Development
A provocative new paper http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1423717/ by researcher Michael Clemens of the Washington-based think tank Center for Global Development argues that advanced economies should consider relaxing immigration policies considerably, based on the fact that migration to rich countries has been remarkably successful at raising the living standards of the world’s poor. Clemens, who has most recently applied his ideas about labor mobility to the Haitian crisis, forces us to question some of our firmly-held assumptions about development process(es) and migration.
Clemens begins by critiquing narrow “place-based” approaches to development- he argues that the field is preoccupied with the idea of poor countries as potential sites of development. Instead, by focusing on statistics such as the average income gains of poor migrant moving to wealthy countries, Clemens says, we can see migration as an effective and efficient mode of development. After citing a number of impressive statistics about the income gains of migrants who move to wealthier countries, Clemens concludes that “No known schooling intervention, road project, anti-sweatshop campaign, microcredit program, investment facility, export promotion agency, or any other in situ development program can surely and immediately raise the earning power of a large group of very poor people to anywhere near this degree.”
There are a number of questions that the article raises for me with respect to the Middle East:
Can migration to wealthier countries in Europe and North America raise the living standards of people in the poorest countries of the region (Yemen, etc)? I assume that this would be the case given the enormous wage and standard of living disparities between the poorest countries of the Middle East and OECD countries. Unfortunately, concerns about terrorism are likely to poison any effort to introduce a policy that would allow large numbers of Yemenis to migrate to France, Germany and England (for example).
Given the documented abuse of expatriate workers in the Gulf, can increased labor mobility within the region enhance the livelihoods of the poor when destination countries (Saudi, Kuwait, etc) do not have a protective legal and political infrastructure? This is a complex issue given the fact that laborers experience an increase in wages but not necessarily in living standards. In this respect, Clemens argument seems more applicable to Western European and North American countries which allow for a more sustainable rise in income and living standards.
It is certainly important for people and organizations concerned with economic development in the Middle East to consider innovative recommendations such as the ones outlined in A Labor Mobility for Development when formulating policy. For example, with respect to the situation in Afghanistan, there may be a strong argument to allowing Afghans to migrate to wealthier countries such as Iran (and perhaps compensating those countries directly for the burden imposed on infrastructure) rather than implementing top-down development programs within Afghanistan at a large cost. Evidence-based, innovative arguments like the one made by Clemens are desperately needed in policy circles where discussions of global development are based on ossified thinking and antiquated ideas about what works.
Clemens begins by critiquing narrow “place-based” approaches to development- he argues that the field is preoccupied with the idea of poor countries as potential sites of development. Instead, by focusing on statistics such as the average income gains of poor migrant moving to wealthy countries, Clemens says, we can see migration as an effective and efficient mode of development. After citing a number of impressive statistics about the income gains of migrants who move to wealthier countries, Clemens concludes that “No known schooling intervention, road project, anti-sweatshop campaign, microcredit program, investment facility, export promotion agency, or any other in situ development program can surely and immediately raise the earning power of a large group of very poor people to anywhere near this degree.”
There are a number of questions that the article raises for me with respect to the Middle East:
Can migration to wealthier countries in Europe and North America raise the living standards of people in the poorest countries of the region (Yemen, etc)? I assume that this would be the case given the enormous wage and standard of living disparities between the poorest countries of the Middle East and OECD countries. Unfortunately, concerns about terrorism are likely to poison any effort to introduce a policy that would allow large numbers of Yemenis to migrate to France, Germany and England (for example).
Given the documented abuse of expatriate workers in the Gulf, can increased labor mobility within the region enhance the livelihoods of the poor when destination countries (Saudi, Kuwait, etc) do not have a protective legal and political infrastructure? This is a complex issue given the fact that laborers experience an increase in wages but not necessarily in living standards. In this respect, Clemens argument seems more applicable to Western European and North American countries which allow for a more sustainable rise in income and living standards.
It is certainly important for people and organizations concerned with economic development in the Middle East to consider innovative recommendations such as the ones outlined in A Labor Mobility for Development when formulating policy. For example, with respect to the situation in Afghanistan, there may be a strong argument to allowing Afghans to migrate to wealthier countries such as Iran (and perhaps compensating those countries directly for the burden imposed on infrastructure) rather than implementing top-down development programs within Afghanistan at a large cost. Evidence-based, innovative arguments like the one made by Clemens are desperately needed in policy circles where discussions of global development are based on ossified thinking and antiquated ideas about what works.
Saturday, February 13, 2010
The Problem with Symbols
Several days ago the Burj Khalifa, the latest 'superlative' to emerge from the emirate of Dubai, was closed to the public after a small explosion in one of the elevators. A group of tourists apparently sat terrified in the elevator, stuck between two floors, for more than 45 minutes before rescue workers managed to pry the doors open and evacuate them via a service elevator. Afterward, Emaar properties, which owns the property, announced that the observation deck would be closed due to "technical issues with the power supply."
This is only the latest public relations debacle to wrangle Dubai, after an embarrassing near-default on semi-public debt that required neighboring Abu Dhabi to come to the rescue with a multi-billion dollar loan. The world watched stunned as Dubai's shiny veneer was briefly scraped away to reveal a slightly grimier undercoating. Dubai responded to this financial setback by unveiling a brand new display of profligacy and ostentation. The opening for the Burj Khalifa was rushed forward to January 4, largely to take the world's attention off the debt embarrassment. The event was steeped in symbolism. At the last minute the name of the building was changed from 'Burj Dubai' to 'Burj Khalifa,' a nod (perhaps of gratitude) to the ruling family of the UAE and a sign of Emirati national unity. The tower is the tallest in the world, a symbol of Dubai's rise to international prominence, a beacon calling one and all to a new cosmopolitan Mecca that fuses the best of the old and the new... Or so they hoped.
The tower may still achieve what Dubai had in mind. But the problem with symbols is that their meaning can shift in unpredictable ways. Until last week the only part of the Burj Khalifa that was open and operational was the tourist observation deck. Even when it opened, the windows at the top were apparently still caked in dust because cleaners had had no time to wipe them down. This new setback, which has received attention in a slew of Western publications, could actually bolster the image of the city that was fostered by the debt mess. Will the emirate continue to be seen as an urban meeting place between the East and the West, with enough pomp to wow even the savviest global travelers? Or will this new tower come to represent a city that is already past its heyday, with nothing much to show for it but a whole lot of debt and a bunch of behemoth-like structures that barely even work?
This is only the latest public relations debacle to wrangle Dubai, after an embarrassing near-default on semi-public debt that required neighboring Abu Dhabi to come to the rescue with a multi-billion dollar loan. The world watched stunned as Dubai's shiny veneer was briefly scraped away to reveal a slightly grimier undercoating. Dubai responded to this financial setback by unveiling a brand new display of profligacy and ostentation. The opening for the Burj Khalifa was rushed forward to January 4, largely to take the world's attention off the debt embarrassment. The event was steeped in symbolism. At the last minute the name of the building was changed from 'Burj Dubai' to 'Burj Khalifa,' a nod (perhaps of gratitude) to the ruling family of the UAE and a sign of Emirati national unity. The tower is the tallest in the world, a symbol of Dubai's rise to international prominence, a beacon calling one and all to a new cosmopolitan Mecca that fuses the best of the old and the new... Or so they hoped.
The tower may still achieve what Dubai had in mind. But the problem with symbols is that their meaning can shift in unpredictable ways. Until last week the only part of the Burj Khalifa that was open and operational was the tourist observation deck. Even when it opened, the windows at the top were apparently still caked in dust because cleaners had had no time to wipe them down. This new setback, which has received attention in a slew of Western publications, could actually bolster the image of the city that was fostered by the debt mess. Will the emirate continue to be seen as an urban meeting place between the East and the West, with enough pomp to wow even the savviest global travelers? Or will this new tower come to represent a city that is already past its heyday, with nothing much to show for it but a whole lot of debt and a bunch of behemoth-like structures that barely even work?
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Egypt's Negotiating Handicap
The International Institute of Strategic Studies just released a 'strategic comment' on the Israeli-Palestinian peace situation. The title kind of says it all: "Receding Prospects for Middle Eastern Peace." It certainly makes for sober reading. The authors systematically enumerate the array of problems that are currently conspiring to make the alleged 'Peace Process' more like a 'Peace Debacle.' Intransigence on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides of the table are the primary drivers of the stalemate, though virtually all of the participating actors have contributed to the mess as well.
One of these actors is Egypt. The Egyptian regime currently serves as a sponsor and intermediary in the talks between Fatah and Hamas to create a unity Palestinian government. Given how much these two parties hate each other, it is not terribly surprising that Egypt has seen little success. As the article explains, Fatah has signed an Egyptian-sponsored reconciliation agreement that would establish elections for a new Palestinian government in 2010. But with no real incentive, Hamas has yet to sign on.
Whereas in the past Egypt has sought to cajole Hamas into taking more conciliatory positions, its strategy at this stage seems to be good, old-fashioned arm-twisting. It has started construction of an underground wall, which will block Hamas's system of tunnels that gives it access to outside goods. It has also started rallying other Arab states to apply pressure on Hamas to sign the agreement and claims to be building support for an Arab peacekeeping force that would maintain security in the Gaza strip. Much of this seems to be a tactic aimed at forcing Hamas to back down and sign the accord.
Egypt's tactic may work. But given how resilient Hamas has proven itself in the face of outside pressure, I agree with the IISS and suspect the group may hold out.
In fact, there are may be a more fundamental problem stemming directly from Egypt's role in the process. I have not seen this discussed much (which means there may be nothing to it!) but I tend to believe that one of the reasons Egypt has so much difficulty extracting concessions from Hamas on Fatah's behalf is because of a basic lack of trust. Hamas doesn't trust the Egyptian regime -- probably with good reason. Egypt is an unequivocal supporter of Abbas and the Fatah party. It also has a deeply hostile position toward political Islam, primarily due to its fraught relationship with its own internal Islamist movement. In fact it struck me as somewhat ironic that this press on stalled Fatah-Hamas talks came simultaneous with news of Egypt's most recent wave of crackdowns on moderate Muslim Brotherhood leaders. How does Egypt expect to build trust with Hamas if it is groundlessly imprisoning and repressing members of Hamas's sister organization? I honestly don't know how deep Hamas's current connection with the MB is (beyond there ideological and historical links), but even if these ties are weak, it does not send a very constructive message.
To be honest, I believe that Egypt is not the best party to broker these negotiations. The best intermediaries are at least ostensibly neutral in the dispute and are trusted by both sides. Egypt is neither of these. I think the prospects for a mutually agreeable reconciliation agreement would be much higher if a different Arab or Middle Eastern government were to step in instead. Off the top of my head, I can think of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Qatar as obvious possibilities. Saudi is a major regional player, which has better Islamist credentials than Egypt and whose role in the Peace Process has come to be crucial over the years. The latter two have both proven to be adept intermediaries (Turkey with Syria and Israel, and Qatar between factions in Lebanon) and also have relatively good relations with both Hamas and Fatah.
To be honest, no matter who is the mediator, the likelihood of these two parties coming together to form a unity government is still very slim. But these things only get solved through baby steps. Jettisoning Egypt as chief negotiator between the two parties might be a good start.
One of these actors is Egypt. The Egyptian regime currently serves as a sponsor and intermediary in the talks between Fatah and Hamas to create a unity Palestinian government. Given how much these two parties hate each other, it is not terribly surprising that Egypt has seen little success. As the article explains, Fatah has signed an Egyptian-sponsored reconciliation agreement that would establish elections for a new Palestinian government in 2010. But with no real incentive, Hamas has yet to sign on.
Whereas in the past Egypt has sought to cajole Hamas into taking more conciliatory positions, its strategy at this stage seems to be good, old-fashioned arm-twisting. It has started construction of an underground wall, which will block Hamas's system of tunnels that gives it access to outside goods. It has also started rallying other Arab states to apply pressure on Hamas to sign the agreement and claims to be building support for an Arab peacekeeping force that would maintain security in the Gaza strip. Much of this seems to be a tactic aimed at forcing Hamas to back down and sign the accord.
Egypt's tactic may work. But given how resilient Hamas has proven itself in the face of outside pressure, I agree with the IISS and suspect the group may hold out.
In fact, there are may be a more fundamental problem stemming directly from Egypt's role in the process. I have not seen this discussed much (which means there may be nothing to it!) but I tend to believe that one of the reasons Egypt has so much difficulty extracting concessions from Hamas on Fatah's behalf is because of a basic lack of trust. Hamas doesn't trust the Egyptian regime -- probably with good reason. Egypt is an unequivocal supporter of Abbas and the Fatah party. It also has a deeply hostile position toward political Islam, primarily due to its fraught relationship with its own internal Islamist movement. In fact it struck me as somewhat ironic that this press on stalled Fatah-Hamas talks came simultaneous with news of Egypt's most recent wave of crackdowns on moderate Muslim Brotherhood leaders. How does Egypt expect to build trust with Hamas if it is groundlessly imprisoning and repressing members of Hamas's sister organization? I honestly don't know how deep Hamas's current connection with the MB is (beyond there ideological and historical links), but even if these ties are weak, it does not send a very constructive message.
To be honest, I believe that Egypt is not the best party to broker these negotiations. The best intermediaries are at least ostensibly neutral in the dispute and are trusted by both sides. Egypt is neither of these. I think the prospects for a mutually agreeable reconciliation agreement would be much higher if a different Arab or Middle Eastern government were to step in instead. Off the top of my head, I can think of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Qatar as obvious possibilities. Saudi is a major regional player, which has better Islamist credentials than Egypt and whose role in the Peace Process has come to be crucial over the years. The latter two have both proven to be adept intermediaries (Turkey with Syria and Israel, and Qatar between factions in Lebanon) and also have relatively good relations with both Hamas and Fatah.
To be honest, no matter who is the mediator, the likelihood of these two parties coming together to form a unity government is still very slim. But these things only get solved through baby steps. Jettisoning Egypt as chief negotiator between the two parties might be a good start.
Monday, February 8, 2010
USIP Report on Oil Politics in Iraq
A recent report on oil politics in Iraq was recently brought to my attention. Entitled "Iraq's Oil Politics: Where Agreement Might Be Found", this intriguing report was published by a fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. It chronicles the developments and negotiatations concerning the hydrocarbon legislation that the Bush administration had long championed as a benchmark for Iraqi political reconciliation, and tries to explain why these negotiations concerning Iraq's oil resources have reached a stalemate.
Given oil's status as Iraq's primary export and the fact that more than 90% of public expenditures are financed by oil monies, finding an acceptable formula for distributing Iraq's oil revenues was always going to be a key issue. Yet the underlying approach pursued by the Bush administration focused more on investment and contracting, and less on an acceptable formula and respectable mechanism for distributing oil revenues. This approach is embodies in the hydrocarbon law, which has gotten nowhere so far and seems dead on arrival in the Iraqi parliament.
The reason this hydrocarbon law (which focuses almost exclusively on oil contracting and investment) is so problematic is because Iraqis disagree vehemently over who should have the authority to sign oil contracts. Should it be the sole right of the central government in Baghdad? Can the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) sign them too? If the Shia were to create a super-region in the south (a very real possibility up until recently), would they be able to award oil contracts separate from Baghdad? The possibility of regional governments overriding the central government in terms of control over the state's main source of funds could lead to the unraveling of Iraq - a prospect that made Sunnis and more nationalist Shia anxy over decentralizing power.
Moreover, part of the problem lies with the Iraqi Constitution. The constitution is purposefully vague about whether regional or national law has primacy over signing oil contracts; the Kurds made sure it was written that way. This gives them wiggle room to sign their own contracts in the future. They have indeed already signed 25 contracts with foreign firms for production in KRG-controlled territory.
In short, Iraqi Arabs are demanding that an agreement on revenue sharing include constitutional amendments that prohibit the Kurds from having the best of both worlds - being alotted 17% of Iraq's oil revenues in addition to signing their own contracts. In the Iraqi Arabs vision, the Kurds would simply be guaranteed 17% of oil revenues, and contracts would be signed with Baghdad alone. This is a formula highly desired by the Kurds, since the current arrangement of being alotted 17% of the budget can capricious and arbitrary. (During the 2008 budget negotiations, there was a concerted attempt by Sunni and Shia Arab MPs to cut the KRG's share from 17% to 13%). Instead, the Kurds would like to see a revenue-sharing law that would provide the KRG with a transparent and automatic mechanism to transfer its share of oil revenues rather than continuing to rely on the budgetary process.
So, both Kurds and Arabs agree that a just and equitable revenue-sharing law is needed. The problem is that the Arabs want constitutional amendments that will solidify the primacy of federal law over regional law; the revenue-sharing mechanism won't work if an entire region can just opt out and start signing its own contracts. Yet, because of the way the constitution was written, the Kurds have veto power over any constitutional amendment. Hence the logjam.
This issue will undoubtedly be central to how the next government is formed after the March 7th elections. Again, because of the way the constitution was written, the Kurds more likely than not will be in a position to play kingmakers during the negotiations to form a government. There actually is a little bit of room for manouvering and compromising. There are plenty of tradeoffs that can be made regarding revenue-sharing and constitutional amendments. Yet, there is always the possibility that such an issue of colossal importance may precipitate violence since constitutional mechanisms seem to be useless. The Constitution is where many of the problems are to begin with.
Given oil's status as Iraq's primary export and the fact that more than 90% of public expenditures are financed by oil monies, finding an acceptable formula for distributing Iraq's oil revenues was always going to be a key issue. Yet the underlying approach pursued by the Bush administration focused more on investment and contracting, and less on an acceptable formula and respectable mechanism for distributing oil revenues. This approach is embodies in the hydrocarbon law, which has gotten nowhere so far and seems dead on arrival in the Iraqi parliament.
The reason this hydrocarbon law (which focuses almost exclusively on oil contracting and investment) is so problematic is because Iraqis disagree vehemently over who should have the authority to sign oil contracts. Should it be the sole right of the central government in Baghdad? Can the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) sign them too? If the Shia were to create a super-region in the south (a very real possibility up until recently), would they be able to award oil contracts separate from Baghdad? The possibility of regional governments overriding the central government in terms of control over the state's main source of funds could lead to the unraveling of Iraq - a prospect that made Sunnis and more nationalist Shia anxy over decentralizing power.
Moreover, part of the problem lies with the Iraqi Constitution. The constitution is purposefully vague about whether regional or national law has primacy over signing oil contracts; the Kurds made sure it was written that way. This gives them wiggle room to sign their own contracts in the future. They have indeed already signed 25 contracts with foreign firms for production in KRG-controlled territory.
In short, Iraqi Arabs are demanding that an agreement on revenue sharing include constitutional amendments that prohibit the Kurds from having the best of both worlds - being alotted 17% of Iraq's oil revenues in addition to signing their own contracts. In the Iraqi Arabs vision, the Kurds would simply be guaranteed 17% of oil revenues, and contracts would be signed with Baghdad alone. This is a formula highly desired by the Kurds, since the current arrangement of being alotted 17% of the budget can capricious and arbitrary. (During the 2008 budget negotiations, there was a concerted attempt by Sunni and Shia Arab MPs to cut the KRG's share from 17% to 13%). Instead, the Kurds would like to see a revenue-sharing law that would provide the KRG with a transparent and automatic mechanism to transfer its share of oil revenues rather than continuing to rely on the budgetary process.
So, both Kurds and Arabs agree that a just and equitable revenue-sharing law is needed. The problem is that the Arabs want constitutional amendments that will solidify the primacy of federal law over regional law; the revenue-sharing mechanism won't work if an entire region can just opt out and start signing its own contracts. Yet, because of the way the constitution was written, the Kurds have veto power over any constitutional amendment. Hence the logjam.
This issue will undoubtedly be central to how the next government is formed after the March 7th elections. Again, because of the way the constitution was written, the Kurds more likely than not will be in a position to play kingmakers during the negotiations to form a government. There actually is a little bit of room for manouvering and compromising. There are plenty of tradeoffs that can be made regarding revenue-sharing and constitutional amendments. Yet, there is always the possibility that such an issue of colossal importance may precipitate violence since constitutional mechanisms seem to be useless. The Constitution is where many of the problems are to begin with.
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