Although the balance of power within Egyptian domestic politics is still very much up in the air, Egypt's post-revolutionary foreign policy is beginning to crystallize. Egypt's foreign policy under Mubarak played a somewhat minor - if any - role in fomenting the flames of revolution back in January and February. Certainly there was some modicum of popular discontent with the Mubarak regime's alliance with Israel and the United States, but these concerns certainly did not drive the revolution that forced Mubarak from power.
Egypt's foreign policy under the transitional government is breaking somewhat from the old alliances forged by the Mubarak regime. The most ovbious indicator of this break from the past is Egypt's role in negotiating a deal between Fatah and Hamas two weeks ago. Egypt had been attemtping to midwife an agreement between the two Palestinian factions for four years to no avail. There were accusations that Egypt was not an honest broker throughout the process, as it allegedly favored Fatah at the expense of Hamas. Yet not three months after the Egyptian transitional government took power, an agreement was struck between Hamas and Fatah through Egyptian mediation. Though it's difficult to know exactly what made the reconciliation possible at this moment, one is led to believe that Egypt's shifting foreign policy goals helped facilitate an agreement.
Egypt has also indicated it is open to closer relations with Iran. Egypt and Iran have not enjoyed diplomatic relations since 1979, when Anwar Sadat provided refuge for the deposed Shah. Iranian cargo ships are now allowed to pass through the Suez Canal, and there are even rumors that both countries are seeking to restore diplomatic relations and return their ambassadors.
The emerging strategic calculus on the part of the post-revolutionary Egyptian government is not entirely surprising. Throughout the last decade, many within Egypt have voiced dissatisfaction with its alliance with Israel, the US, and Saudi Arabia. Many claimed that these alliances limited Egypt's foreign policy options. It also arguably opened the door for countries like Turkey and Qatar to cement their status as independent mediators. As a consequence, these countries have acquired influence at Egypt's expense. How interesting, then, to see Turkey and Qatar invited to Cairo to share in the official announcement of Palestinian reconciliation two weeks ago. Of course, Egypt's options will be perpetually limited in a way that Turkey and Qatar's are not. As we were reminded time and time again throughout news coverage of Egypt's revolution, Egypt receives over $2 billion annually in US aid. Thus, there will surely be limits to Egyptian overtures to Iran and Hamas.
***I expect this to be my last blog entry, as I am graduating in a week. It's been a pleasure blogging for the department throughout the last two years. I'd like to thank Nadia Khalaf for managing the blog, as well as all the others in the department who have made this blog possible. I would also like to thank the readers. As for me, today I begin my long walk off into the sunset.
Showing posts with label Brian Torro. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Brian Torro. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
Friday, May 6, 2011
The US Budget and Title VI
This is not a blog about American politics. Hence, I bet you are wondering why I plan to write about the US budget and how it affects us all at the Kevorkian Center. The answer lies in the fact that one of the victims of the bipartisan budget deal struck between President Obama and House Republicans last April happens to be Title VI of the Higher Education Act. According to this report, the deal cuts funding for Title VI by 40%, reducing the total amount of funds from $126 million to $76 million.
Title VI is the Department of Education program that funds Language Resource Centers across the United States, including New York University's Kevoriakian Center for Near Eastern Studies. This pool of money also funds the FLAS fellowships, which allow so many of us to pursue advanced level study in languages like Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. So many of us at the Kevorkian Center have benefiited enormously from FLAS fellowships. Not only do they facilitate language study during the regular academic year at NYU, they also allow many of us to study during the summer in the Middle East. As anyone who has tried to learn Arabic can attest, there is no way to reach a genuine level of advanced proficiency if you don't spend time living and studying amidst native speakers. Furthermore, the cost of independently financing language study halfway around the world makes these generous fellowships an absolute necessity for many of us.
It baffles me that lawmakers have chosen to cut these programs, practically rolling them back to pre-2001 levels. Out of all the things in the 2011 budget - which tops $3 trillion - why cut programs that give such tangible material assistance to graduate students learning languages like Arabic and Persian? Graduate school would literally be out of reach for many students without this funding. Here's to hoping that the Obama administration increases this funding in the fiscal year 2012 budget, which begins October 1st. If these levels become the new normal, lots of area studies programs and graduate students will be in serious trouble.
Title VI is the Department of Education program that funds Language Resource Centers across the United States, including New York University's Kevoriakian Center for Near Eastern Studies. This pool of money also funds the FLAS fellowships, which allow so many of us to pursue advanced level study in languages like Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. So many of us at the Kevorkian Center have benefiited enormously from FLAS fellowships. Not only do they facilitate language study during the regular academic year at NYU, they also allow many of us to study during the summer in the Middle East. As anyone who has tried to learn Arabic can attest, there is no way to reach a genuine level of advanced proficiency if you don't spend time living and studying amidst native speakers. Furthermore, the cost of independently financing language study halfway around the world makes these generous fellowships an absolute necessity for many of us.
It baffles me that lawmakers have chosen to cut these programs, practically rolling them back to pre-2001 levels. Out of all the things in the 2011 budget - which tops $3 trillion - why cut programs that give such tangible material assistance to graduate students learning languages like Arabic and Persian? Graduate school would literally be out of reach for many students without this funding. Here's to hoping that the Obama administration increases this funding in the fiscal year 2012 budget, which begins October 1st. If these levels become the new normal, lots of area studies programs and graduate students will be in serious trouble.
Monday, April 11, 2011
Tagheer Egypt can believe in?
Two months have passed since the mass uprising in Egypt toppled the regime of Hosni Mubarak. Since then, the supreme military council has commissioned a committee to amend the constitution, and a referendum was held to approve these constitutional amendments. Yet despite the euphoria that swept the nation two months ago, there are many concerns that the revolution's momentum has been stumbling of late.
For instance, the supreme military council led by Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi has come under fire recently for supposedly dragging its feet in prosecuting former Mubarak cronies. Mubarak himself may be constrained by house arrest in Sharm el-Sheikh, but there is little doubt that the vast network of patronage that underpinned his rule has yet to be fully dismantled. Furthermore, the military council's recent warning that continued demonstrations and strikes will not be tolerated certainly hasn't won it many new fans. The same can be said about the arrest of a blogger who has dared to criticized the military council's leadership.
Another source of frustration are the constitutional amendments that many considered to have been rushed through. Though the referendum approved these amendments by a solid majority of 77%, many of the leaders who were at the forefront of the uprising campaigned vigorously against it them. Since these amendments call for elections by September, they naturally privilege the parties that are more organized at the moment. This would give a significant advantage to movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and remnants of the NDP. Conversely, holding elections so soon would pose a challenge to many of the younger, less organized movements that still have not formed adequate cohesion following the uprising. This is why many of them campaigned against the amendments.
The military has pledged to transfer power to a civilian government after elections are held in September. Yet it remains to be seen if an elected civilian government will carry the revolution to its completion, or whether it will be subject to the military at the end of the day. The 18-day uprising that ousted Mubarak was certainly an astonishing achievement in and of itself. Yet clearly, the revolution has a lot more work to do.
For instance, the supreme military council led by Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi has come under fire recently for supposedly dragging its feet in prosecuting former Mubarak cronies. Mubarak himself may be constrained by house arrest in Sharm el-Sheikh, but there is little doubt that the vast network of patronage that underpinned his rule has yet to be fully dismantled. Furthermore, the military council's recent warning that continued demonstrations and strikes will not be tolerated certainly hasn't won it many new fans. The same can be said about the arrest of a blogger who has dared to criticized the military council's leadership.
Another source of frustration are the constitutional amendments that many considered to have been rushed through. Though the referendum approved these amendments by a solid majority of 77%, many of the leaders who were at the forefront of the uprising campaigned vigorously against it them. Since these amendments call for elections by September, they naturally privilege the parties that are more organized at the moment. This would give a significant advantage to movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and remnants of the NDP. Conversely, holding elections so soon would pose a challenge to many of the younger, less organized movements that still have not formed adequate cohesion following the uprising. This is why many of them campaigned against the amendments.
The military has pledged to transfer power to a civilian government after elections are held in September. Yet it remains to be seen if an elected civilian government will carry the revolution to its completion, or whether it will be subject to the military at the end of the day. The 18-day uprising that ousted Mubarak was certainly an astonishing achievement in and of itself. Yet clearly, the revolution has a lot more work to do.
Thursday, March 31, 2011
What Has Bashar Assad Learned From Mubarak?
I don't know if the recent events in Syria will lead to regime change on the scale of what happened in Tunisia or Egypt. But judging from the way in which Mr. Assad has handled the protests, and the speech he delivered on Wednesday, it appears that he has not taken advantage of the opportunity to learn from Ben Ali's and Mubarak's mistakes.
Especially given the clumsy way in which Mubarak addressed the Egyptian protesters demands, one would think Assad could be a bit more tactful. Mubarak would repeatedly invoke foreign conspiracies and the vendettas of certain satellite television channels to belittle the demands of the protesters. He also thought that the excessive use of force would be able to squash the uprising before it reached its tipping point (remember those camels racing through Tahrir square?). He also frequently cited the 'progress' that Egypt had been making over the years in terms of economic and political reform, although always careful to throw in the caveat that it needed to happen quicker. Needless to say, that strategy did not fare well for him.
So how bizarre, then, to see Assad apparently following the same strategy. So far, the excessive use of force on the Syrian protesters in Dara'a have ended up generating more protests throughout the country. The hinting of vague, modest reforms sometime in the future will surely not satisfy the protester's demands. Rather, it will likely ensure that the protesters increase their demands. After all, that's been the pattern we have seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.
So how will Assad deal with these protests that are increasingly gathering strength throughout Syria? What lessons has he drawn from Ben Ali and Mubarak? Judging from yesterday's speech, one wonders if he has squandered the opportunity of having almost three whole months to prepare for this moment.
Especially given the clumsy way in which Mubarak addressed the Egyptian protesters demands, one would think Assad could be a bit more tactful. Mubarak would repeatedly invoke foreign conspiracies and the vendettas of certain satellite television channels to belittle the demands of the protesters. He also thought that the excessive use of force would be able to squash the uprising before it reached its tipping point (remember those camels racing through Tahrir square?). He also frequently cited the 'progress' that Egypt had been making over the years in terms of economic and political reform, although always careful to throw in the caveat that it needed to happen quicker. Needless to say, that strategy did not fare well for him.
So how bizarre, then, to see Assad apparently following the same strategy. So far, the excessive use of force on the Syrian protesters in Dara'a have ended up generating more protests throughout the country. The hinting of vague, modest reforms sometime in the future will surely not satisfy the protester's demands. Rather, it will likely ensure that the protesters increase their demands. After all, that's been the pattern we have seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.
So how will Assad deal with these protests that are increasingly gathering strength throughout Syria? What lessons has he drawn from Ben Ali and Mubarak? Judging from yesterday's speech, one wonders if he has squandered the opportunity of having almost three whole months to prepare for this moment.
Saturday, March 12, 2011
What are the protests in Iraq really about?
Most of the protests that have been sweeping the region have been directed against aging autocrats that have monopolized power for decades. How interesting, then, to see an increasingly active protest movement being organized in Iraq. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, reasonably free and fair elections were held in Iraq just last March. So what are these protests about?
On the most basic level, these protests have been driven by corruption and the lack of services the Iraqi government provides for its constituents. Eight years after the US-led invasion, many areas in Iraq still don't have sufficient electricity. Corruption is rampant, with Iraq ranking 175th out of 178 countries worldwide by Transparency International.
But as Mashriq Abbas notes in al-Hayat, these protests are about something even more fundamental: the very structure of the post-2003 political order. During the last eight years, Iraqi politics have been governed by a sectarian logic. The various ministries have at times been run as sectarian fiefdoms. One's relationship to vast networks of patronage often determine one's status, rather than one's merit or level of expertise.
Furthermore, although Iraq is governed by a parliamentary democracy, there really is no "government / opposition" dynamic in parliament. After elections, the various competing parliamentary blocs work out deals so that almost every bloc is somehow represented in the cabinet. This is done in the name of "national unity". Even Ayad Allawi, whose 'Iraqiyya' bloc won the most amount of seats in the elections last year, chose to take a made-up position in the new government rather than play the role of the opposition. The result has been a government with an ideologically incoherent political program. As a consequence, the government has not worked towards solving substantive issues like providing essential services to the people.
So since there is no "opposition" in Iraqi politics, but just a handful of parties struggling to get a piece of the pie in order to reinforce their patronage networks, there is often no voice to keep the government honest. This is the void that the protesters are filling. So the protest movement is not simply about corruption and lack of services. Although those are certainly the core issues, the more fundamental concern is the presence of an opposition party willing to speak up for those who don't have a seat at the table.
On the most basic level, these protests have been driven by corruption and the lack of services the Iraqi government provides for its constituents. Eight years after the US-led invasion, many areas in Iraq still don't have sufficient electricity. Corruption is rampant, with Iraq ranking 175th out of 178 countries worldwide by Transparency International.
But as Mashriq Abbas notes in al-Hayat, these protests are about something even more fundamental: the very structure of the post-2003 political order. During the last eight years, Iraqi politics have been governed by a sectarian logic. The various ministries have at times been run as sectarian fiefdoms. One's relationship to vast networks of patronage often determine one's status, rather than one's merit or level of expertise.
Furthermore, although Iraq is governed by a parliamentary democracy, there really is no "government / opposition" dynamic in parliament. After elections, the various competing parliamentary blocs work out deals so that almost every bloc is somehow represented in the cabinet. This is done in the name of "national unity". Even Ayad Allawi, whose 'Iraqiyya' bloc won the most amount of seats in the elections last year, chose to take a made-up position in the new government rather than play the role of the opposition. The result has been a government with an ideologically incoherent political program. As a consequence, the government has not worked towards solving substantive issues like providing essential services to the people.
So since there is no "opposition" in Iraqi politics, but just a handful of parties struggling to get a piece of the pie in order to reinforce their patronage networks, there is often no voice to keep the government honest. This is the void that the protesters are filling. So the protest movement is not simply about corruption and lack of services. Although those are certainly the core issues, the more fundamental concern is the presence of an opposition party willing to speak up for those who don't have a seat at the table.
Friday, March 4, 2011
Who's Watching Al-Arabiya?
Since 2003, the politics of Arabic language satellite television have been defined by the rivalry between the Qatar-based al-Jazeera and the Dubai-based/Saudi-funded al-Arabiya. Indeed, al-Arabiya's sole raison d'etre since its founding in 2003 is to counter al-Jazeera. Needless to say, the last eight years have seen some rather interesting media wars between the two.
A poll released last week will be sure to up the ante. The poll was conducted by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and focused on ascertaining which news sources Egyptians tuned into during the protests. The BBG is a Washington based group that apparently used regional subcontracting to carry out the actual polling of 502 Egyptians in Cairo and Alexandria. The results indicate that 65% of Egyptians turned to al-Arabiya to get the majority of their news during the uprising, while only 22% turned to al-Jazeera. I'm sorry, but these results are just not credible.
Anyone who has spent any time at all in an Arabic-speaking country where al-Jazeera is available realizes that it is by far the most popular satellite news channel in the Arab world. During my time in Cairo this past summer, al-Jazeera was simply ubiquitous. Even the World Cup (which I watched religiously) was broadcast on al-Jazeera Sport. I can't remember ever seeing anyone watch al-Arabiya.
Another reason why I have a hard time accepting the credibility of this poll is because its results indicate that Egyptians deemed Nile TV - Egypt's state channel - to be more credible than al-Jazeera. Now, it goes without saying that al-Jazeera certainly has its biases and limitations (doesn't everyone?). But to say that Egyptians put more trust in their state television channel than al-Jazeera is simply laughable. Until Mubarak was practically out the door, Nile TV was continuously downplaying the scale of the uprising in order to discourage popular support. Furthermore, the poll indicates that al-Hurra was more popular and more credible than al-Jazeera during the protests. I find this extremely hard to believe, to say the least.
So what's going on here? My guess is that a significant part has to do with al-Jazeera being blocked by the Egyptian authorities for a week during the uprising. The polling took place between February 4 and February 10. al-Jazeera was blocked during a good part of that period. I wish I could come up with a more sophisticated critique that focuses on the poll's methodological flaws, but it's been a while since I took statistics and econometrics as an undergraduate. Therefore, I'll just stick to my instinctual critique that this poll surely cannot be credible.
A poll released last week will be sure to up the ante. The poll was conducted by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and focused on ascertaining which news sources Egyptians tuned into during the protests. The BBG is a Washington based group that apparently used regional subcontracting to carry out the actual polling of 502 Egyptians in Cairo and Alexandria. The results indicate that 65% of Egyptians turned to al-Arabiya to get the majority of their news during the uprising, while only 22% turned to al-Jazeera. I'm sorry, but these results are just not credible.
Anyone who has spent any time at all in an Arabic-speaking country where al-Jazeera is available realizes that it is by far the most popular satellite news channel in the Arab world. During my time in Cairo this past summer, al-Jazeera was simply ubiquitous. Even the World Cup (which I watched religiously) was broadcast on al-Jazeera Sport. I can't remember ever seeing anyone watch al-Arabiya.
Another reason why I have a hard time accepting the credibility of this poll is because its results indicate that Egyptians deemed Nile TV - Egypt's state channel - to be more credible than al-Jazeera. Now, it goes without saying that al-Jazeera certainly has its biases and limitations (doesn't everyone?). But to say that Egyptians put more trust in their state television channel than al-Jazeera is simply laughable. Until Mubarak was practically out the door, Nile TV was continuously downplaying the scale of the uprising in order to discourage popular support. Furthermore, the poll indicates that al-Hurra was more popular and more credible than al-Jazeera during the protests. I find this extremely hard to believe, to say the least.
So what's going on here? My guess is that a significant part has to do with al-Jazeera being blocked by the Egyptian authorities for a week during the uprising. The polling took place between February 4 and February 10. al-Jazeera was blocked during a good part of that period. I wish I could come up with a more sophisticated critique that focuses on the poll's methodological flaws, but it's been a while since I took statistics and econometrics as an undergraduate. Therefore, I'll just stick to my instinctual critique that this poll surely cannot be credible.
Monday, February 14, 2011
The Devolution of al-Ahram
The fact that Egypt's revolution had succeeded in its primary goal of ousting Hosni Mubarak really hit me on Saturday when I was walking home to my apartment. Every day, I pass a small convenience store with a number of foreign-language newspapers outside, one of which is the government-affiliated Egyptian daily al-Ahram. I usually don't bother to read al-Ahram, as the quality of its news and analysis has been on the steady decline for a while now. More independent newspapers like al-Masry al-Youm and al-Sharouk offer much more serious insight. Thus, I usually glance at al-Ahram everyday while walking by, and continue on my way. If I buy an Arabic newspaper, I buy al-Hayat or ash-Sharq al-Awsat.
But Saturday, I stopped to see the headline on the morning after Mubarak's resignation. It was clear that something had changed. The same newspaper that had continued to downplay the massive protests that began to sweep the country on January 25th now ran a massive headline that read: 11 February 2011...The Fall of the Mubarak Regime. Below it was a massive photograph of youths carrying a banner congratulating the Egyptian people and expressing their desire for an "honorable government". On page six, the newspaper printed all of the names and places of origin of the "martyrs of the revolution". This was clearly a different newspaper than it was under the Mubarak regime.
The devolution of al-Ahram is a fascinating example of how far Mubarak's regime has fallen. In the last few years, the newspaper has grown increasingly uncredible. Several high-profile Egyptian intellectuals (Fahmy al-Huweidi, Jalal Amin, Salameh Ahmad Salameh) who used to write columns in al-Ahram decided to make the move to the more independent-minded Egyptian dailies like al-Masry al-Youm and al-Sharouk. For what its worth, here's a personal anecdote. I remember al-Ahram being a far more ubiquitous newspaper in Cairo while studying Arabic there in 2006 in comparison to my time there in 2010. I even remember getting assigned al-Ahram op-eds in my media class back in 2006. By 2010, that newspaper had become such a joke that it would have been almost unthinkable to use its articles and op-eds in class. Instead, we were assigned op-eds from al-Masry al-Youm and al-Sharouk. After all, that's where all the most influential columnists had relocated.
I'm not saying that anyone could have seen the revolution in Egypt coming, giving the unpopularity of its semi-official newspaper. To some extent, its unpopularity can be seen as a barometer of public opinion, but by no means could that have indicated a possible revolution on the horizon. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to see how al-Ahram reconstitutes itself, hopefully as an independent voice in a future democratic political process.
But Saturday, I stopped to see the headline on the morning after Mubarak's resignation. It was clear that something had changed. The same newspaper that had continued to downplay the massive protests that began to sweep the country on January 25th now ran a massive headline that read: 11 February 2011...The Fall of the Mubarak Regime. Below it was a massive photograph of youths carrying a banner congratulating the Egyptian people and expressing their desire for an "honorable government". On page six, the newspaper printed all of the names and places of origin of the "martyrs of the revolution". This was clearly a different newspaper than it was under the Mubarak regime.
The devolution of al-Ahram is a fascinating example of how far Mubarak's regime has fallen. In the last few years, the newspaper has grown increasingly uncredible. Several high-profile Egyptian intellectuals (Fahmy al-Huweidi, Jalal Amin, Salameh Ahmad Salameh) who used to write columns in al-Ahram decided to make the move to the more independent-minded Egyptian dailies like al-Masry al-Youm and al-Sharouk. For what its worth, here's a personal anecdote. I remember al-Ahram being a far more ubiquitous newspaper in Cairo while studying Arabic there in 2006 in comparison to my time there in 2010. I even remember getting assigned al-Ahram op-eds in my media class back in 2006. By 2010, that newspaper had become such a joke that it would have been almost unthinkable to use its articles and op-eds in class. Instead, we were assigned op-eds from al-Masry al-Youm and al-Sharouk. After all, that's where all the most influential columnists had relocated.
I'm not saying that anyone could have seen the revolution in Egypt coming, giving the unpopularity of its semi-official newspaper. To some extent, its unpopularity can be seen as a barometer of public opinion, but by no means could that have indicated a possible revolution on the horizon. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to see how al-Ahram reconstitutes itself, hopefully as an independent voice in a future democratic political process.
Friday, February 11, 2011
The Revolution Succeeds
The scenes emanating from Cairo on television are absolutely astonishing. The frustration felt yesterday by the hundreds of thousands that had gathered in Tahrir Square when Mubarak refused to resign has turned to euphoria and jubilation in light of Omar Suleiman's brief statement on state television that Mubarak had "left his position."
Significantly, Mubarak has transferred power to a council of military leaders and not to Omar Suleiman, thus signaling a much cleaner break with the past regime. The council of military leaders will now consult with the Egyptian Supreme Court to begin the transition process which will include the drawing up of a new constitutional framework and free and fair elections.
Undoubtedly there is so much work to be done to institutionalize this revolution, but I think it's appropriate now to stop and reflect on all of the events that led up to this momentous climax. For instance, at the "Egypt Rising" panel yesterday, Professor Lockman made a great point that I think often gets lost admist the spontaneity of this revolution: this movement has been a long time in the making. The labor protests in the Delta industrial town of Mahalla al-Kubra in 2008 is an event that often gets overlooked. These protests that were handily crushed by the regime occured in April 2008. The Facebook movement - April 6th Youth Movement - that organized the very first protests on January 25th was named to honor those who stood up and went on strike. The brutal murder of Khaled Said in June 2010 also spurred widespread anger and frustration with Egypt's authoritarian security apparatus.
The panel also made some insightful comments about the role of social and satellite media. It's become a cliche to cite Facebook or Twitter's role in enabling this revolution. Certainly they played a facilitating role, but I reckon that satellite media like al-Jazeera has played a more significant role than social media which can be disabled with a flip of a switch by authoritarian regimes. And even though al-Jazeera was shut down for a time by the governments of Tunisia and Egypt, the Qatari-based coverage never took the spotlight off of these uprisings. The interesting thing is how social and satellite media interact with each other to enable different types of political possibilities. After all, even shutting down al-Jazeera's local office won't prevent people from recording videos on their phones or providing on the ground information and relaying it to al-Jazeera, who can broadcast it throughout the world from their office in Qatar. But in the last analysis, let's not overstate the importance of these social media. Many, many revolutions have occured without them.
Obviously it's impossible to overstate the meaning of today's events, so out of humility I'll just leave it at that.
Significantly, Mubarak has transferred power to a council of military leaders and not to Omar Suleiman, thus signaling a much cleaner break with the past regime. The council of military leaders will now consult with the Egyptian Supreme Court to begin the transition process which will include the drawing up of a new constitutional framework and free and fair elections.
Undoubtedly there is so much work to be done to institutionalize this revolution, but I think it's appropriate now to stop and reflect on all of the events that led up to this momentous climax. For instance, at the "Egypt Rising" panel yesterday, Professor Lockman made a great point that I think often gets lost admist the spontaneity of this revolution: this movement has been a long time in the making. The labor protests in the Delta industrial town of Mahalla al-Kubra in 2008 is an event that often gets overlooked. These protests that were handily crushed by the regime occured in April 2008. The Facebook movement - April 6th Youth Movement - that organized the very first protests on January 25th was named to honor those who stood up and went on strike. The brutal murder of Khaled Said in June 2010 also spurred widespread anger and frustration with Egypt's authoritarian security apparatus.
The panel also made some insightful comments about the role of social and satellite media. It's become a cliche to cite Facebook or Twitter's role in enabling this revolution. Certainly they played a facilitating role, but I reckon that satellite media like al-Jazeera has played a more significant role than social media which can be disabled with a flip of a switch by authoritarian regimes. And even though al-Jazeera was shut down for a time by the governments of Tunisia and Egypt, the Qatari-based coverage never took the spotlight off of these uprisings. The interesting thing is how social and satellite media interact with each other to enable different types of political possibilities. After all, even shutting down al-Jazeera's local office won't prevent people from recording videos on their phones or providing on the ground information and relaying it to al-Jazeera, who can broadcast it throughout the world from their office in Qatar. But in the last analysis, let's not overstate the importance of these social media. Many, many revolutions have occured without them.
Obviously it's impossible to overstate the meaning of today's events, so out of humility I'll just leave it at that.
Thursday, February 10, 2011
The Abdication That Wasn't
I woke up on Thursday morning to news reports that this was to be the day that Hosni Mubarak would officially step down as president. Al-Jazeera was stating that the Egyptian military, after learning that Mubarak was planning to pass on his responsibilities to Vice President Omar Suleiman, was intervening to "safeguard the nation" and to ensure that the protesters would see their demands met. Apparently, the military brass had "reservations" about this transfer of power to Mr. Suleiman, indicating a possible split between the two.
All morning and afternoon, the group that had gathered for NYU's "Egypt Rising" event was on the edge of their seats waiting for Mr. Mubarak to appear on state television and announce his official abdication. The euphoria and delirium of the hundreds of thousands that had gathered in Tahrir Square was palpable, as it seemed an all out certainty that this would be Mubarak's last day in power.
Finally, Mubarak appeared on state television and astonished millions of viewers by stating that he was not in fact stepping down, but merely delegating more responsibility to Mr. Suleiman. It made me think of the conversation I had had with a cabbie in Cairo over the summer, where he claimed that Mubarak was as stubborn as a "gamoos" (water buffalo). His stubbornness was certainly on full display Thursday afternoon.
So why the reports that Mubarak would abdicate, only to find out that he is simply delegating more authority to his vice president? It was already rather clear this week that Suleiman was calling most of the shots - he was the one leading the talks with the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition figures. It had already seemed like Mubarak, having lost such a vast amount of political capital, was receding into the background and biding his time until September's elections. So being told that he intends to give Suleiman more responsibility is nothing new.
So what's the deal? Is he effectively calling everyone's bluff (the protesters, the military, the international community)? Is he purposely provoking more protests, hoping that they lead to chaos and generate nostalgia for the "stability" of the olden days?
And finally, what's the deal with the military? Its statements from earlier Thursday that it was intervening to "safeguard the nation" have engendered so much confusion. Is it waiting for the scale to tip a little further, giving them the leverage to make their move? Friday's protests should be telling in that regard, because they will undoubtedly prove to be the most intense yet. It looks like the oft repeated slogan that "the army and the people are one" will finally be be put to the test.
All morning and afternoon, the group that had gathered for NYU's "Egypt Rising" event was on the edge of their seats waiting for Mr. Mubarak to appear on state television and announce his official abdication. The euphoria and delirium of the hundreds of thousands that had gathered in Tahrir Square was palpable, as it seemed an all out certainty that this would be Mubarak's last day in power.
Finally, Mubarak appeared on state television and astonished millions of viewers by stating that he was not in fact stepping down, but merely delegating more responsibility to Mr. Suleiman. It made me think of the conversation I had had with a cabbie in Cairo over the summer, where he claimed that Mubarak was as stubborn as a "gamoos" (water buffalo). His stubbornness was certainly on full display Thursday afternoon.
So why the reports that Mubarak would abdicate, only to find out that he is simply delegating more authority to his vice president? It was already rather clear this week that Suleiman was calling most of the shots - he was the one leading the talks with the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition figures. It had already seemed like Mubarak, having lost such a vast amount of political capital, was receding into the background and biding his time until September's elections. So being told that he intends to give Suleiman more responsibility is nothing new.
So what's the deal? Is he effectively calling everyone's bluff (the protesters, the military, the international community)? Is he purposely provoking more protests, hoping that they lead to chaos and generate nostalgia for the "stability" of the olden days?
And finally, what's the deal with the military? Its statements from earlier Thursday that it was intervening to "safeguard the nation" have engendered so much confusion. Is it waiting for the scale to tip a little further, giving them the leverage to make their move? Friday's protests should be telling in that regard, because they will undoubtedly prove to be the most intense yet. It looks like the oft repeated slogan that "the army and the people are one" will finally be be put to the test.
Monday, February 7, 2011
Meet the New Boss...
As the uprising in Egypt enters day 14, its momentum appears to be in question. The crowds in Tahrir Square are dwindling, and stores and banks are re-opening. In short, life is slowly returning to normal. On the political front, the opposition leaders are facing an uphill battle against a regime that still has many tricks up its sleeve.
Yesterday's reports that Omar Suleiman, long time intelligence chief and now vice president (and by some accounts, de facto president), granted the opposition key concessions need to be approached with scepticism. Suleiman appeared to make all kinds of concessions - cancelling the emergency law that has been in place since 1981, promising a committee to recommend constitutional changes within the next two months, as well as promising more freedom of the press in the future. Lots of vague indications of a regime willing to mildly reform, but hardly any binding specifics that will satisfy the grass roots opposition demands.
Despite the unprecedented events of the last two weeks, real change in Egypt very much faces an uphill battle. The NDP may appear to be crumbling publicly, but I am not convinced that it is a force that is simply going to wither away. The ruling party in Egypt is not an abstract force that has stayed above the fray, it is (or used to be, at least) a powerful corporate entity with deep pockets and tentacles that reach into all aspects of Egyptian society. Extricating it will not be an easy task. The organized goons sent into Tahrir Square on camels and horses armed with clubs, whips and swords to terrorize protesters is a good indication of just how far those with entrenched interests in the survival of the regime are willing to go.
Is Mubarak really the issue anymore? Protesters still demand that he leave the country, and the opposition leaders are making the start of constitutional negotiations conditional on Mubarak officially abdicating. And by the way, constitutional negotiations - if they ever occur - will undoubtedly be painfully thorny. It is a monumental task to write up founding documents that reflect an accurate balance of power amongst Egypt's fragmented political groups. For those interested in a more detailed discussion of this issue, check out this piece by Nathan J. Browne.
Though the demonstrations seem to have changed Egyptian politics forever, much more work remains to be done in order to institutionalize the opposition's demands. The regime has made it clear it is not going to roll over. Rather, it has given every indication that despite these unprecedented acts of revolt, it is still relunctant to cede any real power to the opposition. In this sense, the divided opposition leaders have their work cut out for them.
Yesterday's reports that Omar Suleiman, long time intelligence chief and now vice president (and by some accounts, de facto president), granted the opposition key concessions need to be approached with scepticism. Suleiman appeared to make all kinds of concessions - cancelling the emergency law that has been in place since 1981, promising a committee to recommend constitutional changes within the next two months, as well as promising more freedom of the press in the future. Lots of vague indications of a regime willing to mildly reform, but hardly any binding specifics that will satisfy the grass roots opposition demands.
Despite the unprecedented events of the last two weeks, real change in Egypt very much faces an uphill battle. The NDP may appear to be crumbling publicly, but I am not convinced that it is a force that is simply going to wither away. The ruling party in Egypt is not an abstract force that has stayed above the fray, it is (or used to be, at least) a powerful corporate entity with deep pockets and tentacles that reach into all aspects of Egyptian society. Extricating it will not be an easy task. The organized goons sent into Tahrir Square on camels and horses armed with clubs, whips and swords to terrorize protesters is a good indication of just how far those with entrenched interests in the survival of the regime are willing to go.
Is Mubarak really the issue anymore? Protesters still demand that he leave the country, and the opposition leaders are making the start of constitutional negotiations conditional on Mubarak officially abdicating. And by the way, constitutional negotiations - if they ever occur - will undoubtedly be painfully thorny. It is a monumental task to write up founding documents that reflect an accurate balance of power amongst Egypt's fragmented political groups. For those interested in a more detailed discussion of this issue, check out this piece by Nathan J. Browne.
Though the demonstrations seem to have changed Egyptian politics forever, much more work remains to be done in order to institutionalize the opposition's demands. The regime has made it clear it is not going to roll over. Rather, it has given every indication that despite these unprecedented acts of revolt, it is still relunctant to cede any real power to the opposition. In this sense, the divided opposition leaders have their work cut out for them.
Friday, January 28, 2011
Rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic?
That's the metaphor on everyone's mind after witnessing Hosni Mubarak stand in front of the television camera trying to convince the Egyptian people that dismissing his cabinet will solve the problem. I know that Mubarak has moved his permanent residence to Sharm el-Sheikh, but is he really that out of touch? Either he is, or he purposely issued a minimal concession in order to buy time and let the army - much more respected amongst the people than the police - quell these unprecedented demonstrations during the days to come.
One thing that comes to my mind while reflecting on the past twelve hours is how poor the US cable news coverage has been in comparison to other outlets. I remember watching some coverage and hearing about how the demonstrations were taking on a more Islamist hue. The evidence? The protesters paused to pray at sunset, and some were shouting "Allahu Akbar". I'm no expert on Egyptian society, but I do know that praying and shouting "Allahu Akbar" does not necessarily make you a card carrying member of the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast, I found the news and analysis on al Jazeera and al Jazeera English to be much more mature and insightful.
Another thing that struck me while watching some of the cable news coverage was how the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood was repeatedly brought up and often exaggerated. I'm not sure whether it is due to poor analysis or simply the fact that bringing up the Islamist threat makes for good television ratings - probably both. Yet all too often, some one with little background knowledge of the specific context would be led to believe that if Mubarak's regime were to fall, Egypt would suddenly be run like Afghanistan under the Taliban, or like Gaza under Hamas. Apparently Mubarak's decades-old policy of using the Brotherhood as a scarecrow is effective. The reality is that the Muslim Brotherhood is a relatively moderate Islamist movement that renounced violence over 50 years ago. And although it would probably win a substantial number of seats in parliament in a free and fair election, it is not capable of "taking over" the government.
The events from today were truly astonishing, and I suspect that this drama is far, far from over. The Egyptian army, deployed on Friday evening, will surely play a key role. So far, the relationship between the army and the protesters is not clear. The army certainly didn't enforce the curfew, and it didn't do much to stop the protesters from setting fire to NDP headquarters and other buildings. Moreover, the protesters showed a marked respect for the military as they rolled in to Tahrir and Ramses squares; they sought no confrontation whatsoever with those forces. On the other hand, I am not sure that the army will passively watch by in the days ahead if the protests continue to escalate and threaten the survival of the regime. Will the army engage the protesters with violence, or will it side with them and force Mubarak out? Will the defense and interior ministers - two longstanding pillars of Mubarak's regime - be forced to resign as well? Will Mubarak refill his cabinet with NDP lackeys, or will he choose a diverse and comprehensive selection of ministers? Clearly, a lot more questions than answers at this point.
One thing that comes to my mind while reflecting on the past twelve hours is how poor the US cable news coverage has been in comparison to other outlets. I remember watching some coverage and hearing about how the demonstrations were taking on a more Islamist hue. The evidence? The protesters paused to pray at sunset, and some were shouting "Allahu Akbar". I'm no expert on Egyptian society, but I do know that praying and shouting "Allahu Akbar" does not necessarily make you a card carrying member of the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast, I found the news and analysis on al Jazeera and al Jazeera English to be much more mature and insightful.
Another thing that struck me while watching some of the cable news coverage was how the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood was repeatedly brought up and often exaggerated. I'm not sure whether it is due to poor analysis or simply the fact that bringing up the Islamist threat makes for good television ratings - probably both. Yet all too often, some one with little background knowledge of the specific context would be led to believe that if Mubarak's regime were to fall, Egypt would suddenly be run like Afghanistan under the Taliban, or like Gaza under Hamas. Apparently Mubarak's decades-old policy of using the Brotherhood as a scarecrow is effective. The reality is that the Muslim Brotherhood is a relatively moderate Islamist movement that renounced violence over 50 years ago. And although it would probably win a substantial number of seats in parliament in a free and fair election, it is not capable of "taking over" the government.
The events from today were truly astonishing, and I suspect that this drama is far, far from over. The Egyptian army, deployed on Friday evening, will surely play a key role. So far, the relationship between the army and the protesters is not clear. The army certainly didn't enforce the curfew, and it didn't do much to stop the protesters from setting fire to NDP headquarters and other buildings. Moreover, the protesters showed a marked respect for the military as they rolled in to Tahrir and Ramses squares; they sought no confrontation whatsoever with those forces. On the other hand, I am not sure that the army will passively watch by in the days ahead if the protests continue to escalate and threaten the survival of the regime. Will the army engage the protesters with violence, or will it side with them and force Mubarak out? Will the defense and interior ministers - two longstanding pillars of Mubarak's regime - be forced to resign as well? Will Mubarak refill his cabinet with NDP lackeys, or will he choose a diverse and comprehensive selection of ministers? Clearly, a lot more questions than answers at this point.
Rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic?
That's the metaphor on everyone's mind after witnessing Hosni Mubarak stand in front of the television camera trying to convince the Egyptian people that dismissing his cabinet will solve the problem. I know that Mubarak has moved his permanent residence to Sharm el-Sheikh, but is he really that out of touch? Either he is, or he purposefully issued a minimal concession in order to buy time and let the army - much more respected amongst the people than the police - quell these unprecedented demonstrations during the days to come.
One thing that comes to my mind while reflecting on the past twelve hours is how poor the US cable news coverage has been in comparison to other outlets. I remember watching some coverage and hearing about how the demonstrations were taking on a more Islamist hue. The evidence? The protesters paused to pray at sunset, and some were shouting "Allahu Akbar". I'm no expert on Egyptian society, but I do know that praying and shouting "Allahu Akbar" does not necessarily make you a card carrying member of the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast, I found the news and analysis on al Jazeera and al Jazeera English to be much more mature and insightful.
Another thing that struck me while watching some of the cable news coverage was how the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood was repeatedly brought up and often exaggerated. I'm not sure whether it is due to poor analysis or simply the fact that bringing up the Islamist threat makes for good television ratings - probably both. Yet all too often, some one with little background knowledge of the specific context would be led to believe that if Mubarak's regime were to fall, Egypt would suddenly be run like Afghanistan under the Taliban, or like Gaza under Hamas. Apparently Mubarak's decades-old policy of using the Brotherhood as a scarecrow is effective. The reality is that the Muslim Brotherhood is a relatively moderate Islamist movement that renounced violence over 50 years ago. And although it would probably win a substantial number of seats in parliament in a free and fair election, it is not capable of "taking over" the government.
The events from today were truly astonishing, and I suspect that this drama is far, far from over. The Egyptian army, deployed on Friday evening, will surely play a key role. So far, the relationship between the army and the protesters is not clear. The army certainly didn't enforce the curfew, and it didn't do much to stop the protesters from setting fire to NDP headquarters and other buildings. Moreover, the protesters showed a marked respect for the military as they rolled in to Tahrir and Ramses squares; they seeked no confrontation whatsoever with those forces. On the other hand, I am not sure that the army will passively watch by in the days ahead if the protests continue to escalate and threaten the survival of the regime. Will the army engage the protesters with violence, or will it side with them and force Mubarak to make major concessions? Will the defense and interior ministers - two longstanding pillars of Mubarak's regime - be forced to resign as well? Will Mubarak refill his cabinet with NDP lackeys, or will he choose a diverse and comprehensive selection of ministers? Clearly, a lot more questions than answers at this point.
One thing that comes to my mind while reflecting on the past twelve hours is how poor the US cable news coverage has been in comparison to other outlets. I remember watching some coverage and hearing about how the demonstrations were taking on a more Islamist hue. The evidence? The protesters paused to pray at sunset, and some were shouting "Allahu Akbar". I'm no expert on Egyptian society, but I do know that praying and shouting "Allahu Akbar" does not necessarily make you a card carrying member of the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast, I found the news and analysis on al Jazeera and al Jazeera English to be much more mature and insightful.
Another thing that struck me while watching some of the cable news coverage was how the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood was repeatedly brought up and often exaggerated. I'm not sure whether it is due to poor analysis or simply the fact that bringing up the Islamist threat makes for good television ratings - probably both. Yet all too often, some one with little background knowledge of the specific context would be led to believe that if Mubarak's regime were to fall, Egypt would suddenly be run like Afghanistan under the Taliban, or like Gaza under Hamas. Apparently Mubarak's decades-old policy of using the Brotherhood as a scarecrow is effective. The reality is that the Muslim Brotherhood is a relatively moderate Islamist movement that renounced violence over 50 years ago. And although it would probably win a substantial number of seats in parliament in a free and fair election, it is not capable of "taking over" the government.
The events from today were truly astonishing, and I suspect that this drama is far, far from over. The Egyptian army, deployed on Friday evening, will surely play a key role. So far, the relationship between the army and the protesters is not clear. The army certainly didn't enforce the curfew, and it didn't do much to stop the protesters from setting fire to NDP headquarters and other buildings. Moreover, the protesters showed a marked respect for the military as they rolled in to Tahrir and Ramses squares; they seeked no confrontation whatsoever with those forces. On the other hand, I am not sure that the army will passively watch by in the days ahead if the protests continue to escalate and threaten the survival of the regime. Will the army engage the protesters with violence, or will it side with them and force Mubarak to make major concessions? Will the defense and interior ministers - two longstanding pillars of Mubarak's regime - be forced to resign as well? Will Mubarak refill his cabinet with NDP lackeys, or will he choose a diverse and comprehensive selection of ministers? Clearly, a lot more questions than answers at this point.
Rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic?
That's the metaphor on everyone's mind after witnessing Hosni Mubarak stand in front of the television camera trying to convince the Egyptian people that dismissing his cabinet will solve the problem. I know that Mubarak has moved his permanent residence to Sharm el-Sheikh, but is he really that out of touch? Either he is, or he purposefully issued a minimal concession in order to buy time and let the army - much more respected amongst the people than the police - quell these unprecedented demonstrations during the days to come.
One thing that comes to my mind while reflecting on the past twelve hours is how poor the US cable news coverage has been in comparison to other outlets. I remember watching some coverage and hearing about how the demonstrations were taking on a more Islamist hue. The evidence? The protesters paused to pray at sunset, and some were shouting "Allahu Akbar". I'm no expert on Egyptian society, but I do know that praying and shouting "Allahu Akbar" does not necessarily make you a card carrying member of the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast, I found the news and analysis on al Jazeera and al Jazeera English to be much more mature and insightful.
Another thing that struck me while watching some of the cable news coverage was how the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood was repeatedly brought up and often exaggerated. I'm not sure whether it is due to poor analysis or simply the fact that bringing up the Islamist threat makes for good television ratings - probably both. Yet all too often, some one with little background knowledge of the specific context would be led to believe that if Mubarak's regime were to fall, Egypt would suddenly be run like Afghanistan under the Taliban, or like Gaza under Hamas. Apparently Mubarak's decades-old policy of using the Brotherhood as a scarecrow is effective. The reality is that the Muslim Brotherhood is a relatively moderate Islamist movement that renounced violence over 50 years ago. And although it would probably win a substantial number of seats in parliament in a free and fair election, it is not capable of "taking over" the government.
The events from today were truly astonishing, and I suspect that this drama is far, far from over. The Egyptian army, deployed on Friday evening, will surely play a key role. So far, the relationship between the army and the protesters is not clear. The army certainly didn't enforce the curfew, and it didn't do much to stop the protesters from setting fire to NDP headquarters and other buildings. Moreover, the protesters showed a marked respect for the military as they rolled in to Tahrir and Ramses squares; they seeked no confrontation whatsoever with those forces. On the other hand, I am not sure that the army will passively watch by in the days ahead if the protests continue to escalate and threaten the survival of the regime. Will the army engage the protesters with violence, or will it side with them and force Mubarak to make major concessions? Will the defense and interior ministers - two longstanding pillars of Mubarak's regime - be forced to resign as well? Will Mubarak refill his cabinet with NDP lackeys, or will he choose a diverse and comprehensive selection of ministers? Clearly, a lot more questions than answers at this point.
One thing that comes to my mind while reflecting on the past twelve hours is how poor the US cable news coverage has been in comparison to other outlets. I remember watching some coverage and hearing about how the demonstrations were taking on a more Islamist hue. The evidence? The protesters paused to pray at sunset, and some were shouting "Allahu Akbar". I'm no expert on Egyptian society, but I do know that praying and shouting "Allahu Akbar" does not necessarily make you a card carrying member of the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast, I found the news and analysis on al Jazeera and al Jazeera English to be much more mature and insightful.
Another thing that struck me while watching some of the cable news coverage was how the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood was repeatedly brought up and often exaggerated. I'm not sure whether it is due to poor analysis or simply the fact that bringing up the Islamist threat makes for good television ratings - probably both. Yet all too often, some one with little background knowledge of the specific context would be led to believe that if Mubarak's regime were to fall, Egypt would suddenly be run like Afghanistan under the Taliban, or like Gaza under Hamas. Apparently Mubarak's decades-old policy of using the Brotherhood as a scarecrow is effective. The reality is that the Muslim Brotherhood is a relatively moderate Islamist movement that renounced violence over 50 years ago. And although it would probably win a substantial number of seats in parliament in a free and fair election, it is not capable of "taking over" the government.
The events from today were truly astonishing, and I suspect that this drama is far, far from over. The Egyptian army, deployed on Friday evening, will surely play a key role. So far, the relationship between the army and the protesters is not clear. The army certainly didn't enforce the curfew, and it didn't do much to stop the protesters from setting fire to NDP headquarters and other buildings. Moreover, the protesters showed a marked respect for the military as they rolled in to Tahrir and Ramses squares; they seeked no confrontation whatsoever with those forces. On the other hand, I am not sure that the army will passively watch by in the days ahead if the protests continue to escalate and threaten the survival of the regime. Will the army engage the protesters with violence, or will it side with them and force Mubarak to make major concessions? Will the defense and interior ministers - two longstanding pillars of Mubarak's regime - be forced to resign as well? Will Mubarak refill his cabinet with NDP lackeys, or will he choose a diverse and comprehensive selection of ministers? Clearly, a lot more questions than answers at this point.
Thursday, January 27, 2011
Will Egypt Follow Tunisia?
Who said Egyptians are indifferent to politics? That popular canard - always brought forward in order to explain low levels of interest and voter turnout in Egyptian elections - certainly rings hollow this week. On Tuesday, thousands of Egyptians poured onto the streets and squares of Cairo, Suez, Alexandria, Tanta, and several other cities throughout Egypt. Though the Mubarak regime has repeatedly tried to portray the demonstrations as the work of the Muslim Brotherhood - its bogeyman of choice - the demonstrations are clearly a popular expression of frustration with a sour economy, rising food and gas prices, high unemployment, and an authoritarian political system.
The organizers of Tuesday's "Day of Wrath" (Youm al-Ghadab) belong to a previously obscure opposition group called the April 6th movement. The movement's namesake refers to a strike by textile workers that occured on April 6th, 2008, and was crushed by security forces. Using social networking media, young activists formed the movement in response to the strikes and the regime's harsh response. After witnessing the successful Tunisian uprising a few weeks earlier, the group planned these demonstrations for Tuesday, Egypt's Police Day, which happens to be a national holiday.
The fact that these protests are arguably the largest since the bread riots in 1977, and possibly since the 1950s, is highly significant. Of course, Egypt is not immune to the occasional public demonstration. However, there is definitely something different about the demonstrations that have swelled in the last few days. Not only are they the largest in quite some time, but they are nation-wide. Perhaps most significantly, they aren't protests organized by some elite opposition political party, but seem to have grass roots support among Egypt's youth. Indeed, the heterogeneous collection of opposition parties in Egypt lack credibility with many of the protesters, as they are seen as having collaborated with the regime throughout its reign.
The New York Times seems to be linking these widespread demonstrations to Mohammed el-Baradei's umbrella group, the National Association for Change. It seems to me that the organization is certainly playing a role in the demonstrations, but Baradei himself is not playing much of a role. However, according to al-Masry al-Youm, Baradei has declared that he is ready to assume power in a temporary role if the Egyptian people desire so.
For now, the National Association for Change has called for President Mubarak to announce that he will not seek re-election, and that his son Gamal will not run for the office either. If the protests continue to escalate, these demands may escalate as well.
A lot of attention has focused on whether the Egyptian protesters will follow their Tunisian counterparts. I think it is difficult to make clear cut analogies here. There's no question that what happened in Tunisia is inspiring many protesters. But there are some crucial differences. First, the Tunisian military played a crucial role in facilitating the revolution by not getting involved. I don't see the Egyptian military as being so averse to intervening. Second, the NDP (the ruling party in Egypt) is powerful and entrenched in so many layers of society. There are a lot of people with a vested interest in the status quo, and I'm not sure a few tens of thousands of protesters can change that. Then again, if the Egyptian stock market continues along this path, who knows what can happen? (How could I not link to this article, given that it is co-written by the Kevorkian's own Liam Stack - bravo Liam!)
It's no use trying to predict how this will end up. At this point, the situation is pregnant with a multiplicity of possibilities. The only thing that is clear is that the entire region seems to be in flux. A successful uprising in Tunisia, unprecedented protests in Egypt, Algeria, and now Yemen. Meanwhile, a part of Sudan just seceded, Hezbollah just nominated the new prime minister in Lebanon, and al-Jazeera might have just put the final nail in the coffin of the Palestinian Authority by its release of embarrassing (but frankly not surprising) documents from its negotiations with Israel. 2011 already looks like it will be quite an eventful year.
PS - for those who read Arabic, check out this article in Egypt's semi-official newspaper Al-Ahram for a good laugh.
The organizers of Tuesday's "Day of Wrath" (Youm al-Ghadab) belong to a previously obscure opposition group called the April 6th movement. The movement's namesake refers to a strike by textile workers that occured on April 6th, 2008, and was crushed by security forces. Using social networking media, young activists formed the movement in response to the strikes and the regime's harsh response. After witnessing the successful Tunisian uprising a few weeks earlier, the group planned these demonstrations for Tuesday, Egypt's Police Day, which happens to be a national holiday.
The fact that these protests are arguably the largest since the bread riots in 1977, and possibly since the 1950s, is highly significant. Of course, Egypt is not immune to the occasional public demonstration. However, there is definitely something different about the demonstrations that have swelled in the last few days. Not only are they the largest in quite some time, but they are nation-wide. Perhaps most significantly, they aren't protests organized by some elite opposition political party, but seem to have grass roots support among Egypt's youth. Indeed, the heterogeneous collection of opposition parties in Egypt lack credibility with many of the protesters, as they are seen as having collaborated with the regime throughout its reign.
The New York Times seems to be linking these widespread demonstrations to Mohammed el-Baradei's umbrella group, the National Association for Change. It seems to me that the organization is certainly playing a role in the demonstrations, but Baradei himself is not playing much of a role. However, according to al-Masry al-Youm, Baradei has declared that he is ready to assume power in a temporary role if the Egyptian people desire so.
For now, the National Association for Change has called for President Mubarak to announce that he will not seek re-election, and that his son Gamal will not run for the office either. If the protests continue to escalate, these demands may escalate as well.
A lot of attention has focused on whether the Egyptian protesters will follow their Tunisian counterparts. I think it is difficult to make clear cut analogies here. There's no question that what happened in Tunisia is inspiring many protesters. But there are some crucial differences. First, the Tunisian military played a crucial role in facilitating the revolution by not getting involved. I don't see the Egyptian military as being so averse to intervening. Second, the NDP (the ruling party in Egypt) is powerful and entrenched in so many layers of society. There are a lot of people with a vested interest in the status quo, and I'm not sure a few tens of thousands of protesters can change that. Then again, if the Egyptian stock market continues along this path, who knows what can happen? (How could I not link to this article, given that it is co-written by the Kevorkian's own Liam Stack - bravo Liam!)
It's no use trying to predict how this will end up. At this point, the situation is pregnant with a multiplicity of possibilities. The only thing that is clear is that the entire region seems to be in flux. A successful uprising in Tunisia, unprecedented protests in Egypt, Algeria, and now Yemen. Meanwhile, a part of Sudan just seceded, Hezbollah just nominated the new prime minister in Lebanon, and al-Jazeera might have just put the final nail in the coffin of the Palestinian Authority by its release of embarrassing (but frankly not surprising) documents from its negotiations with Israel. 2011 already looks like it will be quite an eventful year.
PS - for those who read Arabic, check out this article in Egypt's semi-official newspaper Al-Ahram for a good laugh.
Will Egypt Follow Tunisia?
Who said Egyptians are indifferent to politics? That popular canard - always brought forward in order to explain low levels of interest and voter turnout in Egyptian elections - certainly sounds hollow this week. On Tuesday, thousands of Egyptians poured onto the streets and squares of Cairo, Suez, Alexandria, Tanta, and several other cities throughout Egypt. Though the Mubarak regime has initially tried to portray the demonstrations as the work of the Muslim Brotherhood - its public enemy number one - the demonstrations are clearly a popular expression of frustration with a sour economy, rising food and gas prices, high unemployment, and an authoritarian political system.
The organizers of Tuesday's "Day of Wrath" (Youm al-Ghadab) belong to a previously obscure opposition group called the April 6th movement. The movement's namesake refers to a strike by textile workers that occured on April 6th, 2008, and was crushed by security forces. Using social networking media, young activists formed the movement in response to the strikes and the regime's harsh response. After witnessing the successful Tunisian uprising a few weeks earlier, the group planned these demonstrations for Tuesday, Egypt's Police Day, which happens to be a national holiday.
The fact that these protests are arguably the largest since the bread riots in 1977, and possibly since the 1950s, is highly significant. Of course, Egypt is not immune to the occasional public demonstration. However, there is definitely something different about the demonstrations that have swelled in the last few days. Not only are they the largest in quite some time, but they are nation-wide. Perhaps most significantly, they aren't protests organized by some elite opposition political party, but seem to have grass roots support among Egypt's youth. Indeed, the heterogeneous collection of opposition parties in Egypt lack credibility with many of the protesters, as they are seen as having collaborated with the regime throughout its reign.
The New York Times seems to be linking these widespread demonstrations to Mohammed el-Baradei's umbrella group, the National Association for Change. It seems to me that the organization is certainly playing a role in the demonstrations, but Baradei himself is not playing much of a role. However, according to al-Masry al-Youm, Baradei has declared that he is ready to assume power in a temporary role if the Egyptian people desire so.
For now, the National Association for Change has called for President Mubarak to announce that he will not seek re-election, and that his son Gamal will not run for the office either. If the protests continue to escalate, these demands may escalate as well.
It's no use trying to predict how this will end up. At this point, the situation is pregnant with a multiplicity of possibilities. The only thing that is clear is that the entire region seems to be in flux. A successful uprising in Tunisia, unprecedented protests in Egypt, Algeria, and now Yemen. Meanwhile, a part of Sudan just seceded, Hezbollah just nominated the new prime minister in Lebanon, and al-Jazeera might have just put the final nail in the coffin of the Palestinian Authority by its release of embarrassing (but frankly not surprising) documents from its negotiations with Israel. 2011 already looks like it will be quite an eventful year.
PS - for those who read Arabic, check out this article in Egypt's semi-official newspaper Al-Ahram for a good laugh.
The organizers of Tuesday's "Day of Wrath" (Youm al-Ghadab) belong to a previously obscure opposition group called the April 6th movement. The movement's namesake refers to a strike by textile workers that occured on April 6th, 2008, and was crushed by security forces. Using social networking media, young activists formed the movement in response to the strikes and the regime's harsh response. After witnessing the successful Tunisian uprising a few weeks earlier, the group planned these demonstrations for Tuesday, Egypt's Police Day, which happens to be a national holiday.
The fact that these protests are arguably the largest since the bread riots in 1977, and possibly since the 1950s, is highly significant. Of course, Egypt is not immune to the occasional public demonstration. However, there is definitely something different about the demonstrations that have swelled in the last few days. Not only are they the largest in quite some time, but they are nation-wide. Perhaps most significantly, they aren't protests organized by some elite opposition political party, but seem to have grass roots support among Egypt's youth. Indeed, the heterogeneous collection of opposition parties in Egypt lack credibility with many of the protesters, as they are seen as having collaborated with the regime throughout its reign.
The New York Times seems to be linking these widespread demonstrations to Mohammed el-Baradei's umbrella group, the National Association for Change. It seems to me that the organization is certainly playing a role in the demonstrations, but Baradei himself is not playing much of a role. However, according to al-Masry al-Youm, Baradei has declared that he is ready to assume power in a temporary role if the Egyptian people desire so.
For now, the National Association for Change has called for President Mubarak to announce that he will not seek re-election, and that his son Gamal will not run for the office either. If the protests continue to escalate, these demands may escalate as well.
It's no use trying to predict how this will end up. At this point, the situation is pregnant with a multiplicity of possibilities. The only thing that is clear is that the entire region seems to be in flux. A successful uprising in Tunisia, unprecedented protests in Egypt, Algeria, and now Yemen. Meanwhile, a part of Sudan just seceded, Hezbollah just nominated the new prime minister in Lebanon, and al-Jazeera might have just put the final nail in the coffin of the Palestinian Authority by its release of embarrassing (but frankly not surprising) documents from its negotiations with Israel. 2011 already looks like it will be quite an eventful year.
PS - for those who read Arabic, check out this article in Egypt's semi-official newspaper Al-Ahram for a good laugh.
Thursday, January 20, 2011
That Tunisian Uprising
Throughout the past two weeks, we have witnessed something that hasn't occured in the Middle East since 1979: a popular uprising that forced the collapse of an authoritarian regime. After 23 years of iron-clad rule, Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and his entourage fled the capital and took refuge in Saudi Arabia. This is the first time an event like this has transpired in an Arab country in quite some time.
Already, the self-immolating Tunisian vegetable vendor that sparked the demonstrations in Tunisia seems to have inspired others across North Africa. Similar self-immolations have occured in Algeria and Mauritania. In Egypt, a string of self-immolations in recent days have raised eyebrows about the possibility of a Tunisian-style uprising in that country. It may be too early to tell if the demonstrations in Tunisia will give rise to similar uprisings in other Arab countries plagued with similar (and worse) problems of high food prices, few jobs, and an authoritarian political environment. Nevertheless, these cases of people literally setting themselves on fire in order to express their frustration and despair speak volumes.
If the events in Tunisia have transnational implications (and in light of the role played by al-Jazeera and social media, how could they not?), the obvious question is what sort of impact they will have on Egypt. Egypt will hold a presidential election in September, and by all indications, the aging Hosni Mubarak is expected to seek another six year term. Sensing the inevitable uncertainty associated with such a move, the regime has signicantly clamped down on dissent in the last few months. Recent parliamentary elections were among the most blatantly rigged yet, as the Egyptian government appears to not be taking any chances this time.
So in that context, how do people feel about the chances of a Tunisian-style uprising in Egypt? For his part, opposition leader Mohammed el-Baradei is not advocating for that type of change. In an interview with The Guardian, el-Baradei explicitly said that he supports change from within the existing system over revolutionary change from the streets. He's taken some heat from grass-roots activists for this stance, as they have leveled the charge that he is not "a man of the street." But so what, we knew that already. After all, Baradei's position is not surprising. Egypt has a lot of societal problems lurking beneath the chimera of stability apparent on the surface, so a chaotic popular uprising could precipitate some messy scenarios. This debate about change from within as opposed to revolutionary change is nothing new, although it is sure to be a debate likely to intensify in the months ahead. The Guardian article also mentions that massive anti-government demonstrations are planned for next week in Cairo and Alexandria, so stay tuned.
Already, the self-immolating Tunisian vegetable vendor that sparked the demonstrations in Tunisia seems to have inspired others across North Africa. Similar self-immolations have occured in Algeria and Mauritania. In Egypt, a string of self-immolations in recent days have raised eyebrows about the possibility of a Tunisian-style uprising in that country. It may be too early to tell if the demonstrations in Tunisia will give rise to similar uprisings in other Arab countries plagued with similar (and worse) problems of high food prices, few jobs, and an authoritarian political environment. Nevertheless, these cases of people literally setting themselves on fire in order to express their frustration and despair speak volumes.
If the events in Tunisia have transnational implications (and in light of the role played by al-Jazeera and social media, how could they not?), the obvious question is what sort of impact they will have on Egypt. Egypt will hold a presidential election in September, and by all indications, the aging Hosni Mubarak is expected to seek another six year term. Sensing the inevitable uncertainty associated with such a move, the regime has signicantly clamped down on dissent in the last few months. Recent parliamentary elections were among the most blatantly rigged yet, as the Egyptian government appears to not be taking any chances this time.
So in that context, how do people feel about the chances of a Tunisian-style uprising in Egypt? For his part, opposition leader Mohammed el-Baradei is not advocating for that type of change. In an interview with The Guardian, el-Baradei explicitly said that he supports change from within the existing system over revolutionary change from the streets. He's taken some heat from grass-roots activists for this stance, as they have leveled the charge that he is not "a man of the street." But so what, we knew that already. After all, Baradei's position is not surprising. Egypt has a lot of societal problems lurking beneath the chimera of stability apparent on the surface, so a chaotic popular uprising could precipitate some messy scenarios. This debate about change from within as opposed to revolutionary change is nothing new, although it is sure to be a debate likely to intensify in the months ahead. The Guardian article also mentions that massive anti-government demonstrations are planned for next week in Cairo and Alexandria, so stay tuned.
Friday, December 10, 2010
Where will the Muslim Brotherhood go from here?
The Egyptian parliamentary elections took place last week. Though the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) retained its grip on power in parliament, the results have redrawn the political landscape in subtle ways and have set the tone for the presidential elections to come next year.
First, these elections are notable because the Muslim Brotherhood, said to be the most influential opposition group, boycotted them. Recognizing that the NDP wasn't going to give an inch this time around, the group withdrew its list of candidates and refused to take part in the elections. This is a striking contrast to what happened in 2005. Back then, the Muslim Brotherhood won 20% of the seats in parliament. Rumors have it that the regime gave the Brotherhood some extra breathing space in order to compete, if only to show secular elites "what they need to be afraid of.'
This time was different. The regime cracked down hard on media freedoms in the months leading up to the election, and didn't try nearly as hard to conceal the fact that these elections were certainly not fair and transparent. The Muslim Brotherhood read the writing on the wall, and made a strategic calculation not to participate. As a result, they went from controlling 20% of the seats in parliament to controlling none at all.
This represents a break in the dynamics of Egyptian politics. Though officially banned, the Muslim Brotherhood is 'tolerated' by the regime. Moreover, the group of secular opposition parties (Tagammu' on the left, Wafd on the right) have been not only tolerated, but cultivated by the regime in order to triangulate more effectively between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular opposition. Yet with the Brotherhood's decision to boycott these elections, the future of this political dynamic is called into doubt. The secular opposition parties are also furious, as they have seen the balance of power tilt even more in favor of the NDP in the aftermath of these elections.
What will become of the Muslim Brotherhood in the future? Will the movement devote more of its time and resources towards non-political projects? Since its founding, though, the Muslim Brotherhood has been a political movement, concerned with state power. It's not a quietest religious movement simply focused on societal change (that would be the Da'wa movement, which is not concerned with state power).
I suppose the answer to this question depends on whether the regime is cracking down only in the short-term in order to ensure a smooth presidential election next year, or a smooth transition to Mubarak's successor. After all, even if Hosni Mubarak runs and wins again, the man is not getting any younger. The next few years will certainly be politically delicate in this regard. For this reason, I tend to think it's a bit short sighted to see the crackdown purely in the context of setting the tone for next year's presidential election. I would wager it is something more long-term, designed to make sure any future transition goes as smoothly as possible.
First, these elections are notable because the Muslim Brotherhood, said to be the most influential opposition group, boycotted them. Recognizing that the NDP wasn't going to give an inch this time around, the group withdrew its list of candidates and refused to take part in the elections. This is a striking contrast to what happened in 2005. Back then, the Muslim Brotherhood won 20% of the seats in parliament. Rumors have it that the regime gave the Brotherhood some extra breathing space in order to compete, if only to show secular elites "what they need to be afraid of.'
This time was different. The regime cracked down hard on media freedoms in the months leading up to the election, and didn't try nearly as hard to conceal the fact that these elections were certainly not fair and transparent. The Muslim Brotherhood read the writing on the wall, and made a strategic calculation not to participate. As a result, they went from controlling 20% of the seats in parliament to controlling none at all.
This represents a break in the dynamics of Egyptian politics. Though officially banned, the Muslim Brotherhood is 'tolerated' by the regime. Moreover, the group of secular opposition parties (Tagammu' on the left, Wafd on the right) have been not only tolerated, but cultivated by the regime in order to triangulate more effectively between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular opposition. Yet with the Brotherhood's decision to boycott these elections, the future of this political dynamic is called into doubt. The secular opposition parties are also furious, as they have seen the balance of power tilt even more in favor of the NDP in the aftermath of these elections.
What will become of the Muslim Brotherhood in the future? Will the movement devote more of its time and resources towards non-political projects? Since its founding, though, the Muslim Brotherhood has been a political movement, concerned with state power. It's not a quietest religious movement simply focused on societal change (that would be the Da'wa movement, which is not concerned with state power).
I suppose the answer to this question depends on whether the regime is cracking down only in the short-term in order to ensure a smooth presidential election next year, or a smooth transition to Mubarak's successor. After all, even if Hosni Mubarak runs and wins again, the man is not getting any younger. The next few years will certainly be politically delicate in this regard. For this reason, I tend to think it's a bit short sighted to see the crackdown purely in the context of setting the tone for next year's presidential election. I would wager it is something more long-term, designed to make sure any future transition goes as smoothly as possible.
Monday, October 25, 2010
Some Background on Iraq's Outstanding Issues
In light of tonight's visit by esteemed historian of modern Iraq, Professor Charles Tripp, I thought it would be a good idea to kick off the week by briefly touching on some of the salient issues in Iraq today.
Sectarian versus issue-based politics. A logic of sectarianism as political ideology has largely governed power relations in Iraq since the first elections there in January 2005. Governing institutions were created based on ethnosectarian quotas. As a result, substantive issues have time and again fallen prey to identity politics. In early 2009, there were signs that a more issue-based political dynamic was beginning to emerge. PM Minister Maliki's party had fared exceptionally well in the provincial elections running on a platform based on issues like the rule of law and a strong central government. Building off that success, Maliki broke from the dominant coalition of Shia parties to run separately in the national elections in March 2010. Though he tried to reach out across the sectarian divide and form a transectarian alliance, he ultimately failed in that regard.
Politics are still mired in the logic of identity politics. The current government formation process (now over seven months old) has seen the desire to form an "inclusive" and "representative" government at the expense of one that is ideologically coherent.
The Insurgency. The state of the insurgency has attracted some attention as of late due to the recent New York Times article reporting that substantial numbers of Awakening group members have been deserting their posts and returning to their original role as insurgents. The original deal was that the in exchange for policing their neighborhoods and rooting out elements of the insurgency, the federal government would incorporate these unofficial policemen into its own security forces. Those that weren't given jobs in the security forces would be given jobs in the public sector. On the one hand, it was always going to be difficult to find 91,000 jobs for these individuals - especially given the 2009 budget cuts that the fall in oil prices necessitated. As a result, only a small portion of the 91,000 Awakening group members have been given official positions.
This recent controversy aside, the insurgency is not - and likely will not - be capable of controlling whole neighborhoods and cities like it used to prior to 2008. The government's security forces have grown and improved substantially. As a result, the insurgency is limited to the occasional high-profile car bomb.
Tensions between the Kurdish Regional Government and Baghdad. Because the Iraqi constitution is vague on federal and regional powers, Baghdad and Irbil have locked horns on a number of issues. The most prominent of these are those dealing with territory and hydrocarbons. The two are intertwined, as the struggle for Kirkuk demonstrates. The KRG is pushing for the implementation of article 140, which calls for a referendum to be held in Kirkuk to determine if that province joins the KRG or remains governed by the federal center. The federal government has consistently dragged its feet on this issue, since a referendum would be highly polarizing and could risk the outbreak of violent conflict.
The dispute between Irbil and Baghdad over who has the right to sign oil contracts is also a high-stakes game. The KRG claims it has constitutional authority to sign oil contracts independently of Baghdad. For its part, the central government is adamant that it is the only body legally authorized to sign such deals. It fears that the KRG seeks to rapidly exploit its hydrocarbon resources in order to build an economic infrastructure that will pave for the way for its eventual secession from Iraq. This is the sticking point, not disagreements over "revenue distribution between sects" as is often reported.
So there you have it. Hopefully this will add some context and background to a talk tonight that is sure to be enlightening and insightful.
Sectarian versus issue-based politics. A logic of sectarianism as political ideology has largely governed power relations in Iraq since the first elections there in January 2005. Governing institutions were created based on ethnosectarian quotas. As a result, substantive issues have time and again fallen prey to identity politics. In early 2009, there were signs that a more issue-based political dynamic was beginning to emerge. PM Minister Maliki's party had fared exceptionally well in the provincial elections running on a platform based on issues like the rule of law and a strong central government. Building off that success, Maliki broke from the dominant coalition of Shia parties to run separately in the national elections in March 2010. Though he tried to reach out across the sectarian divide and form a transectarian alliance, he ultimately failed in that regard.
Politics are still mired in the logic of identity politics. The current government formation process (now over seven months old) has seen the desire to form an "inclusive" and "representative" government at the expense of one that is ideologically coherent.
The Insurgency. The state of the insurgency has attracted some attention as of late due to the recent New York Times article reporting that substantial numbers of Awakening group members have been deserting their posts and returning to their original role as insurgents. The original deal was that the in exchange for policing their neighborhoods and rooting out elements of the insurgency, the federal government would incorporate these unofficial policemen into its own security forces. Those that weren't given jobs in the security forces would be given jobs in the public sector. On the one hand, it was always going to be difficult to find 91,000 jobs for these individuals - especially given the 2009 budget cuts that the fall in oil prices necessitated. As a result, only a small portion of the 91,000 Awakening group members have been given official positions.
This recent controversy aside, the insurgency is not - and likely will not - be capable of controlling whole neighborhoods and cities like it used to prior to 2008. The government's security forces have grown and improved substantially. As a result, the insurgency is limited to the occasional high-profile car bomb.
Tensions between the Kurdish Regional Government and Baghdad. Because the Iraqi constitution is vague on federal and regional powers, Baghdad and Irbil have locked horns on a number of issues. The most prominent of these are those dealing with territory and hydrocarbons. The two are intertwined, as the struggle for Kirkuk demonstrates. The KRG is pushing for the implementation of article 140, which calls for a referendum to be held in Kirkuk to determine if that province joins the KRG or remains governed by the federal center. The federal government has consistently dragged its feet on this issue, since a referendum would be highly polarizing and could risk the outbreak of violent conflict.
The dispute between Irbil and Baghdad over who has the right to sign oil contracts is also a high-stakes game. The KRG claims it has constitutional authority to sign oil contracts independently of Baghdad. For its part, the central government is adamant that it is the only body legally authorized to sign such deals. It fears that the KRG seeks to rapidly exploit its hydrocarbon resources in order to build an economic infrastructure that will pave for the way for its eventual secession from Iraq. This is the sticking point, not disagreements over "revenue distribution between sects" as is often reported.
So there you have it. Hopefully this will add some context and background to a talk tonight that is sure to be enlightening and insightful.
Sunday, October 24, 2010
The (In)validity of Labels
Whenever I tell people that I am getting a master's degree in a discipline called "Near Eastern studies" I am often met with confused stares. I then clarify that Near Eastern studies at NYU is more or less the same discipline as Middle Eastern studies; the differences are semantic. We call the masters program "Near Eastern studies" and the PhD program "Middle Eastern studies". Every now and then I'll be asked by friends or acquaintances what the difference is between the "Near East" and the "Middle East", but instead of getting roped into a discussion of the Eurocentrism inherent in the coding of geographical regions and the history of Orientalism, I try to change the subject and enjoy the rest of my day.
But for us students of Near Eastern studies - or Middle East and Islamic studies - the problematic nature of these labels sometimes gets under our skin. I know at least a few students at the Kevorkian who visibly cringe whenever they hear the acronym "MENA". MENA, which stands for Middle East North Africa, takes the arbitrary nature of labels to new levels. After all, what are the countries comprising North Africa? If you were to look on a map, you could say: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Yet for some reason, Egypt is rarely acknowledged to be in the "North Africa" category. Instead, Egypt seems to be universally accepted as part and parcel of the "Middle East". Meanwhile, the term "al-Maghrib" is usually used to refer to Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. So what happens to Libya? Why isn't it included in the Maghrib?
This reminds me of an argument I got into with a colleague this past summer at the CASA program in Cairo. While talking about Algeria's performance in the World Cup, he noted that Algeria was the only team in the tournament from "the Middle East". I rudely cut him off and said that I wasn't sure if Algeria was in the Middle East. This colleague was a graduate of a particular university in the South known for its pretension, so I wanted to give him a hard time anyway. I simply recommended that he replace "fii as-Sharq al-Awsat" with "fii al-3alam al-a3rabi". The professor sided with my suggestion, and the issue was settled.
But it wasn't. Perhaps it never will be. Until it is, we graduate students of Near Eastern studies can continue debating the (in)validity of these labels.
But for us students of Near Eastern studies - or Middle East and Islamic studies - the problematic nature of these labels sometimes gets under our skin. I know at least a few students at the Kevorkian who visibly cringe whenever they hear the acronym "MENA". MENA, which stands for Middle East North Africa, takes the arbitrary nature of labels to new levels. After all, what are the countries comprising North Africa? If you were to look on a map, you could say: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Yet for some reason, Egypt is rarely acknowledged to be in the "North Africa" category. Instead, Egypt seems to be universally accepted as part and parcel of the "Middle East". Meanwhile, the term "al-Maghrib" is usually used to refer to Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. So what happens to Libya? Why isn't it included in the Maghrib?
This reminds me of an argument I got into with a colleague this past summer at the CASA program in Cairo. While talking about Algeria's performance in the World Cup, he noted that Algeria was the only team in the tournament from "the Middle East". I rudely cut him off and said that I wasn't sure if Algeria was in the Middle East. This colleague was a graduate of a particular university in the South known for its pretension, so I wanted to give him a hard time anyway. I simply recommended that he replace "fii as-Sharq al-Awsat" with "fii al-3alam al-a3rabi". The professor sided with my suggestion, and the issue was settled.
But it wasn't. Perhaps it never will be. Until it is, we graduate students of Near Eastern studies can continue debating the (in)validity of these labels.
Sunday, October 17, 2010
Identity Politics in Egypt
Tensions between Muslims and Copts have been on the rise lately in Egypt. Two incidents in particular have led to a marked deterioration in inter-sectarian relations since May 2010: a legal battle between the Coptic community and the state over whether divorced Coptic men can legally remarry; and the issue of Camillia Shehata, the wife of a Coptic priest who Muslims claim has converted to Islam and is being held by her family against her will.
The history of Muslim-Copt relations is a long one, as the two have been coexisting in Egypt since the 7th century. The Coptic community welcomed the Arabs, who gave them more religious freedom than they had enjoyed under Byzantine rule. The trope that Copts were forced to convert upon the Arab invasion is an utter falsehood; mass conversions did not occur until much later on (circa the 14th century). Regarding more recent relations, many Egyptian Copts - rightly or wrongly - attribute the rise in sectarian tensions to the growing religious conservatism of the Muslim majority since the 1970s, and the role of the state in fostering that growth.
The two aforementioned incidents have sharpened sectarian tensions. Furthermore, they have exposed the problems underlying the effort to secure rights for religious minorities in the modern secular nation-state.
First, the legal battle between the state and the Coptic community. In May 2010, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the Coptic church could not prevent two divorced Coptic men from legally remarrying. The Coptic church considered this an infringement by the state on their religious rights, since Egyptian law grants the church primacy over personal status affairs. In response to the ruling, Pope Shenoudah III - head of the Coptic church - appealed to President Mubarak. Though the ruling was subsequently overturned, the Coptic community was once again vulnerable to the accusation that they constitute a state within a state.
The second controversy has generated more sectarian tension. After Camillia Shehata, the wife of a Coptic priest, disappeared, rumors spread that she had converted to Islam and was being held against her will by her husband and father as punishment. Mosques became the sites of rallies and demonstrations calling for the liberation of "sister Camillia". Despite the fact that a You-Tube video was posted in which Camillia appeared and explained that she had left her husband due to a marital dispute, and not because she had converted, the demonstrators insisted that the video was a fraud and that she was being held against her will. To add fuel to the fire, the number two in the Coptic church, Bishop Beshoy, gave an interview to al-Masri al-Youm in which he called the Coptic community the original inhabitors of Egypt, and that the Muslims were simply "guests". So much for tactful PR.
The Mubarak regime itself has attracted attention for its inaction in the midst of these tensions. The security forces have not lifted a finger to crack down on any of the public demonstrations, which some say reflects a strategic calculation on the part of the Mubarak regime. For example, Ibrahim Eissa, the prominent regime critic and recently sacked editor of one of Egypt's largest independent newspapers, has underscored the notion that with the prices of vegetables, fruits, and meat having risen by 300%, fomenting identity politics is a great way to distract attention from more substantive issues that transcend sectarian divisions. The title of his editorial says it all: "Muslims, Copts, and Meat."
Perhaps the most interesting thing about these recent episodes of sectarian tension is that many of the demonstrators who oppose the stance of the Coptic church in these issues couch their arguments in the language of civil rights. Though the state sees itself as enforcing religious freedom by permitting the Coptic church to manage personal status issues, these demonstrators charge that by doing so, the state is enabling the church to act in ways that are perceived as "illiberal". Many of them support a unitary civil code, regardless of religious affiliation. Indeed, the concept of a unitary civil code constitutes an integral part of the normative Western conception of the modern, secular nation-state.
But what these advocates often fail to recognize is that unitary civil codes can be illiberal in their own ways. The implementation of them involves drastic transformations in the way adherents of a particular religious tradition relate to that very tradition. In this way, the secularizing project inevitably involves power, coercion, and work on the self. In short, if the Egyptian state's policy of allowing the Coptic church to manage their personal status issues enables "illiberal" traditions, so does the project of enforcing a unitary civil code.
Not surprisingly, advocates for an individual rights-based framework don't get very far when they appeal to the Egyptian government. After all, as far as the NDP is concerned, there's nothing like good old sectarian controversy to take the public's attention off of high food and gas prices, unpopular foreign policies, and an increasingly harsh media crackdown in an election year.
The history of Muslim-Copt relations is a long one, as the two have been coexisting in Egypt since the 7th century. The Coptic community welcomed the Arabs, who gave them more religious freedom than they had enjoyed under Byzantine rule. The trope that Copts were forced to convert upon the Arab invasion is an utter falsehood; mass conversions did not occur until much later on (circa the 14th century). Regarding more recent relations, many Egyptian Copts - rightly or wrongly - attribute the rise in sectarian tensions to the growing religious conservatism of the Muslim majority since the 1970s, and the role of the state in fostering that growth.
The two aforementioned incidents have sharpened sectarian tensions. Furthermore, they have exposed the problems underlying the effort to secure rights for religious minorities in the modern secular nation-state.
First, the legal battle between the state and the Coptic community. In May 2010, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the Coptic church could not prevent two divorced Coptic men from legally remarrying. The Coptic church considered this an infringement by the state on their religious rights, since Egyptian law grants the church primacy over personal status affairs. In response to the ruling, Pope Shenoudah III - head of the Coptic church - appealed to President Mubarak. Though the ruling was subsequently overturned, the Coptic community was once again vulnerable to the accusation that they constitute a state within a state.
The second controversy has generated more sectarian tension. After Camillia Shehata, the wife of a Coptic priest, disappeared, rumors spread that she had converted to Islam and was being held against her will by her husband and father as punishment. Mosques became the sites of rallies and demonstrations calling for the liberation of "sister Camillia". Despite the fact that a You-Tube video was posted in which Camillia appeared and explained that she had left her husband due to a marital dispute, and not because she had converted, the demonstrators insisted that the video was a fraud and that she was being held against her will. To add fuel to the fire, the number two in the Coptic church, Bishop Beshoy, gave an interview to al-Masri al-Youm in which he called the Coptic community the original inhabitors of Egypt, and that the Muslims were simply "guests". So much for tactful PR.
The Mubarak regime itself has attracted attention for its inaction in the midst of these tensions. The security forces have not lifted a finger to crack down on any of the public demonstrations, which some say reflects a strategic calculation on the part of the Mubarak regime. For example, Ibrahim Eissa, the prominent regime critic and recently sacked editor of one of Egypt's largest independent newspapers, has underscored the notion that with the prices of vegetables, fruits, and meat having risen by 300%, fomenting identity politics is a great way to distract attention from more substantive issues that transcend sectarian divisions. The title of his editorial says it all: "Muslims, Copts, and Meat."
Perhaps the most interesting thing about these recent episodes of sectarian tension is that many of the demonstrators who oppose the stance of the Coptic church in these issues couch their arguments in the language of civil rights. Though the state sees itself as enforcing religious freedom by permitting the Coptic church to manage personal status issues, these demonstrators charge that by doing so, the state is enabling the church to act in ways that are perceived as "illiberal". Many of them support a unitary civil code, regardless of religious affiliation. Indeed, the concept of a unitary civil code constitutes an integral part of the normative Western conception of the modern, secular nation-state.
But what these advocates often fail to recognize is that unitary civil codes can be illiberal in their own ways. The implementation of them involves drastic transformations in the way adherents of a particular religious tradition relate to that very tradition. In this way, the secularizing project inevitably involves power, coercion, and work on the self. In short, if the Egyptian state's policy of allowing the Coptic church to manage their personal status issues enables "illiberal" traditions, so does the project of enforcing a unitary civil code.
Not surprisingly, advocates for an individual rights-based framework don't get very far when they appeal to the Egyptian government. After all, as far as the NDP is concerned, there's nothing like good old sectarian controversy to take the public's attention off of high food and gas prices, unpopular foreign policies, and an increasingly harsh media crackdown in an election year.
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