The Mossad Assassination: Strategic Move or Attempt at Absolute Gangsterdom?

The assassination of top Hamas commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai several weeks ago has attracted considerable attention in international affairs circles, with many foreign ministries and independent analysts accusing Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad, of carrying out the target killing. The Economist published an article titled “Does Mossad really make Israel safer,” analyzing the strategic implications of such an aggressive operation while sympathetic commentators were quick to pat the Israelis on the back for a job well done. Some of these analyses dwelt on issues such as al-Mabhouh’s alleged connections with Iran and other relatively un-compelling reasons why Israeli officials may have ordered the hit. I think there is a very clear motivation for the operation that has been ignored by regional experts and diplomat savants alike: the Israelis simply wanted Mossad to be considered for the title of the “World’s Most Gangster Intelligence Agency, ” the unofficial designation given to the intelligence agency which is able to carry out the most callous, brazen violations of international law within a given time frame.

Though bulldozing homes, destroying large parts of southern Lebanon, and using White Phosphorus on U.N. personnel and Palestinian civilians certainly qualifies as gangster, Israel decided that an assassination carried out by its elite intelligence agents would be the logical next step in a series of “gangster-as-hell” moves. Upping the ante for Israel has been difficult given the country’s moderately gangster foreign policy, but the Israeli decision must have been based on the idea that any reduction in Mossad’s perceived gangsterness would pose a serious (existential?) threat to the small nation state. Several political scientists at John Hopkins’ School of International and Advanced Studies, a small group of academics who created the Aggregate Gangsterness Index (AGI) in order to quantify the gangsterness of governments, private individuals, and Russian businessmen, point to Israel’s troubling scores in the past few years as one possible explanation for its actions. Israel’s AGI score, they say, peaked immediately after the Gaza operation but has plummeted considerably in the two years after due to its relative inactivity. The Israeli score hovers above the world median due to its periodic military operations in the Territories and its “straight gangsta” blockade of the Gaza Strip. Besides falling AGI scores, there is yet another other reason for Mossad to fret about losing its position as the world’s most gangster intelligence agency: stiff competition from other intelligence agencies.

Mossad has always lived in the shadow of its American counterpart, the Central Intelligence Agency. In order to challenge the sheer dominance of the CIA in the area of gangsterness, Mossad needed to plan a spectacular operation that did not involve the use of aerial drones or secret prisons (lest they look like CIA copycats). Also,rather than use the Russian method of poisoning dissidents and Ukrainian opposition leaders, Mossad decided to employ the good, old-fashioned, time-tested tactic of veteran gangsters: murder. Mossad’s attempt to cement its position at the top of the gangster hierarchy has been impressive but the agency still has much to learn from the Russians and Americans. For example, Mossad’s network of Palestinian and Lebanese (native) informants cannot match the CIA’s rolodex of nefarious, murderous regional power brokers in Afghanistan. Nor have Israelis shown the gall of the Russian and Uzbek government-connected gangsters who murder their own journalists with relative impunity. Al-Mabhous’ assassination was a valiant attempt but the Israelis have yet to foment revolutions (Central America) or overthrow democratically elected leaders (Iran). However, there is something admirable in the publicness of the act as well the brazen disregard of international norms displayed in the forging of foreign passports, elements of the assassination which suggest that perhaps Mossad may be able to contend with Saudi intelligence for the title of the “Most Gangster Middle Eastern Intelligence Agency.” This is surely a significant achievement that should be celebrated by Israelis from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. To Mossad, a Mazeltov is in order.

The Love Lives of M.E.S. Students: More Problems than Methods

Having been witness (and perhaps party to) many stilted and uncomfortable conversations that do not include references to Foucault but are, instead, attempts to enter into relations with an attractive classmate, I am convinced that Middle Eastern Studies students are particularly awkward when it comes to romance. To some extent, the awkwardness of gender relations in the field can be attributed to the region’s own rigid gender divisions and conservative social culture. For instance, one would expect Lain American Studies students to be relatively more adept in this arena because of the region’s inherent sensuality and its peoples’ unbridled hedonistic impulses. (In particular, Paraguay has gained the reputation of being a bastion for pleasure-seekers.)

I seek here not only to problematize gender relations as they manifest themselves in daily graduate student life, but to suggest a new framework for how these gender relations may evolve. For that purpose and in belated celebration of Valentine’s day, I have composed a few pick-up lines, customized for students of the region. While making reference to common subjects of interest, these pick-up lines also subvert and complicate assumptions about the nature of romance in contemporary MESAstan. Note of qualification: Though these pick-up lines display a distinct heteronormative bias, they are in no way meant to support the unstable, socially-constructed categories that characterize gender.

1. Why don’t we continue this conversation about forms of contestation in Ottoman Macedonia over drinks on Friday night?

This line is particularly effective if you have just attended a lecture on Ottoman Macedonia and are engaged in a riveting conversation about the role of the bandit in the Empire’s far flung provinces. If you have not been discussing Ottoman Macedonia, this statement may be a non-sequitur. The danger here is that when you do continue the conversation, you are unable to impress your classmate with your knowledge of Macedonian geography and Ottoman language.

2. Let me be your Caliph, I will put an end to the fitna within your soul.


3. May I establish my intellectual hegemony over you during a cup of coffee?

This sentence reveals your intellectual “confidence” in a not-so-subtle way. Also, asking someone out for coffee is always a safe bet given the reality that some of the Pious, Righteous and Virtuous members of the ummah do not indulge in the drink (laban).

4. I would like to problematize your single status on Facebook by taking you to dinner on Thursday night.

Most Middle Eastern Studies graduate students spend an embarrassing amount of time on the social networking site. While referencing somebody’s relationship status on Facebook may have been taboo two years ago, the nearly universal adoption of Facebook as an element of our Panoptic society means that you can safely use this line. However, you may feel obligated to mention how Facebook is used to surveille and discipline the population and, therefore, constitutes a form of state power. References to the not-so-unproblematic forms of self-representation and modes of “staging the self” engendered by Facebook participation would also be appreciated.


5. I’d like to be the New Historian of your current relationship.


6. Ana Ismi Maha. Ana adrus el arabiyya fi Jamaat New York. Eskun fi Brooklyn. Walidi t’amel fi el umum el mutahida. Wa Ana fahlan wahiida.

Imitating Maha from al-Kitaab’s impeccable fusa is one way you can establish your linguistic prowess and impressive your classmate. However, you must be sure to stick to the script, lapsing into colloquial Egyptian is guaranteed to elicit stares and derogatory comments from the Lebanese. (Ca va?) This method works best when you are able to use Maha’s lines semi-appropriately in context. For example, in a crowded public lecture you may turn to your attractive classmate and say:

“Why don’t we grab a coffee, ya’ni, besebub el izdiham” (on account of the crowdedness”)

Migration as Development

A provocative new paper http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1423717/ by researcher Michael Clemens of the Washington-based think tank Center for Global Development argues that advanced economies should consider relaxing immigration policies considerably, based on the fact that migration to rich countries has been remarkably successful at raising the living standards of the world’s poor. Clemens, who has most recently applied his ideas about labor mobility to the Haitian crisis, forces us to question some of our firmly-held assumptions about development process(es) and migration.

Clemens begins by critiquing narrow “place-based” approaches to development- he argues that the field is preoccupied with the idea of poor countries as potential sites of development. Instead, by focusing on statistics such as the average income gains of poor migrant moving to wealthy countries, Clemens says, we can see migration as an effective and efficient mode of development. After citing a number of impressive statistics about the income gains of migrants who move to wealthier countries, Clemens concludes that “No known schooling intervention, road project, anti-sweatshop campaign, microcredit program, investment facility, export promotion agency, or any other in situ development program can surely and immediately raise the earning power of a large group of very poor people to anywhere near this degree.”

There are a number of questions that the article raises for me with respect to the Middle East:

Can migration to wealthier countries in Europe and North America raise the living standards of people in the poorest countries of the region (Yemen, etc)? I assume that this would be the case given the enormous wage and standard of living disparities between the poorest countries of the Middle East and OECD countries. Unfortunately, concerns about terrorism are likely to poison any effort to introduce a policy that would allow large numbers of Yemenis to migrate to France, Germany and England (for example).

Given the documented abuse of expatriate workers in the Gulf, can increased labor mobility within the region enhance the livelihoods of the poor when destination countries (Saudi, Kuwait, etc) do not have a protective legal and political infrastructure? This is a complex issue given the fact that laborers experience an increase in wages but not necessarily in living standards. In this respect, Clemens argument seems more applicable to Western European and North American countries which allow for a more sustainable rise in income and living standards.

It is certainly important for people and organizations concerned with economic development in the Middle East to consider innovative recommendations such as the ones outlined in A Labor Mobility for Development when formulating policy. For example, with respect to the situation in Afghanistan, there may be a strong argument to allowing Afghans to migrate to wealthier countries such as Iran (and perhaps compensating those countries directly for the burden imposed on infrastructure) rather than implementing top-down development programs within Afghanistan at a large cost. Evidence-based, innovative arguments like the one made by Clemens are desperately needed in policy circles where discussions of global development are based on ossified thinking and antiquated ideas about what works.

Which Middle Eastern Language?

The choice of which Middle Eastern language to study can be an agonizing one, especially for those of us who value language skills as an essential aspect of our area studies education. The vast majority of Middle Eastern Studies students, both undergraduate and graduate, elect for Arabic while the few, the proud, the unpragmatic choose Persian, Turkish, and other less-widely spoken languages. There is certainly a strong case to be made for studying Arabic but other Middle Eastern tongues remain important for a number of reasons. Let us attempt to tease out some potential justifications for the study of less widely-spoken languages.

Persian- When one studies the Persian language, he has complete and unfettered access to the inflated national ego and chauvinistic imaginary of the Persians, which dwarfs even that of the Arabs. The Persians, whose language has been sadly circumscribed to Afghanistan, Iran and the relatively insignificant Tajikistan, have a glorious past dating back to days of US-supported Shah. Learning Persian would give you the ability to simultaneously quote poetry to scholars of the Mughal period and collude with the State Department on its top-secret Restoration of the Iranian Monarchy Initiative. If your Farsi is superb and your career aims more modest, you could help the Iranians tweet to freedom by working for Open Society’s secret office in Bahrain. Sample Tweet: Shmo baroi jomai madani vokei va jomai jahon omodeh hastid?

Translation: Are you ready for real Civil Society and the World Cup?

Potential Careers for Farsi speakers:

Spokesman, Iranians for Reinstatement of the Monarchy, Los Angeles
Assistant to the Mughal Emperor- Old City, Dehli, India
Carpet merchant- Kabul, Afghanistan

Turkish- Learning Turkish will help you connect with Turkic speaking breathren all over the Asian continent, especially populations in the remote, obscure countries of Central Asia. You can revive the pan-Turkic movement by writing the definitive grammar textbook of a Turkish Esperanto that is to be spoken from the villages of Turkmenistan to the oil fields of Kazakhstan. Learning Turkish can be a challenge- the grammar of this agglutinative language is even more complex than the place of religion in the Turkish society. If you have no moral qualms about perpetuating the hegemony of the modern state, you can help the Turkish army maintain its position as protector of the secular republic by working as a Turkish language teacher/army commandant in subversive Kurdistan. Fortunately, I have had the chance to learn some Turkish through my interaction with the young Turks at our department. Bilgilid Tsekkur Attaturk Edderimadiliguri oz bodinjon mikilet! (Oh, Attaturk may the sun never set on your eggplant sandwich).

Some Potential Careers for Turkish speakers:

Roller Blade shop owner in Izmir
Protector of the Turkish republic
Head of State Archives- Kyrgyzstan


Hebrew- What are you, a Zionist?

A vocabulary list for MES

I sometimes wish that someone had given me a vocabulary list, similar to the ones that many of us were forced to memorize in high school, customized for the field of Middle Eastern Studies upon my matriculation at NYU. That way, I would have had some key words to draw on for my response papers and history essays rather than relying on my usual method of googling the words “Middle East Studies Sound Smart” in those crucial minutes before an in-class presentation. Perhaps if I had mastered these terms, I would not have sounded like such a Philistine in front of my distinguished colleagues in class and during department socials.

Below are a number of words that you may hear or read throughout the course of your Middle Eastern Studies career. Learning these terms and using them effectively in context is absolutely critical if you hope to advance in the increasingly competitive world of Middle Eastern Studies academia. Since I have provided my own definitions for some of the terms listed, you may notice there is some slippage (see entry for slippage) between the dictionary definition of the word and its use in the MES context.

1. problematize ( v.)

i) to insist on the complexity of a seemingly simple concept, category, or fact
ii) to reframe a category, statement of truth, or an objective reality as a problem

ex. “In this presentation, I seek to problematize Egyptian laborer’s Khalil Mahmood’s new haircut using a number of notable texts on discourses concerning hair styling in modern-day Egypt.”

The beauty of this word is that one can essentially problematize every concept, idea or historical narrative with which one is presented. That being said, the main objects of problematization in Middle East Studies are as follows: Gender, Egypt, Ottoman Identity, Arabness, Sexuality, Islam, Modernity, Jihad, Progress, Labneh.

2. deconstruct (v.)

i) to whittle away the constituent parts of a reasonable interpretation until it collapses under the weight of its own logical thrust

ii) to cry shamelessly in front of your advisor the week before your thesis on an obscure Turkish poet is due

ex. “Khalil really deconstructed in my office a few minutes ago- I guess we will have to let him pursue the joint program in Middle Eastern Studies and Badminton.”

2. slippage ( n.)

i) a logical gap or a point of discontinuity between two explanations or statements

ii) the area between a pious woman’s hijab and her ear

ex. Male MES student to other Male MES Student: “I saw Nazima’s slippage in Persian class yesterday. Mashallah!”

3. Israel (n.)

i) an omnipotent, demonic regional superpower responsible for the destruction and degradation of the Arab world

ii) the sole point of agreement between sharia-loving Islamist students and secular, wine-sipping Arabs

iii) primary source of Arab fatalism

ex. “Who do you think will win in the upcoming Palestianian elections?”
“It absolutely doesn’t matter- Israel will never let us have a state anyways.”


4. Islamicate (n. and v.)

i) ambiguous term used to refer to diverse cultures, empires and peoples of the Islamic faith

ii) national plan and highest wish of the region’s Islamist parties, usually involving the implementation of sharia

ex. “We are going to Islamicate this country until it can be Islamicated no more.”

5. hegemony (n.)

i) complete or partial domination of one country, idea, discourse over another

ii) the situation that arises when a graduate student unceremoniously destroys an undergraduate’s argument in a mixed class, usually in front of a thesis advisor

6. undergraduate (n)

i) human subject who serves as a barrier between a graduate student and campus destinations

ii) the Subaltern, a creature that lurks in the ambiguous timespace continuum between high school and Enlightenment

7. Foucault (n.)

i) God

8. Job

i) something more distant and unattainable than the two-state solution
ii) a choice of necessity for Philistines, Zionists, law graduates, and inferior MES graduate students

Professors Elias Khoury and Sinan Antoon in The New Yorker: Two N.Y.U faculty members feature prominently in article about the modern Arabic novel

The latest issue of The New Yorker features a piece by Claudia Roth Pierpont on the modern Arabic novel. Among the novels reviewed by Claudia Pierpont are two works written by current M.E.S./affiliated faculty members: I’jaam by Sinan Antoon, Assistant Professor at the Gallatin School of Individualized Study, and Gate of the Sun by Elias Khoury, Global Distinguished Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. The article makes for an interesting read, especially since it is meant to serve as a survey for those unfamiliar with the Arabic literary landscape. In addition to providing summaries of and commentary on a number of recent Arabic novels, Claudia Roth Pierpont meditates on the serious political commitment of contemporary Arab writers which, she believes, reflects both the precarious position of intellectuals within the Arab world and tortured history of their countries of origin.

You may read The New Yorker article here:

http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2010/01/18/100118crbo_books_pierpont

For more on Gate of the Sun and I’jaam:

Gate of the Sun By Elias Khoury:

http://www.archipelagobooks.org/bk.php?id=11

I’jaam by Sinan Antoon:

http://www.citylights.com/book/?GCOI=87286100771670

Career Choices for Middle Eastern Studies Students

Question: What can/should I do with myself after I graduate with a master’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies?

Answer: For many of us, the painful but ultimately self-indulgent and pointless existential crisis triggered by this question is remarkably familiar- we experienced it shortly after graduating from undergrad. After earning a bachelor of arts degree (B.A.) in history or comparative literature with a focus on Middle Eastern Languages and Literatures from [insert liberal arts college/ research university here] we were convinced that others [read: employers] would respect our deep, unwavering commitment to attaining knowledge about this “fascinating” [read: economically stagnant and hopelessly violent] area of the world.

While the common but ultimately irksome response from our friends “Oh you study the Middle East- that’s so interesting. Everybody will want to hire you,” was comforting in the short-term, we soon realized that “everybody” really only included second-tier NGOs and the Central Intelligence Agency. The same existential crisis rears its head in a more potent, virulent form in graduate school when one cannot simply delay his entry into the real world by pursuing further studies (Except for the Phd candidates among us who will never enter the real world- unless you consider the real world to be a faculty conference room at Columbia). We have been told repeatedly that our skills and knowledge are “highly-valued”- but by whom?

Below are a few career suggestions for our master’s students, who have spent two years honing their language skills and area knowledge.

1) Study Abroad Advisor- Yemen

Your in-depth knowledge of the region and slippery command of fusa (Kef Fal Hal?) help you as you lead six groups of 20 wide-eyed twenty-year old American college students through the dangerous, almost-African-in-its -misery part of the Arabian Peninsula. Your position of authority will also afford you the opportunity to rail against American foreign policy while picking up the local habit(us)- chewing khat. Though some of your other friends/ colleagues also work in the region, you remind them that you live in the real Middle East, a place where hope gives way to despair in a titillating cycle of suffering. Besides, given America’s soon to be militarized concern for Yemen, the expat party scene in Sana’a is really unparalleled. Drinking martinis with General Petreaus one day and lambasting him as General Betray-Us the next is more than any other area studies graduate could ever ask for in a “real world” job.

2) Saving the World- Entry Level Project Assistant

Working for a New York-based NGO will give you a chance to network with other self-righteous, pro-Palestinian graduates of liberal arts colleges and perhaps more importantly, grant you the right, nay the obligation, to condescend to bankers, lawyers and other high-status New Yorkers. At private apartment parties, you can either talk about the latest press release you have written about the Israeli bombing in Gaza or mention the situation in Sudan to maximize the amount of rich world guilt you inflict upon your audience.

3) Teach for Lebanon- Founder

After you are rejected by Teach for America (you are sure that they blackballed you because of your pro-Palestinian activism) you decide to start a similar organization focused on educational crisis facing Lebanese schools. You appoint one Maronid, one Shiite, and one Druze as co-CEO’s and spend several months traveling through Saudi Arabia, France, Syria, Iran and the United States pitching your idea to Lebanon’s main patrons. You believe you can harness the productive potential of Lebanon’s human capital, young Lebanese males with gelled hair and a skewed view of their own physical attractiveness, to bring education to the less fortunate in the country. Your plan fails when the American government discovers that the seed money for your organization is going to Hezbollah co-sponsored soup kitchens near the border with Israel.

4) The Agency- Analyst

5) Mamoun’s - Falafel Maker/Maitre D

Though you have spent two years problematizing authenticity (isn’t it, ultimately, a discourse?), you still seek it. Your study abroad Arabic language program in Syria, spring break trip to the West Bank, and brief summer stopover in Istanbul were all unsatisfactory because you did not discover the real Islam(s) nor did you discover the real Middle East. You are disillusioned with the ummah, Palestine, and the godless Turks and decide that true authenciticy lies in the palate. Your elementary school level Spanish is adequate to land you a job as the front man at Mamouns where you spend hours ranting about your marginalized position vis-à-vis the Israeli owned cafes on MacDougal Street. Every once in a while, your customers discuss Middle Eastern politics and you inject yourself into the argument by quoting directly from your thesis titled "Subversion of a Metadiscourse: Ibn al-Khaldun’s poetry: A Revisionist Interpretation".

Regardless of which of these options you pick, there is a bright future waiting for you. You need only to seize the opportunity. Me? I will practicing intoning the following sentence with all due seriousness,

"One job with hot sauce, please."

Predictions for what will not happen in 2010

Around this time of year, analysts, prominent think-tanks, and the Central Intelligence Agency attempt to predict what is going to occur in the Middle East in the upcoming twelve months. Recent events in Iran and Yemen have only added to speculation about the future of the region ( keep in mind that here “future” is narrowly interpreted to mean events and/or circumstances that will directly impact U.S. interests in the region such as wars, the growth of al-Qaeda, or the formation of small subversive, female-led reading groups in Tehran.) I will do no such thing.

Instead, I want to offer a set of anti-predictions: a list of completely implausible events which would only occur under the most unbelievable circumstances.

1. The formation of a Palestinian state

The anti-prospects for peace have already been belabored by those writing on all sides of the Arab- Israeli conflict and personally, I would be willing to bet my first-born child on the impossibility of this particular event. Not only has the Obama administration failed dismally in stopping Israeli settlement activity on the West Bank, administrations officials have shown a uncanny ability to avoid, deflect, and backtrack, especially when it comes to any issue of substance. However, if a Palestinian state were to materialize, Palestine’s chief negotiator Saeb Erakat would celebrate his dual appointment as Angry-aggrieved-Palestinian-in-Chief and Sultan of Self-Righteousness by throwing an all-night Camp David-themed dance party in Nablus (where all attendees must dress up as their favorite member of the Israeli or Palestinian team at Camp David) . In attendance: Jimmy Carter as Yasir Arafat and Bill Clinton as Ehud Barak.

2. Yemen overtakes Saudi Arabia as the region’s largest and most dynamic economy

Rather than sow discord within the ummah by attacking the federal government in Yemen, Al-Qaeda uses its popular support to form small microfinance lending cooperatives modeled on the Grameen Bank. Sanaaa replaces Dubai as the region’s newly ascendant financial center and the desert city soon becomes synonymous with new world decadence.

3. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu writes an open letter to the Palestinians titled “Our bad”

At the urging of Bono and the progressive organization AIPAC, Israel’s Prime Minister decides that apologizing to the Palestinians for the Gaza offensive would be “the right thing to do.” In the letter Netanyahu begrudgingly admits that, contrary to Ehud Olmert’s statement about the IDF, Israel does not have the most moral army in the world but rather, the third-most moral army in the world (after the United States and the People’s Democratic Republic of the Congo). After discussing the existential threat that Omanian cashews pose to the state of Israel, Netanyahu acknowledges the possibility that vague, U.N.-promoted notions such as human rights may sometimes be just as important as Israel’s security.

4. Iran’s President hosts Pride Week

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the embattled President of Iran, realizes that he might be able court the young, Westernized supporters of the Green Movement by embracing the global gay rights movement. Opposition demonstrations are replaced by large, pro-gay rights marches throughout in Tehran, Isfahan and Shiraz with the immaculately-dressed Basij marching alongside Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi. Since there is enormous political fall-out among religious and social conservatives, Ahmadinejad is forced to qualify his support for Pride Week by stating that despite their effeminate-sounding language, Iranians are by no means gayer than their Arab co-religionists.



5. The Kevorkian Center at N.Y.U. passes a resolution in support of Israel

After attending a lunchtime lecture by a prominent professor titled “Politics of Polygamy: Towards an Understanding of Agency”, master’s and doctoral students in M.E.S. meet in the library to discuss Israel’s latest offensive in the Palestinian territories. Though it takes them about an hour to hash out the language, forty-nine out of fifty students decide that they unequivocally support Israel’s right to defend itself. However, the students decide that simply passing a resolution is not enough- concrete action must be taken to support the troops. The Kevorkian sends bottles of red and white wine, Portobello sandwiches, and several plates of Hummus from Tanoreen to the IDF as care packages. Meanwhile, the Center announces that Problems and Methods in Middle Eastern Studies will now be taught by visiting professor Daniel Pipes who will use the class as a platform to address the strong bias against Israel in the field.

The Turks/Saudis are coming!

A few weeks ago, I wrote about the Open Doors Report, a survey which tracks the number of students of foreign origin studying in America and American students who study abroad. The report contains two sections: one which discusses trends in foreign enrollment in the United States and another which lists common destinations for American students studying abroad. After combing the statistics tables for data about the Middle East, I discovered that two Middle Eastern countries make the list of the top twenty-five countries of origin for foreign students studying in the United States. Turkey and Saudi Arabia both qualified as top destinations with Turkey sending over 13,000 students a year to American universities and Saudi Arabia sending slightly less at 12,600 in the most recent documented year. The report notes that the government of Saudi Arabia has boosted its scholarship program and that this increase in funding has resulted in a dramatic increase in enrollments (a 28% increase in the last year alone). The majority of Saudis are studying at the undergraduate level (62 %) whereas most Turks (52%) who study in the United States are pursuing graduate studies. No other Middle Eastern country appears on the list of top countries of origin which is led by India, China and South Korea.

As I suggested in my last post on Open Doors, I think some of us who have experience in regional studies may have a skewed perspective on how many students of Middle Eastern origin are in the States. Open Doors reminds us that the number of students of Middle Eastern origin pales in comparison to the number of students coming from Asian and Latin American countries. Another interesting statistic that appears in the report concerns our own institution. New York University is second on the list of universities that have the largest international student body with a population of 6,671 internationals out of a total enrollment of 50,917 students. N.Y.U’s achievement, while laudable, seems less impressive when you look at graduate students as a percentage of the entire student body. For example, Columbia’s total student body is half the size of N.Y.U’s but the number of international students is roughly the same as N.Y.U.’s. , implying that international students comprise roughly a fourth of Columbia’s total student body.

You may view the report here. http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/?p=150817

The question of gender

Perhaps the most sensitive issue in public discourse about the Middle East is the political, economic, and social position of women in Arab and non-Arab societies. As Leila Abu Lughod and others have argued (http://www.smi.uib.no/seminars/Pensum/Abu-Lughod.pdf), Western discourse about Middle Eastern, and specifically Muslim women has been formulated in a particular way which while disregarding or downplaying the West’s own problems with gender relations, also provides a compelling justification for military intervention. On the other hand, an extreme sensitivity to the “hegemonizing” Western discourse sometimes results in a defensive, culturalist argument which argues that problems of gender have been grossly misunderstood by Westerners, who need only to take a closer look at the actions of Middle Eastern women to discover that they are powerful cultural and political agents (thus the focus on “agency” in some contemporary social scientific literature). In my opinion, this perspective obfuscates the stark political and economic reality of gender in the Middle East.

Sometimes the culturalists attempt to resituate or transform tradition through a reinterpretation of religious texts in order to reassert a fundamental, inherent precept of a culture which, if universally adopted, would have a profound equalizing effect on gender relations. This is one way I can explain the burgeoning interest and investment of Middle Eastern Studies students in shari’a- the prevailing belief among many of them being that a new ijtihad would result in a more equitable indigenous legal structure (that would better protect the rights of minorities, women, etc). Professors and students with Islamist sympathies find this type of liberal exegesis especially appealing because it affirms a priori beliefs about the inherently, progressive nature of Islam and counters the secularist argument for a wholesale adoption of Western legal and social categories. In the complex postcolonial configuration of the Middle East and of Middle Eastern studies, an approach based on a revisionist historical framework is certainly appealing because of the way in which it exonerates culture and instrumentalizes it for an eschatological end. I find the logical presuppositions of such an overtly political project to be questionable at best because the approach places an extraordinary amount of hope in “tradition” (however dynamic that tradition may be) and perhaps, implicitly, attributes a certain primacy to culture as a catalyst for social change. In general, I find that there is an overreliance on cultural approaches to explain the condition or status of women as well as to prescribe a new way forward. Rather, I think what is needed in addition to cultural studies work is a better understanding of the economic and political dimensions of gender disparity in the Middle East.

My point here is that a micro approach which neglects issues of workforce participation and economic achievement is fundamentally inadequate because it disregards potentially important mechanisms of change. If we look closer at gender disparity in this way, there are a number of potential solutions to gender inequity that lie firmly outside the cultural studies framework. Some may say that this approach is reductive because it explains gender as a politico-economic position and posits “economics” and “politics” as monolithic categories without addressing how cultural norms give rise to particular political and economic preferences, but I think the question needs to be examined from multiple angles in order to produce a more nuanced understanding of persistent, pernicious structural inequalities. For now, the cultural approach seems to dominate academic circles where many are (for reasons of political correctness, ideological investment, and disciplinary training) more comfortable talking about constructions of masculinity in medieval times than for example, wage disparities between men and women in modern day Egypt.

Dear America, I miss you. Love, Central Asia

The Middle East has taken center stage as the primary region in which the world’s superpowers (America, China, Russia) vie for power and influence. Many commentators have written about a decline in American hard and soft power in the region as the inevitable result of military overstretch, botched diplomacy, and Tiger Wood’s zealous promotion of Hedonism as an alternative to fundamentalist Islam. Meanwhile, Maoist China has taken advantage of our follies by engaging in a nefarious, godless campaign to court Middle Eastern governments by providing them with low-cost hummus containers and hand-stitched silk dragon hijabs. (For another sign of the shifting landscape in the Middle East, one need only look at Ahmadnejad’s insistence on using Mandarin Chinese for all official negotiations conducted between him and the Hidden Imam.)

This new unstable geopolitical configuration has been welcomed by Middle Eastern dictators, FLAS-funded graduate students, CNN commentator and token Muslim Fareed Zakaria (for tokenism, see: Iraqi Vice President Tarik al Hashemi), and others who benefit indirectly or directly from continuing turmoil in the region. While we can certainly appreciate the high level of geopolitical importance assigned to our favorite region, we must also remember that there are those who continue to suffer because the United States’ narrow foreign policy focus on the Middle East. A great injustice has been done to another integral part of the Arabo-Islamo-Turkic world, Central Asia.

The Central Asian nation states, whose boundaries were drawn up in 1989 during a drunken game of Risk at the Kremlin, are pleading for more direct U.S. engagement. While we have been attentive to the pleas of the Saudi government for a dozen gold-plated life-size replicas of the Ka’aba and Israel’s request for more Palestinian-Civilian-guided White Phosphorus bombs, we have been neglecting Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and most importantly, Tajikistan.

The Central Asian states, whose entreaties and overtures are more modest than those of our Middle Eastern partners, are like a gentle, loyal lover that the United States has abandoned in favor of another more violent, passionate mashuq- the Middle East. The mostly Turkic-speaking nations still embody the bizzare counterfactual scenario of what could have been if the Soviet Union had not collapsed (for counterfactual scenarios see: O.J. Simpson’s book, If I Did It)- and sadly, they have been unable to unleash their economic and political potential because America has been reluctant to vigorously push the freedom agenda through military force and neoliberal financial institutions.

The Central Asian states are tired of having an increasingly irrelevant country like Russia as their main patron and their startlingly unattractive, eccentric leaders are looking for another superpower to bolster and legitimize their repressive regimes. The United States, which has proven its commitment to liberal democracy through its support for Hosni Mubarak and the Al-Saud family, will not be that type of partner in Central Asia. We will, instead, use a carrot and stick policy to convince Central Asian leaders that allowing a nominal, weak opposition party to compete in a national game of goat-head polo (buzkashi) is the only sensible path for a secular repressive regime looking to increase its domestic and international legitimacy. While they work towards perfecting this critical element of democratic governance, we will increase trade with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan so that average Americans will have access to their most valuable exports: obedient women with unibrows and uranium, respectively. American and European banks will capitalize on the opportunity to finance the rise of a new Central Asian Dubai in Almaty or Bishkek by lending out large amounts of money to be invested in yurt speculation and goat herding . Meanwhile, the Christian right would be thrilled at the possibility that their ministries would have direct access to millions of confused, liberal-enough-to- drink Muslims.

In sum, the good news is that the United States would be able to increase its influence in these strange, natural-resource rich post-Soviet nations , which are, coincidentally, close in geographical proximity to our new colonial possession, Afghanistan. The bad news is that Middle East Studies would wane in importance to such an extent that MESA would be forced to hold its annual convention in the lower levels of Bobst.

How do we comfort ourselves about the unintended consequences of renewed engagement in Central Asia? We must look to the wisdom of that oft-repeated quote from the Bush years, which can help us understand why Middle Eastern Studies will eventually have to play second-fiddle to post-Soviet studies. Freedom isn’t free.

Open Doors Report

In November, the Institute for International Education released its Open Doors report, a study which aggregates statistics and trends related to study abroad. The report contains some interesting statistics regarding the Middle East as a destination for American students studying abroad. For many of us in Middle Eastern Studies, the numbers can be shocking since many of us have either studied abroad or worked in the Middle East before matriculating at N.Y.U. Our social circles also tend to include people with similar interests and study abroad experiences so we perceive the numbers of American students in the Middle East to be much higher than they are in reality. For example, the institute’s press release notes http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/?p=150651 that the number of American students who study abroad in the Middle East remains dismally low:

“The number of American students studying in the Middle East increased by 22%, though the region is host to a little more than 1% of the total number of students studying abroad. The report shows the number of U.S. students rising dramatically in such countries as Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, although the total numbers are still very low. Israel still hosts the largest number of students in the region by far, with a 4% increase over the previous year.” (Open Doors Report)

Even Israel barely qualifies as a top twenty five destination for American students studying abroad. These numbers reveal that first-hand knowledge of the Middle East is still limited to an extraordinarily small number of students who venture off the beaten path. Despite a large increase in enrollments in the Middle Eastern languages at American colleges, very few American students make it over to the region where they would be able to practice their language skills and enhance their understanding of Middle Eastern cultures and societies.

I do not think more students should study abroad in the Middle East because it will serve some perceived national security interest, rather; I think it is imperative that Americans be exposed to native Middle Eastern perspectives given our current and past military involvement in the area, the importance of the region in the new world economic order and the centrality of the Middle East to debates about culture and politics. Students who travel to the region are able to offer a more nuanced and informed perspective than television commentators or senators who stay in military bunkers. Given the extremely low percentage of students who study abroad in the Middle East, I shudder when I think about the number of students who are studying in less well-known regions of the world such as Central Asia. One thing is for sure: a larger number of students with first-hand knowledge of the Middle East would yield a correspondingly bigger number of professionals with cultural and political knowledge about this dynamic and fast-changing region.

The Biggest Loser: Middle East Version

Some of you may have seen NBC’s reality television show, The Biggest Loser, where overweight contestants attempt to shed pounds with the help of personal trainers in front of a national audience. I think that this game should be adapted for ethnic minorities in the Middle East; specifically groups with laughably unrealistic national aspirations. Though the Palestinians and the Kurds would qualify as the main contenders for this title, there are a number of smaller players such as the Baloch and the Copts who would keep the competition interesting. However, my guess is that the small size and obscurity of the Baloch nation would force them to demonstrate the viability of their cause through an elaborate, coordinated tribal dance on the Pakistan-Iran border. (Given reports that the CIA and Indian intelligence agencies have been supporting the Baloch separatist movement Jundollah, the dance would have to include a hybrid bhangra/square dance sequence).

Though the main competition would not involve an official declaration of independence or a pathetic exhibition of whatever conventional/unconventional military force these groups maintain, the competition for the least viable national cause would instead be based on current lack of progress towards recognition and would adjudicated by veteran Middle East analysts such as Thomas Friedman (author: The Palestinian and his Olive Tree, The Kurdish Cause is Flat) and Jimmy Carter (author:, How to Love America’s Enemies: A Primer, Jesus loved Palestine: Therefore, So Do I ). In such a competition, each ethnic minority group would be paired with a viability trainer who would be able to coach the groups on how they can shed their ideological weight (read: Hamas) and promote their cause without relapsing into an abysmal state of loserness (read: the Palestinians). The winner would be the group that best demonstrates its ability to forfeit opportunities for national recognition through mismanagement, corruption, and the use of violence directed towards states that could possibly grant them the aforementioned recognition. Let us take a closer look at the potential contestants in order to get a sense of the challenges that face each participant as they compete for the title of the Middle East’s Biggest Loser:

The Kurds: Widely known as conniving enemies of the Turkish state who speak a strange, dangerously-close-to-Persian-sounding language, the Kurds have placed their hopes in the likes of Jalal Talabani and the PKK. Their national aspirations have to some extent been realized thanks to American patronage in northern Iraqistan and the proven ability of their leaders to influence Iraqi politics. Thankfully, for the purposes of our competition, the Kurds still qualify as losers because of the dismal state of their cause in Iran and more importantly, Turkey. In reality, there is a larger chance of Turkey Islamist prime minister Receyyip Erdogan going on a Birth Right trip to Israel and praying at the Wailing Wall with an IDF commander than there is of an independent, viable Kurdistan coming into existence. Perhaps the most obvious sign that the Kurdish cause is faltering is the fact that they have been more successful in organizing film festivals at N.Y.U. than in seriously threatening the Turkish state. The Kurds are so rife with division it makes their claim to the title of least viable national cause almost as competitive as the Palestinians'.

The Palestinians: The Palestinians are shoe-ins for the title of the Middle East’s biggest losers. In some ways, it is unfair that the Palestinians be allowed to compete for this title since the odds are so stacked in their favor. The loserness of the Palestinians is manifest in every futile attempt to bring attention to their national cause. If you could build a nation by throwing rocks, cursing Israel, making shoddy jihadist Youtube videos, and by talking about fuzzy concepts like “solidarity”, most Middle East Studies departments in the United States would be viable free-standing nation states. My guess is that the Palestinians would exceed expectations in all categories of loserness including lack of territorial contiguity (thank you Mr. Wall), belief in Islamism as a viable political and emancipatory ideology, fashion (the green headband is so passé) and least sexy leader (Abbas.Though admittedly, Ismail Haniya is quite the looker). It’s hard to imagine who could top the disunity of the Palestinians, their level of geographic dispersion, and steadfast refusal to accept benign Israeli stewardship of the West Bank.

There is no doubt in my mind that there would be stiff competition for the Middle East’ Biggest Loser, but only for the second and third place slots. As for the number one slot, the Palestinans are slated to be the perennial champions, at least for the near future.

Dubai's troubles

Dubai World’s recent announcement that it would be delaying debt payments to a number of institutional investors and banks for at least six months caused considerable volatility in global stock markets on Thursday and Friday. Analysts were quick to interpret the news as a sign that Dubai’s main financial patron, Abu Dhabi, is not ready to enact a wholesale bailout of its neighbor despite the somewhat symbiotic financial relationship between the two emirates. (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/business/global/26dubai.html?scp=5&sq=dubai&st=nyt) This view seems to be supported by the recent announcement by Abu Dhabi that it would provide aid to Dubai on a “case by case basis.” As Andrew Hammond of Reuters notes in a recent analysis,

“Abu Dhabi has stepped in to help, but avoided a direct bail-out of its neighbor -- but it could be drawn into more direct backing if its own prestige is affected by Dubai's woes.” (http://www.reuters.com/article/ousivMolt/idUSTRE5AP2RZ20091127)

There are a number of competing interpretations about the short and long –term effects of the Dubai announcement on the financial health and future of Dubai. Some analysts think that this event effectively heralds the end of the city’s reign as a regional financial powerhouse since the foreign capital that has funded Dubai’s development will be harder to come by. Others take the view that oil revenues will continue to create opportunities for investment in Dubai, keeping the emirate relevant in the long-term. (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125917636109164423.html) I tend to agree with the latter view which clashes violently with the prevailing wisdom that Dubai is and was always, a house of cards. One can talk ad nauseam about the sustainability of the Dubai model and the absurdity of attempting to diversify an oil economy by focusing only on tourism and financial services but the position of Dubai in the region as a business center is unlikely to change for a number of reasons. There is no doubt that Dubai will face some competition from other regional cities which aspire to attract foreign investment and position themselves as financial centers, but the inertia, social culture, and infrastructure are all on the side of the city where many multinationals are currently based. There is no other city which has the infrastructure needed to be a regional hub for business activity and a gateway to other emerging markets (mostly in Asia). No other regional city has seemed as willing to house rowdy expats and remove restrictions on alcohol consumption and lifestyle to make the living experience for the professional class more sustainable. The problem with the doom-and-gloom analysis is that it disregards many of the competitive advantages that Dubai maintains relative to its regional competitors as well as the emergence of increasingly interconnected markets in the Gulf. Until other cities such as Doha and Manama are able to build the infrastructure to support large-scale business activity or cities such as Abu Dhabi choose to liberalize their laws, Dubai will continue to serve an important function as a regional financial center and business hub.

Orientalism is Fun

Many students and scholars of the region are fixated on the so-called corrupting influence of Orientalism on scholarship about the Middle East. It’s not uncommon to hear the accusation of Orientalism being leveled at a good, intellectually-confident academic since there is no quicker way to discredit a scholar’s work than to label him or her an Orientalist. Orientalism, like the word Truth, evokes an automatic negative response from most well-trained Middle Eastern Studies students. Like political science, Israel, and objectivity, it is an idea which one must be reject completely if he hopes to maintain his regional studies credibility.

Frankly, I am tired of hearing about the fundamental “flaws” and “misguided” aims of the Orientalists. There is, in fact, a very simple explanation is for the incredible staying power of Orientalism as a totalizing worldview and dominant explanatory framework among twelve-year old boys from rural Kansas and major newspaper columnists. (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/opinion/editorialsandoped/oped/columnists/thomaslfriedman/index.html)

It’s fun.

That’s right, post-colonial studies has completely corrupted what was once the largest selling-point of regional studies; the ability to live one’s life as a explorer of those primitive peoples of the Middle East and as an active participant, ney, a patriotic servant, in a grand civilizing project.

In order to tease out the truly enjoyable element in Orientalism, you must ask yourself a few questions: Is there any other school of thought that allows you to make vast generalizations about an entire region based on its perceived religious roots? No. Is there any other school of thought that has such powerful resonance with both Middle America and Washington D.C. policy-makers? No. Is there another school of thought that is both descriptive and prescriptive in the sense that simultaneously grasps the problem (What Went Wrong) and suggests a new way forward for errant Arab societies? (i.e. be more like Turkey.) Of course not, well, perhaps modernization theory qualifies. That’s right, though post-colonial studies gives us the opportunity to create new words such as Islamophobaheteronormativity , queergenderism, metateleodiscourse, and postSabaMahmoodian, Orientalism employs simple categories such as “the Arab mind” and “the native disposition” in order to understand that age-old practice of freedom-hating.

Orientalism is not a paradigm, rather; it is a way of life.

Wearing tweed coats, collecting stone artifacts and orphan children from Oman, traveling to the region on exciting, four-year long sabbaticals to understand the natives in their primitive environment is not part of the academic lifestyle anymore. Sure, we go abroad to places such as Constantinople, Ramallah in new Israel, and Le Souk (http://www.lesoukny.com/) in Morocco but we do so in order to “understand,” “problematize,” and “observe.” Where is the strong, paternalistic Oxbridge-daddy-knows-best language and the remarkably lucid explanations of Islamic decline?

Some of the obfuscation and intellectual opaqueness of the post-Orientalist scholars can only be attributed to the decline of philology as a tried and true method of ascertaining the essence of Islam and therefore, of the Islamicate peoples. Thankfully, the study of obscure languages such as Ottoman still persists but where are Syriac, Aramaic, and Hittite? (www.harvard.edu)

We can easily remedy this situation by hiring academics who have a commanding knowledge of Hittite, little to no knowledge of contemporary politics, and a strong affinity for the ummah (at least in its idealized form). If we are successful, three years from now, the award-winning dissertation at MESA will be titled “A History of the Mohammedian Peoples from the Prophet’s Birth to the Modern day: A Story of Freedom-Hating and Insurrection.”

Iraq as battleground

The latest issue of the The Economist features an interesting article about the rising influence of Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in the Iraqi political process. The article cites sources who claim that a meeting took place between top American diplomatic and military officials and the head of Iran’s Quds Force in Iraq, General Qasem Suleimani. Analysts interpret this meeting as a sign that the United States is both coming to terms with the massive influence that Iran holds amongst Iraqi Shias and tacitly acknowledging the sheer dominance of the Iranian position relative to that of other regional players. (Although it is yet to be seen just how accommodating the United States will be towards Iranian aspirations for great influence in the region. There are many in the U.S. government who believe the United States must do everything in its power to counter Iranian influence, even if that means using Iraq as a battleground.) The article notes that Iraq has also become an important area of influence for Turkey and Saudi Arabia as demonstrated by the fact that both governments have established links with Iraqi political actors.

"Iraq’s three beefiest neighbors-Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey- have seen their influence in Baghdad wax as the Americans’ wanes. All three fear lest the vacuum left behind be filled by a regional rival…Simply put, the Iranians back the Shias and the Saudis back the Sunnis." (The Economist)


As Killian mentioned in his post, there is another conflict in which the broader Shia-Sunni rift is visible: the battle between the Houthis and the Yemeni government. The changing nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Yemen point to an important trend: the emergence of regional proxy wars between the Middle East’s dominant powers in countries with a weak or emasculated central government. In the Middle East, the prime battlegrounds for regional hegemony are countries in which there is a significant power vacuum (Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon). In Iraq, Iran has employed a clever hedging strategy by supporting both the militias and the Shia-led parties based in Baghdad while the Saudis have advocated on behalf of Sunni interests. What is remarkable here is not Saudi Arabia and Iran’s willingness to use proxies to nakedly pursue their own interests, it is rather America’s inability to effectively project its power in these conflict zones. The economic power in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and the new regional player, Iran by virtue of their geography and historical ties to constituencies within Iraq, have much more influence over the trajectory of the Iraqi politics than the Americans could wish for. Therefore, America, it seems, will be forced to exercise its remaining influence through its allies in the region, a highly problematic strategy given the authoritarian nature of these regimes and their demonstrated willingness pursue their own regional ambitions through the strategic use of violence. As a number of Iran analysts have noted, the situation in Iraq also exposes the weakness of the American position vis-à-vis Iran: since America has not dealt extensively with Iran in the past thirty years, it maintains little to no soft influence with the Iranian leadership. That is precisely the dismal political reality that General Odierno and Ambassador Hill may have been attempting to rectify through their clandestine meeting with Suleimani, an effort which bears more similarity to the tactics of the C.I.A. than to the methods of a traditional diplomatic corps.

The Middle Eastern Studies Student

Ever since I matriculated in the master’s program at N.Y.U. last fall, I have been plagued by a simple but terribly perplexing question: Why does one study the Middle East? (or as Princetonians , Britishers and old colonial hands (there is an incredible overlap between the three) like to call the region, the “Near East.” For me, the term Near East evokes nostalgia for colonialism, the Persian Empire, and the Moslem rule of Andalusia. Only the former name of Zimbabwe, Rhodesia, has that same evocative effect on my supple, post-postcolonial imagination. I know full well why I’m interested in the region, though my future employer (http://www.mamouns.com/) would not be thrilled if I disclosed my oh-so-practical motivations in a public forum.

Since I know my own motivations, I have begun to frame the question in terms of others desires and interests: What is it that motivates others to study the Middle East?

I believe one’s response to the question “So, why are you interested in the Middle East?” reveals a great deal about his/her assumptions, ideological persuasion, and thought patterns.

Below are a number of possible responses to that question:

Question: “So, why are you interested in the Middle East?”

Response: I want to combat the assumption/stereotype that there is a distinctly Middle Eastern (read: Muslim) impulse towards patriarchy by liberating Middle Eastern (again, Muslim) women through new exegesis of Qu’ranic texts and by writing a revisionist history of Medieval Syria. Specifically, I am focusing on the ways in which Medieval Syrian women subverted gender roles by using a flat iron pan instead of a round pan while preparing hummus.

Good luck. Perhaps you’d like to use Saba Mahmood for your theoretical framework. It’s not as if everybody else and their cousin Khadija are not reading her in an effort to “problematize” some construct or another. Another suggestion: use Foucault- talk about how the patriarchical Syrian state was able to project its power into the domicile through an official discourse regarding proper hummus preparation. But do yourself a favor: While you are busy problematizing gender, agency, Medieval Syria, patriarchy, Islam, Arabness and other “overgeneralized” categories, remember what Orientalism and neoconservatism have taught us: answers about the Middle East are always incredibly simple and intuitive. Question: Were Syrian women oppressed in Medieval times? Answer: Yes, they hated our freedom and our way of life back then.

Response: I believe the Middle East is a region of great strategic interest for the United States and will be important for the next decade to come.

We all know the national security students because of their incredibly myopic view of region and their insistence that the region’s history, politics, and conflicts must be seen through the prism of American foreign policy interests. For the national security students, terribly-accented Amerrabic, references to entire countries as the “theater of operation” and a CLI scholarship in Cairo are musts.

I have a suggestion for these students: study Urdu and focus on Pakistan. No country will give you more street credibility with the Agency than that delightful mix of chaos and South Asian Spice. (see: Salam Khalid’s seminal article: The Karachi Bazaar: Spice Market or Gendered Post-Colonial Space?) Unlike other countries in the region which may be stable in the next five to ten years (Iraq, the Palestinian territories (soon to be Greater Israel)), Pakistan is guaranteed to help you stay employed.

Response: I am interested in Middle Eastern literature and arts.

My answer: How quaint. Me? Before a dinner party, I prefer to read half of an Orhan Pamuk book so that during the event I can reference the former glory of Istanbul, mention Mahmoud Darwish and “the cause,” and then ask the question: “But the real question is: CAN THE SUBALTERN SPEAK” as loudly as possible. Literature students, the work you are doing on Safavid Poetry is just as important as the work being done to end poverty in Africa and the work done by Human Rights Watch on human rights abuses in Gaza. Therefore, you have every right to condescend to political scientists and to speak about your research with an exaggerated sense of self-importance.

These are just a few common answers to the question we are all asked at family get-togethers, dinner parties, and job interviews. In general, a little more self-reflection, self-deprecation, and an awareness that we are not saving the world (literature students) is needed in the field. Let us take ourselves seriously but also be able to laugh at the institutionalized modes of thought and orthodoxies that pervade the field. Only then will we be able to approach an understanding of how those Syrian housewives were able to take a simple cooking implement and subvert the gendered hierarchy that defined Medieval Syria.

Militant Zoroastrianism?

If we want to know why the Middle East has been subject to such political tumult in the past fifty years, we must enumerate and dissect some of the perverse ideologies and currents of political thought which have dominated the region. I thought it would be useful to take a critical look at some of these trends as well as propose several alternatives to existing ideological frameworks. Political ideologues, student activists, Thomas Friedman, and others invested in changing the political configuration of the Middle East (read: the Kurds) have been myopic in their assessment and have not embraced the more radical (possibly “subversive”) alternatives. Borrowing on Arkoun who writes about Islamic reform, I wanted to excavate the “unthought” in Middle Eastern political thought in order to find a new way forward. Below, I have proposed a couple of alternatives to Arab nationalism, Islamism, and secular authoritarianism.

Pan-Zoroastrianism

If Islam really is hindering political and economic reform, why not embrace a more ancient, positively bizarre religion originating in the Middle East. Not only do most people not understand Zoroastrianism, its primary liturgical text is so opaque and strange that it could never give rise to a orthodox interpretation: there is no Zoroastrian equivalent of the Wahhabism or of jihad (trial by fire?) simply because nobody really has any idea what the Avesta actually says. The rise of Pan-Zoroastrianism would allow Iran to find its roots in its pre-Islamic glory days of Darius and Cyprus, while the Arab states would be able to capitalize on their oil reserves by organizing an enormous regional oil fire. Zoroastrianism is also monotheistic, so in that sense, it wouldn’t involve a radical shift in theology for anybody except upper-class Turks, who have no religion besides Europe-worship. Lastly, with the embrace of Pan-Zoroastrianism, Iran’s central role in the new regional configuration would be tacitly recognized without a brouhaha erupting over its religious differences with the rest of the region. However, Middle Eastern Studies centers in the U.S. and the Central Intelligence Agency would surely find themselves scrambling given the small number of specialists trained in Avestan language and ancient Iranian civilization.

Pan-Gaddafism

A new ummah formed on the basis of adherence to an enlightened, father-like leader would resolve the problem of political authority in the Middle East and in the Islamic world more generally. The problem that afflicts Middle Eastern politics is not secular authoritarianism as such: it is that there are too many secular dictators who have shown themselves unable to coordinate with each other and who have made a half-hearted attempt to coopt Islam (read: Mubarak). Already president of the African Union, Qaddafi would be able to infuse the region with a stronger sense of anti-Americanism based on colonial and neocolonial grievances while he would also crystallize the absurdity of the pan-Arab political imaginary. The problem of illiteracy in the Arab world would disappear almost overnight as the Green Book and accompanying commentaries would be disseminated to elementary schools and Egyptian ministry offices alike. Far more interesting reading than Orhan Pamuk or Syed Qutb, the Green Book would give rise to a new literati based in Tripoli who would be able to move the revolution forward, one authoritarian step at a time. The only potential drawback of this new ideology is that it would not prepare the region for long-lasting but benign American hegemony imposed at the end of a barrel. Freedom hating would become the new national (transnational) sport of the Middle East and the freedom-haters and evil doers would find themselves reveling in their newfound unity (tawhid).