Courage to Think in Tunisia

On Monday, April 9, NYU's Center for Dialogues hosted an event co-sponsored by Human Rights Watch and Scholars At Risk titled "Courage to Think: Intellectual Freedom in Tunisia and the Arab Spring" moderated by the center's director (and American of Tunisian heritage) Mustapha Tlili and featuring four Tunisian academics.

Tlili gave the opening remarks, which I will briefly summarize:

Is the "Jasmine revolution" at risk? The protesters who brought an end to Ben Ali's regime are the educated sons and daughters of the state built by Habib Bourguiba, the independence leader among a generation of intellectuals who looked to Europe and the Enlightenment. Tunisian identity has been shaped by this history and an education valuing individual liberty, openness, and women's rights. It is this transmission of values from Bourguiba that has built a modern Tunisia.  

The so-called spring did not last, however. The Islamists have ushered in the Winter. Their rhetoric had been tactical and measured but after their October 2010 electoral victory has become harsher and forceful.  

One of history's darkest trends is when a minority hijacks a liberal revolution and gains control through any possible means, including violence. Will Tunisia follow that example?  

The world's liberal democracies need to influence the Islamist government in Tunisia to adhere to a free democratic society and to enforce the law against violent ultra-conservatives as opposed to allow them carte blanche in the name of  "freedom of expression". The ruling interim government must change its course to save Tunisia's "honor and image in the eyes of the world".  

If we are not vigilant and Tunisia's revolution is hijacked then the Arab world may witness a long (decades even) winter as Tunisia serves as a warning for the region. In other words, if liberal democracy cannot prevail in Tunisia, what hope is there for (allegedly) less propitious landscapes (such as Egypt)?  

Arabs will pay the price in backwardness and poverty, and the West will not be spared either: an explosive mix of backward, poverty, and fanaticism will lead to terrorism. 

I thought this presentation was problematic for several reasons, one I voiced in the Q&A: The speaker collapses the ultra-conservative Salafis with the more moderate and amendable ruling Islamists of al Nahda into one essentialist bloc that isn't useful for purposes of political distinction and also inevitably undermines what I believe to be the crucial task of compromise between secularists and Islamists (no matter what we may think, they exist, are prominent, and have to be part of the equation) during a transitory period toward the institutionalization of democracy when political polarization is a perilous path that may retard democratic gains. 

Tlili responded with what I thought was a fair answer: There isn't a blurring of lines between Salafis or al Nahda but a continuum. al Nahda is not the instigator of violence, but its passivity in the face of it makes it complicit. Why has it allowed, or failed to properly prosecute, acts of vandalism against a Christian cemetery, violence against Jews and the Russian Orthodox community, a radical cleric who on the main thoroughfare in Tunis called for the killing of Jews, and the beating up of artists? al Nahda is either managing its electoral base or allowing the Salafis to run wild in order to intimidate Tunisians and even maintain Salafis as a potential tool of violence. Is there then a blurring between the two? 

Fair enough, but I still contend that al Nahda is more varied and diverse in outlook, even though admittedly there are pro-Salafi currents in the party. One criticism of the party I do share is their weak-kneed, at best, approach to Salafi violence (sometimes arresting them, but no public prosecutions to date) while forcefully going after a newspaper editor for alleged indecency and recently arresting, charging and sentencing two young men for posting images of the Prophet Mohammad on Facebook. al Nahda may be wary of going after Salafis because they do serve part of their base (one member of the panel suggested Nahda was hedging its bets), but the party cannot just be indiscriminately lumped in with the former. 

I also strongly contest the idea that Bourguiba had raised "sons and daughters". This is a paradigmatic statism that imagines Tunisians as less agentive, idealizes Bourguiba's authoritarian years, and may be conflated with a pinning for a return to the old system of charismatic, self-aggrandizing politics. Let us not forget that Bouguiba once stated, "I am the state". This mindset produced the president-for-life in Tunisia. And we should qualify what constitutes "modernity" since many secularists believe that only a Western way-of-life is "modern". Many al Nahda voters are education and ambitious professionals with all the commercial modern amenities, and their commitment to their faith and vote for a party they believe represents their values does not make them less "modern". Tlili, I believe, uses "modern" in an exclusive manner; a modernity that is a political project. 

And backwardness and poverty, even mixed with religious zeal, (a point made by others as well) is not the cause of terrorism. 

The other speakers, I believe, offered a more measured presentation. 

Professor Hamadi Redissi (al Manar University - School of Law and Political Sciences) spoke about the hopeful post-revolutionary turn from uncertainty toward the building of stable democracy. But he criticized al Nahda for refusing to govern in a more conciliatory manner befitting a transition period. Instead its efforts to monopolize the process, after its electoral victory, has resulted in tension and polarization: secularists and Islamists, state and society. 

He also noted how the "newcomers" (Salafi) have put al Nahda in a bind: it cannot repress them given the reality of democracy but as the same time these "newcomers" are highly aggressive and even challenge the party's understanding of Islam in Tunisia. How al Nahda navigates this moment will determine whether this period will be a moment for democratic consolidation or a portent for a bleak future. 

Then Professor Fawzia Charfi (Professor of Physics, University of Tunis and former cabinet secretary for higher education in the first post-revolutionary interim government) spoke about one of the hopeful signs in the constitutional draft proposals. A draft written by the former head of the electoral commission has been tabled; one that includes the liberal rights enshrined in the UN's Declaration of Human Rights. 

These aspirations for a liberal constitution are shared by civil society in a reflection of Tunisian gains and the history of liberalism and secularism in Tunisia, and if the nation succeeds it will be another example for the Arab world. 

Professor Ikbal Gharbi (Professor of Anthropology at Zaytuna University, the premier center for Islamic jurisprudence in the nation) spoke about how the revolution has presented an opportunity to live through the ecclesiastical debates she had been teaching for years. 

Gharbi went on to detail the history of religiosity and co-existence in Tunisia. The Jewish minority has lived for a millenium and Christianity has been present since Roman times. There are sects of Islam, ex. Shi'a, in the south. And Tunisia Islam has been heavily influenced by Sufi trends emphasizing balance, love of life and a convivial atmosphere. But this reality is threatened by the Salafis who have acted aggressively against the Jewish and Christian minority, along with Shi'as. A monastery of a Sufi saint in Tunis has been attacked, for example. Tunisia's history of religious tolerance - codified in a pact in 1861 - compels us to be vigilant. 

The Salafis are promoting the false idea that there are those pro and con Islam. The truth is that Tunisian Islam is centuries old and a faction has kidnapped it in the name of Wahhabi and a unilateral reading. But Gharbi is not without hope: Tunisian youth, in particular, have brought a new sense of unity: We should overcome this clash between religion, identity and freedom. 

Well said! 

For the record, she has been a personal victim of Salafi thuggery in the form of an apostasy accusation because she dares to teach religion as a subject of study as opposed to preaching it as infallible truth. 

Lastly, there was Habib Kazdaghli (University of Tunis-Manouba and Dean at the humanities school). Mr. Kazdaghli has been at the center of a months-long drama at his university when a collection of Salafis (not students, but "outsides" in Kazdaghli's word; and some dressed in "Afghan garb") violently took hold of the university after their 'sisters in Niqab' were denied admission to class on the grounds that a full-face veil obstructs the communicative aspect of higher education. His office was turned into a Salafi camp until they were forced out by riot police. Kazdaghli expressed gratitude for the secular and liberal President Moncef Marzouki (the head of the center-left CPR, one of two secular parties in a governing troika with al Nahda) for criticizing the Salafis and conveying his collegial support as a former academic, but had less than enthusiastic words for the way al Nahda handled the affair by being, in his view, less than forceful in defending the university. 

The universities in Tunisia can play a crucial role in creating a space for education and debate in the nation's future and he touched on the already promising changes: Deans and university boards used to be appointed by the ancien regime, but the revolution enabled all schools and colleges to have elected board of directors and trustees. Last June elections were held at 195 institutes. The revolution rid the universities of the police. On every major campus there was a police center that reported to the Interior Ministry. And student prisoners, of course, have been freed. 

Academic freedom, the concern of the panel, is still a cause calling for its courageous fighters. Every single one of the guests has been targeted by Salafis for insufficient piety or "un-Islamic" ways. And they have had to contend with ultra-conservative voices. Ms. Charfi, for instance, relates how from the beginning of her tenure as a cabinet secretary she was being petitioned by Salafis calling for gender segregation. But, as Gharbi noted, take a look at the intermingling of sexes at the hajj: Islam is a not a faith of segregation. 

In the end, the panel concluded, what is needed is a constitutional provision securing academic freedom. The Salafis may protest. That have that freedom, but freedom also needs law and order to ensure freedom for all. 

A snapshot of post-revolutionary life in Tunisia. 

"Tunisia After the Revolution"

Tunisia, the tiny brave nation the sparked the Arab uprisings, relies heavily on tourism. But the revolution, subsequent instability and a months-long civil war in next-door Libya convinced many tourists to look elsewhere. 

The national climate has gotten a lot better in the last several months after the historic free and fair October elections. Protests, riots, and strikes are a near daily occurrence but now in a normalized manner befitting a democracy as opposed to a general state of insecurity.

One of the reasons for the revolutionary upheaval was the state of the economy, especially high youth unemployment. Creating a thriving economy remains a laborious task and unemployment has actually risen since the revolutions as businesses have shut doors and tourism taking a fall.

You can do YOUR part but checking out this beautiful country.

That is why I was quite pleased to see the New York Times travel section do a very nice piece on Tunisia this past week:

Tunisia After the Revolution 

BELOW the watchtower of the ancient fortress known as the Ribat, a panoramic view of the Tunisian city of Sousse unfolds. To the east lies the Mediterranean coast, where the Carthaginians moored their navy during epic battles with the Roman Empire. To the south and west, the labyrinthine passageways of the medina, the city’s old walled quarter, extend to the vanishing point amid a sea of tightly packed houses and minarets.....

For those further intrigued, a few years back the Times did an even better piece - less a blow-by-blow travel account and more a poignant memoir on Tunisia - that featured one of my favorite places in the country:

Under the Tunisian Sun

The crowd that gathers at El Firma, a 1920’s colonial farmhouse-turned-restaurant on a desolate stretch of land outside Tunis, is as sexy and stylish as any in the world. The work of two young Tunisian brothers, Sadri and Iyed Tej — one trained in Nice, the other at the legendary Institut Paul Bocuse in Lyon — and a Tunisian designer, Mona Mechri, El Firma is an incredibly beautiful place: antique cushioned chairs reupholstered in fuschia and furs play off the rough, warm texture of old stone walls; in the long, narrow dining room, a large plate-glass window frames a tumult of vegetation outside, lighted from below. On a soft night recently, when the seating moved out into the large, open courtyard, I found young Tunisian fashionistas just home from Paris or Rome sitting on sofas backed by elaborate antique headboards while their mothers (even more stylish) remained at tables deep in conversation in a jumble of languages. Above it all, a canopy of sheer curtains billowed sensuously in the soothing breezes of the North African night.... 


Check it out!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

No Need To Fear Religiosity in Tunisia?

Over at MERIP Rikke Hostrup Haugbolle and Francesco Cavatorta have an amusing theory as to why the moderate Islamist al Nahda did so well in the Tunisian October 2011 election - the first free and fair contest in the nation's history. The usual explanations do not hold up since other parties can claim similar variables: 

First, it is said that Ennahda was very quick and skilled in reorganizing its structures across the country after Ben Ali fell on January 14, 2011.
A second explanation refers to the party’s reputation as an uncompromising opposition movement during the Ben Ali era.
A third focuses on the weaknesses of the other parties.
Fourth, some attribute the appeal of Ennahda to its constant quest for a democratic national “consensus” on the key institutional matters.
Finally, the party is said to have swayed many voters with pledges of job creation and replication of the successful Turkish model of economic development.

But all of these can be said about other Tunisian parties in one variant or another. So why did al Nahda do so well? Because the preceding decade has witnessed a rejuvenation in piety among Tunisians. But not the Political Islam menacingly portrayed in Western media. Rather a new generation of pious Tunisians who are seeking an individualized Islam - one that is based on freedom to practice faith as opposed to a political project to enforce a selective interpretation of Islam.

Tunisia in the decade leading to the January 2011 revolution witnessed the emergence of a civic Islam: Islamic private schools, Qur'anic classes and community social welfare organizations. In part, this was a reaction to the Ben 'Ali regime which publicly demoted Islam while emphasizing neo-liberal consumerism increasingly tainted with regime graft. By partaking in an Islamic civic activity - "performative activity" to borrow anthropological discourse - Tunisians were subtly engaging in an act of resistance against an authoritarian regime that promoted a particular life style which suited official corruption.

It is this cohort, the authors argue, that not only serves as the basis for the Nahda victory but has influenced the party to adopt an understanding of the role of Islam in public divergent from the maximalist, dogmatic and theocratic trope favored by ultra-conservatives:

The glue of these [Islamic] networks is a specific understanding and practice of Islam whereby religious precepts apply to those who choose them and are not imposed on the whole of the community. This shift in perspective has filtered up to the Ennahda leadership, which has repeated professions of tolerance incessantly since being legalized, partly to reassure secular Tunisians, but partly to reflect the views and practices of its new members and supporters. As Tirad Labbane of Riadh Ennasr said: “Our commitment to Islam does not mean that we want to impose what we do on others. In that sense, you could say that we are anti-salafi, because we do not approve of imposing behavior. If you want to wear a mini-skirt, it is not my problem; if you do not want to wear the veil, it is also not my problem. Choices have to be left to individuals; the state cannot impose behavior. From the state authorities we ask only that they let us do our work in peace.”

Their rallying to Ennahda is not necessarily based on the party’s policy statements or past record or on Ghannouchi’s leadership, but on the assumption that it is the political actor whose beliefs are closest to their own. 

These Tunisians are skeptical of any drive for a strong state. Young and old, the pious middle class rather supports the quest for a decentralized democracy with a thriving private sector. The new generation believes in free-market forces and wants to take advantage of the fall of the regime to expand the business opportunities they were denied under Ben Ali. The older generation has weathered the repression of the strong, centralized state and wishes to break it up. Their other bond is the attachment to religious values and practices that they believe should inform policymaking, but not dictate it. 

Recently, al Nahda announced that it will not include Islamic law as a source of legislation in a new constitution to be drafted. I wrote a piece on that here. 

I hope that authors are right. That al Nahda and the new pious character of many Tunisians is one enlightened with a belief in individual choice and liberty. If Tunisians can navigate this period in their history and establish an Arab Muslim democracy at home both with Islamic identity and individual liberty then they'll be trailblazers for the region once again. 

Tunisia's Religion Is Islam. So What?

Agence France-Presse. Salafi in Tunis at a rally for an Islamist constitution.

Tunisia's post-independence 1959 constitutes states: "Tunisia is a free, sovereign and independent state, whose religion is Islam, language is Arabic and has a republican regime." [Italics mine]. 

That italicized part says everything and nothing at the same time. It's origin was the compromise reached between the republic's first president, Habib Bourguiba, and the then mufti at al Zaitouna University, the nation's leading religious authority. The staunchly secular Bourguiba sought to appease religious and clerical elements by declaring that the religion of a free Tunisia is Islam. But so what? The pious may have got what they wanted by it does not entail any subsequent policies or norms of state discourse. Tunisia was not governed under Islamic law anymore than France under Catholic dogma. 

It is a simple reassuring line for those deeply rooted in Islamic identity while innocuous enough so as not to threaten those preferring a civil state, as the fashionable parlance now goes in the Arab world. In short, a bridge allowing for national consensus - Tunisia is Muslim, but the state does not seek to enforce "Muslim-ness". 

Since the downfall of the Ben 'Ali regime, vocal (albeit marginal) Salafis have chanted for strict imposition of their interpretation of Islamic law (Shari'a). Many secularists, liberals and Westerners have fretted that the moderate Islamist party may seek to gradually legislate Islamic fiqh into national laws. Many Tunisians have accused al Nahda (which won 37% of the vote in the last elections, a plurality, and leds a governing troika alongside two center-left, secular parties) of perfidy: a moderate mask for the task of surreptitiously building a theocracy. 

Since the currently seated elected 'constituent assembly' has a mandate to draft a new post-revolutionary constitution, a debate has been ensuing as to where the role of religion will be positioned in the new document. al Nahda, the leading voice, has stated its desire for no change. 

"Ennahda has decided to retain the first clause of the previous constitution without change," a party spokesman stated recently. "We want the unity of our people and we do not want divisions."

Most Tunisians are not concerned with having a long-winded discussion over the exegesis of Islamic jurisprudence and where it should fit in the state legal structure. The troika will be judged by its ability to deliver on economic grounds above all. And Nahda clearly has repeatedly sought to avoid being bogged down in debate over religion and culture - any effort to amend the above wording would have served as a lightening rod for critics and fundamentalist supporters distracting from the mundane work of economic revival. 

And while Nahda's statement will disappoint the Salafi faction, it will come as relief for secularists and liberals. But for most Tunisians this simply isn't the arena for reform they are looking for. It is met with shrugs. 

And this formula has worked well in the past. Moving forward, this is one thing about pre-revolutionary Tunisia that would be best left at peace. 

Ben Ali Apologia and Qatari Involvement

Since the downfall of the Ben 'Ali regime in Tunisia, a string of books - memoirs, tell-all, ect.. - have been published by former regime hands or other connected types. Many have illuminated heretofore hidden aspects of a dictatorship that reigned for 23 years. As The Economist recently reported:

In Tunisia Amor Chedly, an adviser to Habib Bourguiba, a former president, has published a bestselling account of the 1987 “medical coup” in which his ailing boss was deposed by Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who then ruled until he fled to Saudi Arabia in January last year. Other ex-officials are shedding light on formerly taboo subjects, including the assassinations of dissidents. Radhi Meddeb, a businessman, has published an economic manifesto, “Together let us build the Tunisia of tomorrow”, that has made him a political star.

Naturally, there is apologia and lament for the Ben 'Ali years as well. Mezri Haddad was until the revolution Tunisia's ambassador to UNESCO - the UN's cultural organization. Until the last hour he was a fixture on French television defending the regime and then after Ben 'Ali's exile quickly tried (unsuccessfully) to pose as an opposition figure.

Perhaps recognizing that his opportunism was too transparent and a cursory YouTube search would obviate any dissident claims, Haddad has opted to portray the regime as a worthy lost cause. In that effort he has published (in French) The Hidden Side of the Tunisian Revolution: Islamism and the West, a High-risk Alliance (see above). His thesis:

“Behind the intoxication of freedom and the triumph of democracy, loom three deadly poisons: the temptation of fundamentalism, the sublimation of anarchism and the abandonment of sovereignty."

Beyond that he argues that Ben 'Ali's regime was the least offender among Arab tyrants - a dubious statement. Tunisia consistently ranked among the worst in internet and press censorship. Any dissent was fiercely repressed - including 140 characters worth as the regime banned the Twitter pages of opponents. Ben 'Ali arrested more journalists than Syria's Ba'ath regime with less than half the population. Morocco and Egypt, among others, arguable allowed for wider parameters of criticism. 

In another effort to redeem his former patron's legacy, Haddad argues that Ben 'Ali produced the most prosperous North African nation. Whatever the indexes may say, Tunisia's revolution was born in a fit of resentment and frustration due to a growing sense of pauperization. 

So how does this tie into Qatar? Because recently Haddad refused to shake the hand of the Qatari ambassador to UNESCO in stated opposition to Qatar's involvement in Tunisian domestic affairs. “You destroyed Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. You created division in Syria and you plot against Algeria. You represent an enemy of the Arabs [...] it would dishonor me to shake your hand," Haddad reportedly said to the Qatari representative. 

Qatar has been playing an unseemly role resented by many Tunisians. The Qatari regime financially and diplomatically backs the ruling moderate Islamic faction al Nahda and Nahda's founder Rashid Ghannoushi has been a frequent visitor to the kingdom along with being awarded with an inordinate amount of favorable coverage on the Qatari station al Jazeera leading up to the October 2011 elections. 

The relationship between the monarchy and al Nahda is as such that a Qatari minister was an invited guest at the first session of the elected Tunisia constituent assembly tasked with writing a new constitution. 

All this has been to the great protestation of a many Tunisian secularists and liberals who fear that the Persian Gulf statelet is using its resources wealth to finance an Islamist party to the detriment of Tunisian sovereignty, secularism and liberalism. Even many Nahda supporters have complained about the neo-colonial patronage role played by Qatar in its intimate alliance with Nahda - as if a peninsula monarch is toying with Tunisia's fate in a leisurely compartment paid for by natural gas. Beyond concerns for disrupting the political field through a comparative advantage in funding other parties cannot match, it rubs against Tunisian nationalist sensibilities. "The people" sought the downfall of the regime not so a Gulf monarchy could seek to parlay their future into the grand ambitions of Qatari foreign policy. 

While protestations against Qatar are well-earned, in my opinion, it is absurd for someone like Haddad to pose as a defender of Tunisian dignity when he championed and continues to pine for a regime and ruling elite that did more to strike at the self-worth of Tunisians than anything Qatar has done. There was a time for Haddad to demonstrate his courage and respect/solidarity for his compatriots. He choose otherwise. 

Tunisians Protest Against Salafi Call for Islamic State

On Tuesday, March 20, thousands of Tunisians marched in opposition to extremist voices calling for an Islamic state or a Caliphate. Tunisia's revolutionary uprising in January 2011 did not feature any evident exhibition of religious imagery or oratory, but Salafi (literally predecessors - those who aspire to live a conservative Muslim life ostensibly reflective of the life the Muslim predecessors lived in the age of the Prophet) voices have sought to claim the revolution as a mandate to impose Shari'a; or, rather, their puritanical interpretation of Islamic law.


Since the 1956 independence from France, Tunisia has been the most avidly secular Arab nation. President Habib Bourguiba (1956-86) curtailed the power of the clergy, banned polygamy and gave women equal divorce rights; and promoted an ideology of state secularism so gallant that he once drank orange juice during the fasting month of Ramadan.


Many Tunisians now worry that this legacy is being threatened. The current elected government is a "troika" consisting of a moderate Islamist party (al Nahda) alongside two left-of-center secular parties (CPR and Ettakatol). While al Nahda - which holds the most ministries and the premiership - has insisted that it does not aspire to ban alcohol or bikinis, that it will keep the nation tourism-friendly, and that Islamic laws are not an aspiration, many Tunisians protest that it has trended softly in response to often violent and disruptive behavior by Salafis. Detractors argue that either Nahda is playing a cynical electoral gambit wary of alienating part of its base or that at heart it shares the Salafi goals but prefers to allow them to carry the burden.


al Nahda argues that it isn't sympathetic to either the extremists or the secularists, but is trying to negotiate a delicate middle path and is also constrained by how much attention it can focus against Salafis considering much of the country is witnessing recurrent strikes and other pressing priorities - especially over unemployment. It isn't true that al Nahda has ignored Salafis. It sent in riot police when Salafis took over a university demanding that niqab (full-face veil) students be allowed to attend. The Salafis were kicked out and the university reopened with the niqab ban still enforced. A young Salafi who head-butted a secular lawyer was arrested and, last year, Salafis who attacked a cinema screening a anti-religious film were also arrested. Salafi violence has not gone without response. Although many Tunisians, myself included, have demanded a more forceful reply.


But where should this reply come from? The ruling coalition or civil society? The Tuesday rally was staged in response to a Salafi rally. Just as a past secular and liberal gathering was in response to the head-butting incident. Tunisian editorial pages, news programs and radio shows are at the forefront in speaking against extremism - as is the average Tunisian, secular and pious. Extremism cannot be defeated with the heavy hand of the state which may only exacerbate tensions and even imperil the freedoms of the general public in the name of "combating extremism".


As the Tunisian president Moncef Marzouki recently said, “The nation cannot be built with one color. Tunisia will pay a heavy price in blood and tears if [the state] has to confront by force extremists from all sides.”


The Salafis are a obnoxious bunch. But while loud they number a marginal few. They have to rely on dramatic episodes and  thuggery in their attempts to get their way. If this crosses the line into physical attacks or holding institutions hostage then that is, of course, a policing matter for the state. 


But it is up to Tunisian civil society to defeat extremism and bring many of the astray youth who fell for a vacuous ideology promising a false salvation from humiliation and depravation back into the mainstream fold and discredit the Salafi current. In calling for the state to defend Tunisia's liberal legacy, these very Tunisians are themselves doing it. 

The revolution did not rely on a vanguard. So why start now? 

Symbolism in Tunisia

Reuters. 


Tunisia's fringe albeit vocal Salafi movement seeks to compensate for a lack of broad following by staging orgies, pardon the French, of fanaticism. They need no "provocation"(an absurd proposition for their rampages and death threats), they chant, heckle and pounce for lack of anything useful to do. Many have become religious fundamentalists after failing to find employment, burdened with a sense of humiliation and turned to opportunist clerics for solace with plenty of free time to assimilate the oratory of extremism. 


Since the January 2011 revolution, Tunisia's Salafis have publicly attacked a leftist film maker, burnt the house of a TV station owner after the airing of a film that depicted God, and ran mayhem at a cinema that screened the irreligious documentary "No God, No Master" - attacking attendees and destroying property. 


Most recently, in a scene that outraged most Tunisians, one Salafi (later arrested for his act) head butted a Tunisian lawyer defending the aforementioned station owner at a trial pertaining to the broadcast:

Salafis also like to boast their own flag - a black parchment with white inscription. And they defame the Tunisian flag as the emblem of secular-nationalism standing in the way of their asinine and delusion aspiration for a pan-Islamic state or Caliphate.


Recently, at a university a Salafi climbed the main gate and removed the national flag. A female student at the campus went up and sought to stop him only to be pushed down by the Salafi demonstrating his idea of "protecting" women (Salafis often take up the mantle of "defending" Tunisian women: like minded individuals have caused disruptions in universities through their [sometimes violence] protest in support of a handful of female students who have been denied registration for wearing the niqab). 


That young student - Khaoula Rachidi - has now become a national hero among Tunisia's secular middle class inspiring a new found pride in the national flag. This latest act in a continuum by Salafis with a vulgar insistence of imposing their stamp on an unwilling nation far removed from the former's sensibilities has only served to further galvanize public opinion, this time by raising the national flag - exhibiting a battle for national identity through flags and their respective meanings in different communities:

The Salafis do not pose any consequential threat to Tunisia's secular and liberal order. Their numbers are too small and they need attention garbing displays or else no one would bother noticing. In addition, the security situation remains tenuous with many police still busy restoring order in restive interior towns - a reality Salafis exploit in organizing their spectacles. But their acts do not go without rebuttal. In the press, on blogs, and on the street many Tunisians register their abhorrence for such extremism and declare their commitment to the values the revolution was fought for: freedom, liberty and democracy. A liberal rally in Tunis after the head-butt incident was one of the largest since the revolution.


It is not just sloganeering, but reflects a determination to ward off extremist voices. It is now being dubbed a cultural war. But it is hardly that since the phrasing suggest an equal sided conflict. Salafis are simply trivial in the long run. 


Ultimately, I believe, that while it is vital to speak out against Salafism: argue and protest against, ect... that this is at heart a socioeconomic phenomenon. Why have some Tunisian youth turned to an extremist ideology that had no traction just a few years back? This question is best answered looking at the levels of unemployment, frustration, anger, resentment and - crucially - a feeling of humiliation that has bred a search for some vague notion of authentic identity and belonging to a larger community, hence a rock bottom convert's zeal toward Islam and the desire for a global Umma.


It is by addressing this inequities will the fanaticism exhibited in the videos above be slowly unraveled. 

Press Freedom Under Attack In Tunisia?

A short while back I wrote about the controversy surrounding a Tunisian paper's decision to reprint a photograph of a German-Tunisian footballer alongside his nearly-naked wife (see above). State authorities labeled it indecent and sent the prosecutors against the editor and two other individuals employed by the press organ.

Well, a verdict has been reached. The AP reports:

A Tunisian court on Thursday fined a newspaper publisher $665 for printing a photograph of a soccer player posing with his nude girlfriend, a ruling that raised concerns about a possible media crackdown by the country’s new Islamist government. The newspaper, Attounissia, a tabloid created after the revolution that ousted President Zine al-Abdine Ben Ali last year, published the photograph last month of Sami Khedira, a player for Real Madrid who is Tunisian and German, dressed in a tuxedo with his hands covering the breasts of his naked girlfriend, Lena Gercke, who is a German model. The publisher, Nasreddine Ben Saida, was fined for offending public morals and taste, the official TAP news agency reported.

The AP's judgement that this whole spectacle is cause for concern for press freedoms in Tunisia is made more forceful by Elliot Abrams, the in-house Middle East putative specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations:

Ghannouchi's finessing of the issue of press freedom — attack the company, not the journalists — is clever, for corporate fines will never attract the international attention and protests that arise when a journalist is jailed. But both methods can be effective in censoring Tunisia's newly free press, so Ghannouchi's failure to support freedom of expression is alarming. Ennahda dominates the new Tunisian government and parliament, so it will be difficult for liberal groups to defend press freedom if the ruling party will not do so.

For the record, the above referenced Rashid Ghannoushi does not play an official role in Tunisia's governing coalition and is no longer even the official held of the dominant party - although he remains influential within and without the party. 

Both the AP and Abrams may be overdoing it. Newspapers and broadcasters should be allowed to published whatever they wish free from state censorship. But state regulation in the name of "decency" is transnational, contingent, and may not be an authoritarian portent.

Let us recall the public outcry over a mili-second of "indecency" at the Superbowl a few years back. That led to a heavier hand at the FCC imposing millions of fines for violations of "decency" and forcing networks to rewrite scripts and adopt 5-minute delays on live programs, and leading to the radio departure of "shock jock" Howard Stern.

The U.S. is not alone. Western European nations, for instance, impose restrictions and fines on language or imagery that recall the Nazis.

The obvious point being that Tunisia, the pioneer in the so-called "Arab Spring", is not a trailblazer when it comes to imposing fines in the name of upholding public morals (albeit in Tunisia's case the fine is trivial as opposed to literally millions in the FCC's handbook). Many nations have limits on free publication and broadcast. Ideally, freedom of the press would be unqualified but in practice societies negotiate boundaries. Thus these restrictions are contingent on public moods liable to change. A few years after the Super-uproar died down the FCC loosened its grip and networks once again are "pushing the boundaries".

These boundaries do not mean a state is necessarily illiberal or it is liable to return to a dictatorship. Of course, if jail time is added to the mix that, then, elevates the concern. But that isn't the case in Tunisia. And neither is the fine meant to cripple the newspaper.

Democracy-in-practice is an interminable process of contested public space and constructed notions of acceptable and unacceptable public speech and imagery. American history (the era of "I Love Lucy" to whatever contemporary awfulness) is a testament to how parameters shift and individuals in a relatively free space are able to remold their societies, contest public space and expand horizons within the context of relative freedom.

My point isn't that Tunisia acted right. As stated, I am for plenary right to publish whatever. But I am making the case that this right isn't established even in the self-styled leaders of the free world and is not a necessary condition for the maintenance of a mostly free society. And that Tunisia's democratic future is similarly not in jeopardy.

Why expect Arab democracy to look any different from the messy reality in the West?

Of Footballers And Moral Boundaries

German-Tunisian footballer (soccer player) Sami Khedira is kind of a big deal back home. Not only does he play for the German National team, which placed third at the '06 World Cup and second at the '08 Euro Cup, but he's also on the pitch for Real Madrid - second only to FC Barcelona. And Tunisia's football obsessed. So it is natural that he would be profiled by a newspaper. Attounissia ran a story on Khedira accompanied with a photo of Khedira and his German supermodel wife from a GQ cover: 

That was enough to land the publisher, editor in chief and foreign affairs editor in jail after the so-called prosecutor of the republic ordered their detention on grounds of violating public morals, according to the AP. An investigation is pending. 

In the meantime, the paper is fighting back. In the last several hours it has published two editorials decrying the prosecution as a "shocking precedent" threatening censorship of the press and in another detailing the support the paper has received from the National Union of Journalists (which called for “the immediate release of all journalists and the rejection of intimidation against reporters.”), the Association of Culture and Technology, and the International Federation of Journalists, along with stating that the battleground of the "Revolution Is Back". (Both links in Arabic). 

For many Tunisians it is an omission sign about the intentions of the moderate Islamist-led government and speaks to larger fears over the minor but vocal Salafite movement that has threatened and even physically attacked liberal artists and broadcasters (the paper received a bomb threat likely emanating from this circle and is being guarded by police). Many fear that the ruling party, al Nahda, will clamp down on similar papers that cross the party's definition of public morality. 

Many have taken to Facebook - where more than a fifth of the nation congregates - to condemn the arrest as a throwback to the ancien regime. The page "For a free, moderate and tolerant Tunisia" even made a mock cover with obvious inference: 

The most popular radio station, MosaiqueFM, (known for its liberal line), attacked the government for acting so quickly against journalists in the name of a photo while still not prosecuting those responsible for killing over 200 Tunisian civilians during the December 2010-January 2011 uprising that toppled ex-president Ben Ali. 

All this raises questions as to where public moral boundaries will be drawn in the future. Few, if any, nations allow unfettered freedom - at least on public airways. America's FCC imposes prohibited fines that compel broadcasters - TV and radio - to follow guidelines on "indecency" without strictly engaging in censorship. And remember the outcry over the Janet Jackson Super Bowl haft time show that introduced the 5-minute delay and self-censorship by the networks, and exiled Howard Stern to satelliet radio? 

Of course, there is a line between fines and actual detention and prosecution. Tunisia's freedom of the press is not under threat (yet, anyhow). Public morals are a common theme in Western democracies (A 1949 French law, for instances, bans the favorable portray of cowardice in children's books). Tunisia's parameters of public printing and broadcasting will likely entail a long struggle involving courts and parliamentary debate, and occasional loosening and tightening of permissible imagery and discourse. 

Furthermore, it is a healthy sign that civil society and the paper have responded so forcefully in defending their rights. Such a robust counter-attack augurs well for securing freedom of expression. And legal rights are upheld so prosecution, if it goes forward, is likely to be fair and not arbitrary. 

In all, a snapshot as an Arab nation continues to define the boundaries of its nascent democracy. 

Tunisia's Islamist Gov't Goes After Radical Islamists

Tunisian interior minister Ali Larayed announced Monday the break up of a "terrorist organization" with alleged links to al Qaeda in Libya and perhaps Algeria. The 12 men arrested had previously been jailed by the ancien regime but after Tunisia's uprising and the exile of former President Ben Ali, the interim government hastily released all political prisoners, which included radical fundamentalists. An additional 9 members escaped arrest and are believed to be in Libya.

As to their motive: "They were intending to establish an Islamist state," Larayed said.  

Larayed's statement merits reflection, if only for its ironic nature. Tunisia's elected government - a first in national history - is led by the moderate Islamist Hizb al Nahda (Party of the Renaissance), which won a plurality of 37% of the vote and leads a troika coalition with two secular, center-left parties. al Nahda had been banned under the previous regime. Much of its leadership, including Larayed, were jailed or forced into exile. 

The Ben Ali regime portrayed al Nahda as a threat to secular values and rather indistinguishable from militant Islamic movements, such as al Qaeda. This was a domestic and foreign ploy: Only Ben Ali stood between Tunisia and harsh Islamic theocracy. It was such a common line that many secularist Tunisians internalized the discourse and at times casually defended the regime as the best option in a bad lot. 

Today's news is a press release rebuffing that old line: An Islamist government fighting radicals seeking to establish an Islamic state, a goal previously (and often still) attributed to al Nahda which has been portrayed as the natural allies of the very latter now being arrested by the former. Whatever one may think of al Nahda, today's news illustrates once again just how unfounded the propagated fear of the "Muslim Brotherhood" wrecking havoc, and thus justifying secular dictatorship, has been all along. And how broad the spectrum of contemporary Islamists movements is.